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Summary 
In the pre-constitutional era courts had a very specific approach to eviction remedies. 
This approach was the result of legal doctrine that regulated the concept of ownership, 
eviction remedies and standard practices of presiding officers as entrenched in rules 
of interpretation and procedural rules.  
The advent of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the “Constitution”) 
transformed the eviction landscape by way of section 26(3) of the Constitution and the 
subsequent promulgation of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (“PIE”). After the first Constitutional Court judgment 
Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers (2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) it became 
apparent that the PIE not only replaced the pre-constitutional eviction remedies but in 
fact also required that the deep-level assumptions of a landowner’s right to evict and 
the standard practices associated with the courts’ role in eviction cases were also 
revolutionised. The pivotal consideration of this study, in light of these developments 
of eviction law brought about by the constitutional dawn, is whether the courts are 
indeed approaching and applying PIE in line with their mandate. This is critical as a 
superficial shift will only frustrate the transformative thrust of the Constitution in the 
context of eviction. 
The study of the courts’ approach to eviction remedies in the pre-constitutional and 
constitutional context has shown that section 26(3) and PIE have indeed transformed 
the eviction landscape on a theoretical basis. In this regard, the courts’ approach to 
eviction remedies has changed from conservative, formalistic and passive in the pre-
constitutional era to context-sensitive, flexible and proactive. However, some courts, 
especially the lower courts, are still failing to apply PIE as mandated. This is due to 
the continued pre-constitutional deep-level assumptions of the strength of the 
landowner’s right to evict, combined with procedural practices that form part of their 
pre-constitutional legal culture. Interestingly, the specific focus on landowners in this 
study indicated that this failure on the part of the court is surprisingly problematic for 
landowners. 
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Opsomming 
 
Voor die inwerkingtreding van die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid Afrika, 1996 
(die “Grondwet”) het die howe uitsettingsremedies op ŉ baie spesifieke wyse benader. 
Dié benadering was die resultaat van die regsdogma wat die eiendomsbegrip 
gereguleer het, die wese van bestaande uitsettingsremedies, sowel as die reëls van 
interpretasie en prosedure rakende die voorsittende beampte se rol in hofverrigtinge. 
Die inwerkingtreding van die Grondwet en die Wet of die Voorkoming van Onwettige 
Uitsetting en Onregmatige Okkupasie van Grond Wet 19 van 1998 (“Uitsettingswet”) 
is daarop gemik om die wyse waarop uitsettings gereguleer en benader word, te 
transformeer. Die hof in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers (2005 (1) SA 
217 (CC) het dit duidelik gemaak dat die Uitsettingswet nie net die voor-grondwetlike 
uitsettingsremedies vervang het nie, maar ook ŉ ommekeer vereis. Laasgenoemde 
word vereis ten aansien van onderliggende aannames oor ŉ eienaar se reg op 
uitsetting, asook standaardpraktyke wat betref die hof se rol in uitsettingsake. Dié 
uitspraak rakende die hof se nuwe rol is kardinaal omdat slegs ŉ oppervlakkige 
verandering die transformasie-oogmerke van die Grondwet sal frustreer. 
Die studie van die wyse waarop howe uitsettingsremedies in die grondwetlike en voor-
grondwetlike era benader, dui aan dat artikel 26(3) van die Grondwet en die 
Uitsettingswet op ŉ teoretiese vlak die uitsettingslandskap verander het. In hierdie 
verband het die studie aangetoon dat die hof se benadering verander het vanaf ŉ 
konservatiewe, meganiese en onbetrokke benadering voor die inwerkingtrede van die 
Grondwet tot ŉ konteks-sensitiewe, soepele en betrokke benadering.  
Ten spyte hiervan dui onlangse regspraak steeds daarop dat die vereiste 
transformasie nie altyd bespeur word wanneer howe uitsettingsake beslis nie. Die 
studie wys uit dat sommige howe, veral laer howe, steeds nie daarin slaag om die 
Uitsettingswet toe te pas soos deur die Grondwet vereis nie. Hierdie versuim kan 
toegeskryf word aan die handhawing van voor-grondwetlike regskultuur wat betref 
onderliggende aannames oor die inherente krag van eiendomsreg en die navolg van 
voor-grondwetlike prosedurele praktyke. Die navorsing dui verder aan dat in gevalle 
waar howe sodanig misluk, hul dienooreenkomstig nalaat om grondeienaars se 
eiendomsreg na behore te beskerm.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1 1 Introduction to the research problem 
The common law rei vindicatio has for many years been the remedy available to a 
landowner to evict unlawful occupiers.1 In this regard, unlawful occupiers are persons 
occupying property without the owner’s consent or another right in law to occupy such 
property.2 The rei vindicatio allowed landowners to obtain eviction orders against 
unlawful occupier(s) irrespective of the circumstances of such occupier(s).3 Evictions 
brought about by this private law remedy had the implication that swift action could be 
taken against unlawful occupiers on the basis of landowners’ relatively strong right vis-
a-vis the weak position of unlawful occupiers.4 Accordingly, the availability and effect 
of the rei vindicatio flowed naturally from the owner’s ownership. However, the rei 
vindicatio was not the only legal remedy that could prompt a court to order the eviction 
of unlawful occupiers. Evictions in accordance with legislation were very popular in the 
pre-constitutional era and were even less complex and more expedient than the rei 
                                                          
1 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 346; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed 
(1994) 467; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African 
law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 538-555. 
2 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 347; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed 
(1994) 467; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 
ed (2006) 242; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South 
African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 539. 
3 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 347; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed 
(1994) 468; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African 
law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 539; Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A)  20; Vumane v Mkize 1990 (1) SA 
465 (W); Shimuadi v Shirunga 1990 (3) SA 344 (SWA). 
4 AJ van der Walt & GJ Pienaar Introduction to the law of property 7 ed (2016) 145. Van der Walt and 
Pienaar observe that the underlying idea behind the rei vindicatio is “that the owner’s real right to the 
thing is so strong, that the thing […] held without any legal cause, can be recovered by the owner”. See 
further CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 350; AJ van der Walt Property in the margins (2009) 
53; Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 16. 
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vindicatio.5 As a result, courts approached eviction cases in a very specific manner, 
privileging ownership above any other right. 
The advent of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the “Constitution”) 
envisioned a new approach for eviction in South Africa.6 Section 26(3) of the 
Constitution and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of 
Land Act 19 of 1998 (“PIE”), promulgated to give effect to section 26(3), require a shift 
from a rights-based approach to an approach where all relevant factors must be 
considered.7 This shift on the surface is evident in the complete move from a common 
law-based eviction remedy to an eviction remedy based on legislation in the context 
of unlawful occupation.8 Furthermore, it is characterised as a move away from 
stringent and fixed requirements towards a more flexible approach that mandates 
courts to consider all relevant circumstances.9 Sachs J in the landmark decision Port 
Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers (“PE Municipality”) enunciated that:  
“[t]he court is thus called upon to go beyond its normal functions, and to engage in active 
judicial management according to equitable principles of an ongoing, stressful and law-
governed social process. This has major implications for the manner in which it must 
                                                          
5 GM Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution on the eviction of squatters in South African 
law LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2011) 55; GM Muller “The legal-historical context of urban 
forced evictions in South Africa” (2013) 19 Fundamina 367 386; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 667. 
5 JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 688. 
6 The court in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 23 held that 
“[i]n sum, the Constitution imposes new obligations on the courts concerning rights relating to property 
not previously recognised by the common law. It counter poses to the normal ownership rights of 
possession, use and occupation, a new and equally relevant right not arbitrarily to be deprived of a 
home. The expectations that ordinarily go with title could clash head on with the genuine despair of 
people in dire need of accommodation.” 
7 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 23; Machele and Others 
v Mailula and Others 2010 (2) SA 257 (CC) para 15; Pitje v Shibambo and Others (144/15) [2016] ZACC 
5 (25 February 2016) para 17. 
8 Section 4(1) of PIE; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of 
property 5 ed (2006) 242; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 688; S Liebenberg Socio-economic rights 
adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 270. 
9 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 23; Machele and Others 
v Mailula and Others 2010 (2) SA 257 (CC) para 15; Pitje v Shibambo and Others (144/15) [2016] ZACC 
5 (25 February 2016) para 17. 
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deal with the issues before it, how it should approach questions of evidence, the 
procedures it may adopt, the way in which it exercises its powers and the orders it might 
make.”10 
This dictum of the Constitutional Court not only denounced the traditional approach to 
eviction cases, but it also enjoined courts to align their (philosophical, procedural, 
interpretive and remedial) approach to the eviction of unlawful occupiers with section 
26(3) of the Constitution and PIE. 
Interestingly, in a recent case Pitje v Shibambo and Others11 (“Pitje CC”) the 
Constitutional Court highlighted that the type of approach courts employ in eviction 
cases is critical after the High Court in Shibambo and Others v Pitje12 (“Pitje HC”) failed 
to apply the PIE, as mandated by the legislative measure itself, the constitutional 
provision in terms of which the legislation came into existence and the numerous 
Constitutional Court judgments handed down since PIE’s promulgation. 
Pitje HC concerned an application for the eviction of an elderly person of ill-health from 
his primary residence.13 In an attempt to resist the eviction proceedings against him, 
the respondent alleged that a valid and enforceable sale agreement existed between 
himself and the seller,14 of which the applicant had prior knowledge.15 In the 
alternative, the respondent raised the provisions of PIE against the eviction order 
sought by the applicants.16 
The court assumed on the basis of the pleadings that the case was a relatively 
straightforward double sales case and ignored the respondent’s defence in terms of 
PIE. Therefore, its ratio primarily focussed on whether or not the applicants were bona 
fide purchasers for purposes of determining whether the doctrine of notice should find 
application in these circumstances. The court eventually found that no prior knowledge 
                                                          
10 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 36. 
11 (144/15) [2016] ZACC 5 (25 February 2016). 
12 (77700/2010) [2015] ZAGPPHC 89 (17 February 2015). 
13 Shibambo and Others v Pitje (77700/2010) [2015] ZAGPPHC 89 (17 February 2015) para 1; 
Shibambo and Others v Pitje (77000/10) [2014] ZAGPPHC 501 (7 March 2014) paras 2-3. 
14 Shibambo and Others v Pitje (77700/2010) [2015] ZAGPPHC 89 (17 February 2015) para 2. 
15 Shibambo and Others v Pitje (77700/2010) [2015] ZAGPPHC 89 (17 February 2015) para 2. 
16 Pitje v Shibambo and Others (144/15) [2016] ZACC 5 (25 February 2016) para 10. 
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existed and therefore held that the sale between the applicants and the seller was 
valid and enforceable against the respondent. On this basis alone the court granted 
an order for eviction against the respondent.17 The respondent subsequently applied 
to the Supreme Court of Appeal for leave to appeal, however, such leave was 
refused.18 
In particular, two issues emerge here, namely (a) the disregard of the legislative 
measure PIE as a whole; and (b) the granting of eviction orders without any regard to 
section 26(3) of the Constitution that expressly requires that courts consider all 
relevant circumstances in eviction cases. The Pitje HC decision shows that courts 
continue to struggle to deal with the mandate conferred upon them in the context of 
evictions. 
The pivotal consideration of this study, in light of the obvious changes to the eviction 
landscape brought about by the constitutional dawn, is whether the courts are indeed 
approaching and applying PIE in line with their mandate. This is critical as a superficial 
shift only may lead to more Pitje HC-style judgments and consequently frustrate the 
transformative thrust of the Constitution in the context of eviction.19 Therefore, the 
question that arises and which is explored in this study is whether the courts’ approach 
to eviction remedies in actual fact always reflect the new role of the court as envisioned 
by the Constitutional Court in PE Municipality, as alluded to above. 
 
1 2 Research aims, hypotheses and methodology 
This research is not aimed at determining whether a change in approach has taken 
place on the surface level only (in other words, the remedy an owner can utilize in the 
context of unlawful occupation of land and its chances of success). Rather, the aim is 
                                                          
17 Shibambo and Others v Pitje (77700/2010) [2015] ZAGPPHC 89 (17 February 2015) para 16. 
18 Pitje v Shibambo and Others (144/15) [2016] ZACC 5 (25 February 2016) para 1. 
19 In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 36 the court held that 
“[t]he Constitution and PIE require that in addition to considering the lawfulness of the occupation the 
court must have regard to the interests and circumstances of the occupier and pay due regard to 
broader considerations of fairness and other constitutional values, so as to produce a just and equitable 
result.” 
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to ultimately assess whether the underlying rationale of the courts in the constitutional 
dispensation is in line with the transformative thrust of eviction law. 20 In this regard the 
study investigates the extent to which section 26(3) of the Constitution has influenced 
the courts’ approach to the application of eviction remedies available to an owner 
looking to evict unlawful occupiers.21 It will therefore be important to consider whether 
theoretical underpinnings and background assumptions influence the rationale with 
which courts approach eviction remedies. These assumptions and underpinnings 
have been described as the unarticulated premises or concealed stimuli of judges that 
consist of, as Dugard puts it, a “judge’s legal education, race and class, political, 
economic and moral prejudices.”22 To that end, great emphasis will also be placed on 
the legal culture of judges in South Africa. 
My hypothesis is that some courts are applying the transformative eviction remedy, 
PIE, within a pre-constitutional paradigm. This has important implications, including 
that the constitutional eviction paradigm is precluded from achieving its objectives. 
Furthermore, where courts fail to embrace their new role in eviction cases, as was the 
case in Pitje HC, it is expected that the rights and interests of unlawful occupiers will 
not find adequate protection via the provisions of PIE. However, the ensuing impact of 
                                                          
20 The preamble of the applicable Act, namely the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 sets out the objectives of the Act. These objectives include that “no 
one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit 
arbitrary deprivation of property; AND WHEREAS no one may be evicted from their home, or have their 
home demolished without an order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances; AND 
WHEREAS it is desirable that the law should regulate the eviction of unlawful occupiers from land in a 
fair manner, while recognising the right of land owners to apply to a court for an eviction order in 
appropriate circumstances; AND WHEREAS special consideration should be given to the rights of the 
elderly, children, disabled persons and particularly households headed by women, and that it should be 
recognised that the needs of those groups should be considered.” 
21 The study will specifically not focus on unlawful evictions but rather lawful evictions where owners 
diligently followed all the procedures prescribed by the remedies in order to ultimately asses the 
approach of the court in these circumstances. For a discussion of the remedies possibly available to a 
possessor in that regard see: ZT Boggenpoel & JM Pienaar “The continued relevance of the 
mandament van spolie: Recent developments relating to dispossession and eviction” (2013) 46 De Jure 
999-1021. 
22 See CJR Dugard “The judicial process, positivism and civil liberty” (1971) 88 SALJ 181 188 (citing) J 
Frank Law and the modern mind 1 ed (1930) 105. 
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such failure on the owners’ rights has not been reiterated and explained with regard 
to section 25 of the Constitution. My presumption, in this regard, is that a pre-
constitutional approach to eviction remedies that automatically prioritises landowners’ 
entitlements has the effect that the landowner is not unjustifiably limited in his property 
rights. 
In order to investigate the research problems, I will describe and analyse the manner 
in which courts applied eviction remedies before the constitutional dispensation. This 
investigation will be undertaken with the help of legal historical textbooks, pre-
consitutional case law and journal articles concerning and dealing with the courts’ 
approach to evictions of unlawful occupiers as informed by the way it viewed the 
owner’s right to evict unlawful occupiers. The purpose of such description is to enable 
an understanding of the underlying assumptions. This is done by way of identifying 
characteristics of the pre-constitutional approach that accompanied the courts’ 
application of eviction remedies in that era with specific reference to the rights 
protected by the eviction remedies and the courts’ interpretive and procedural role in 
eviction cases. 
I will then investigate the contemporary approach courts are required to follow in the 
constitutional context by identifying, describing and analysing the applicable sections 
in the Constitution, legislation, journal articles, case law and textbooks. This will enable 
deductions to be made about certain characteristics that should underpin the approach 
courts follow when they apply the eviction remedy, PIE. These characteristics will be 
deduced from a careful analysis of case law and academic literature pertaining to the 
philosophical underpinnings of the PIE, as well as courts’ prescribed interpretive and 
procedural role in eviction cases in the constitutional era. Eviction case law 
adjudicated under the auspices of PIE will be analysed specifically so as to determine 
whether the actual approach of courts aligns with the constitutional standard set for 
evictions. 
The findings of the above investigations will be critically analysed to indicate whether 
a new eviction paradigm with regard to the philosophical underpinnings, interpretive 
function of courts and the prescribed procedural role of courts on a theoretical level 
has taken place. This finding will be compared with the conclusions drawn from the 
analysis of the approach that is actually employed by courts. In the event of disparities 
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between the approach theoretically required and the approach actually being applied, 
a further investigation into whether such disparities can be ascribed to the pre-
constitutional legal culture of courts will be undertaken. In light of the above-mentioned 
conclusions about the pre-constitutional thinking within the constitutional eviction 
paradigm, the research explores briefly the ensuing consequences for, in particular, 
landowners where the underlying rationale and deep-level assumptions of some 
courts still reflect pre-constitutional legal culture. The consequences for landowners 
are specifically focussed on in this study due to the relatively strong position of 
landowners before PIE came into existance. However, this is not the main focus of the 
study, but rather a consequential investigation. A brief constitutional analysis will 
indicate whether such failure may cause an arbitrary deprivation of a landowner’s 
constitutional property rights. 
 
1 3 Overview of the chapters 
This thesis consists of five chapters, including the current introductory chapter. 
Chapter two investigates the courts’ approach to eviction remedies before the 
commencement of the Constitution. It sets out and describes the impact of the 
established doctrine pertaining to ownership and an owner’s right to evict on the 
courts’ approach to eviction remedies in the pre-constitutional era. Accordingly, the 
chapter describes the historical development of and the philosophical approach that 
developed the concept of ownership and the rei vindicatio in Roman, Roman-Dutch 
and South African law and subsequent eviction legislation. From this discussion the 
main characteristics with which the concept of ownership and the eviction remedies 
were received into South African law are identified. A further analysis of South African 
case law is undertaken to illustrate how these characteristics established certain deep-
level assumptions regarding the strength of an owner’s right to vindicate. 
Furthermore, the chapter investigates the impact of courts’ prescribed interpretive 
function and procedural role on the way in which courts applied and approached 
eviction remedies in the pre-constitutional era. In this regard, chapter two describes 
the dominant interpretive rules in the pre-constitutional era as well as the rules 
pertaining to the role of presiding officers during court proceedings. From these rules 
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certain characteristics are deduced to describe the courts’ approach to eviction 
remedies in the pre-constitutional era. 
Chapter three turns to the courts’ approach to eviction remedies in the constitutional 
era. The chapter starts by describing the historical and the political background that 
led to the promulgation of PIE. It furthermore describes the philosophical tenets that 
underpin PIE by means of a detailed description of the landmark decision of Port 
Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers.23 The description of the philosophical 
underpinnings are employed so as to deduce the characteristics that should be guiding 
the courts’ approach to PIE. The chapter also discusses and analyses the basic 
requirements of PIE. The most important case law in this regard is also scrutinised to 
determine whether or not the identified characteristics are in actual fact present in the 
courts’ application of PIE. 
Furthermore, the chapter describes and analyses the courts’ prescribed interpretive 
role and the prescribed role of presiding officers in the constitutional context. This is 
followed by an analysis of how these rules in the constitutional era require courts to 
apply PIE. This analysis paves the way for determining the impact of these rules on 
courts’ application of PIE and ultimately describes the manner in which these 
interpretive and procedural rules enjoin courts to apply PIE in the constitutional era. 
Chapter four provides a critical analysis of the changes brought about by section 26(3) 
and PIE in the constitutional era, compared to the pre-constitutional era. In this 
comparison the role of the court in the constitutional era is focussed on specifically. 
The new approach of courts is subsequently compared with common law equity to 
determine the extent of change brought about by section 26(3) of the Constitution and 
PIE. This comparison is followed by a critical analysis of the actual approach of courts. 
Where a flaw in the approach of the courts is identified, the study explores whether it 
can be ascribed to pre-constitutional legal culture. Finally, chapter four explores the 
impact of the failure of courts to apply PIE as mandated on landowners in particular. 
The concluding chapter provides a summary of the findings and purports to provide 
some reflection on the research problem. 
                                                          
23 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC). 
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Chapter 2: The courts’ approach to eviction 
remedies before the Constitution 
 
2 1 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to determine the courts’ approach to eviction remedies 
prior to the commencement of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(the “Constitution”). The eviction remedies discussed are limited to only those 
remedies that were available to an owner of immovable property to evict unlawful 
occupiers from residential property, on the basis of ownership and not mere 
possession.1 In the pre-constitutional era certain rules had an impact on the owner’s 
ability to vindicate her property. The point of departure was that an owner of property 
could not be deprived of her property without her permission.2 The reason being that 
the law accepted and assumed that the owner would normally be in possession of her 
property unless the owner deliberately consented to the possession thereof by 
another.3 This was the general point of departure for both movable and immovable 
property.4 Therefore, in the context of evictions where the type of property concerned 
                                                          
1 See ZT Boggenpoel & JM Pienaar “The continued relevance of the mandament van spolie: Recent 
developments relating to dispossession and eviction” (2013) 46 De Jure 999-1021 for a discussion of 
the remedies possibly available to a possessor. 
2 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
242. However, this point of departure must be recognised along with its qualifications or exceptions. 
The state’s regulatory or police power could, in the pre-constitutional era, limit property rights in favour 
of public safety, public security or public purpose. Such a limitation was justifiable and could even 
extend to expropriation of property. See AJ van der Walt Property in the margins (2009) 61. Also see 
Gien v Gien 1979 (2) SA 1113 (T) 1120 where Spoelstra AJ held that:  
“The point of departure is that a person can, in respect of immovable property, do with and on 
his property as he pleases. This apparently unfettered freedom is, however, a half-truth. The 
absolute power of an owner is limited by the restrictions imposed thereupon by the law.” 
3 Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 20. 
4 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 347; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed 
(1994) 467-468; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of 
property 5 ed (2006) 243; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles 
of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 539. 
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immovable property, these rules also applied. For example, where the owner of 
immovable property found unlawful occupiers on her land, the law was structured in 
such a way to provide legal recourse to an owner seeking to vindicate her ownership. 
South African common law5 and statutory law,6 provided this recourse in the form of 
remedies which operated in favour of the owner.7 The common law offered the rei 
vindicatio and legislation offered provisions that regulated evictions. Both remedies 
provided the owner with procedural and substantive frameworks to effectively 
vindicate and recover occupation. Therefore, two distinct legal remedies existed, upon 
which the court could adjudicate eviction cases, depending on which one of the two 
the owner relied upon. 
The requirements of the respective remedies, together with the unique facts of each 
case, steered the court in deciding whether an eviction order should be granted. 
However, these were not the only factors that influenced the outcome of eviction 
cases. Therefore, in this chapter the emphasis will not only be on the impact of the 
remedies and their requirements on the courts’ approach to eviction, but it will extend 
to identifying the legal culture within which the court applied eviction remedies to 
provide a holistic view of the courts’ approach to eviction in the pre-constitutional 
period. 
Accordingly, the courts’ approach, in this chapter, is dealt with, with reference to the 
particular legal culture of the South African courts in the pre-constitutional era. Bhana 
explains that legal culture comprises of the various attitudes and understandings of 
law in a society.8 She argues that these various attitudes and understandings are a 
result of a society’s legal education and members of a society’s personal experiences 
of the law. Furthermore, these attitudes and understandings comprise of the “highly 
theoretical legal conceptions put forward by jurisprudential scholars[,] ‘professional 
                                                          
5 AJ van der Walt “Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure and eviction orders: A model to evaluate 
South African land reform legislation” 2002 TSAR 254 256. 
6 AJ van der Walt “Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure and eviction orders: A model to evaluate 
South African land reform legislation” 2002 TSAR 254 259. Examples of legislation that made provision 
for evictions are: the War Measure Act 13 of 1940 (“WMA”) and the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 
52 of 1951 (“PISA”). 
7 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 347. 
8 D Bhana “The role of judicial method in contract law revisited” (2015) 132 SALJ 122 124. 
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sensibilities, habits of mind [and the]… intellectual reflexes’ and ensuing standard 
practices of judges and lawyers”.9 In this chapter the courts’ understanding and 
attitude towards the right to evict are described through both the identification of the 
highly theoretical conceptions of eviction remedies that were embraced by courts and 
the courts’ standard practices and procedures that were applicable when courts 
adjudicated eviction cases. 
The chapter is divided into three main parts. The first and second parts highlight the 
courts’ understanding of eviction remedies in the pre-constitutional era, by setting out 
the historical background and theoretical underpinnings of the pre-constitutional 
eviction remedies (the rei vindicatio and statutory eviction provisions). It identifies the 
historical origin and development of the eviction remedies in conjunction with the 
historical roots and development of the concept of ownership. The purpose of this 
discussion is to emphasise the strong link between the conceptual understanding of 
ownership and the application of eviction remedies during the pre-constitutional era. 
This allows for inferences to be made about the type of legal culture that the 
conceptual understanding of ownership and the right to evict brought about. This in 
turn allows for conclusions to be drawn about the courts’ approach to the application 
of eviction remedies in the pre-constitutional era. 
The third part of the chapter focuses on the impact that the prescribed role and 
functions of courts in the pre-constitutional period had on the manner in which they 
applied eviction remedies. Firstly, this section identifies the way in which courts were 
required to interpret the law (both the common law and statutory law). Secondly, the 
section investigates the impact of the adversarial nature of court proceedings on the 
way adjudication took place. Finally, these two findings are utilised to describe the 
legal culture with which courts applied eviction remedies in the pre-constitutional era. 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 D Bhana “The role of judicial method in contract law revisited” (2015) 132 SALJ 122 124. Footnotes 
omitted.  
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2 2 The common law eviction remedy: The rei vindicatio  
2 2 1 Introduction 
Ownership (or property) may be protected by various remedies or methods, depending 
on the factual situation and objectives of the particular remedy sought.10 The rei 
vindicatio is one of the remedies aimed at protecting ownership and it is regarded as 
the most important remedy to this effect.11 In this regard, what sets the rei vindicatio 
apart from all the other remedies is its unique operation, namely that it allows the 
owner to recover possession from any type of unlawful occupier12 (mala fide or bona 
                                                          
10 H Mostert, JM Pienaar & J van Wyk “Land” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA Vol 14 Part 1 2 
ed (2010) para 30. See further CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 346-373; JC Sonnekus & JL 
Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 464; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 242-270; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du 
Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 538-555. 
11 See also CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 346; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg 
vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 467; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s 
principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 538-555 where the authors reiterate that the rei 
vindicatio is the most important vindicatory remedy. 
12 See J Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas (1829 translated by P Gane Commentary on the Pandect 
1958, hereafter referred to as “Voet”) 6.1.22; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 347; JC Sonnekus 
& JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 476; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg 
and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 242; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du 
Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 539; Wainwright and Co v Trustee 
Assigned Estate S Hassan Mahomed (1908) 29 NLR 619 626-627; Mngadino NO v Ntuli and Others 
1981 (3) SA 478 (D) 485. The focus of this chapter will fall on the rei vindicatio and not on possessory 
actions. The rei vindicatio is a real vindicatory action available to an owner to recover possession, 
although it is essentially aimed at protecting ownership of property. Its real nature implies that the owner 
can institute the action against any person who has possession of her property. From this the difference 
between the rei vindicatio and a possessory action becomes evident. In the first place, the possessory 
action is available to possessors, while the rei vindicatio is only available to the owner of the property. 
In this regard, see Ncume v Kula (1905) 19 EDC 338 338-340. In the second place, the rei vindicatio 
enables an owner to recover lost property from any person with unlawful possession of the property 
while a possessory remedy may only be recovered from the specific person who dispossessed the 
lawful possessor. See CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 96-97. 
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fide); and that it purports to restore the owner’s physical control (possession) over the 
property, together with the fruits thereof.13  
In the context of immovable property, the remedy protects the owner’s right to occupy 
her property by requiring a court to order eviction, after the owner satisfied the 
requirements of the remedy.14 An owner or co-owner could succeed with an eviction 
application in the event of him or her successfully proving three requirements. These 
requirements are set out in the Supreme Court of Appeal judgment of Chetty v 
Naidoo.15 In the first place, the applicant has to prove ownership of the relevant 
property.16 In this regard, it is sufficient for the applicant to prove on a balance of 
probabilities that she is the registered owner of the land.17 Secondly, the property must 
be in the possession of the defendant at the time the action is instituted.18 The third 
                                                          
13 Voet 6.1.30; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 352; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg 
vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 472-474; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s 
The law of property 5 ed (2006) 246; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s 
principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 540. 
14 T Mommsen, P Kruger & A Watson The Digest of Justinian Vol IV (1998), hereafter referred to as “D” 
6.1.1.1; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 347; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 
2 ed (1994) 468; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South 
African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 539; Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A)  20; Vumane v Mkize 1990 
(1) SA 465 (W); Shimuadi v Shirunga 1990 (3) SA 344 (SWA). 
15 1974 (3) SA 13 (A).  
16 Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 21. See further Voet 6.1.20, 24; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 
ed (1989) 347; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 468; PJ Badenhorst, JM 
Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 243; CG van der 
Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405-
729 539; Kemp v Roper NO (1885-1906) 2 Buch AC 141 143; Judelman v Colonial Government (1906-
1909) 3 Buch AC 446 452-453; Marcus v Stamper and Zoutendijk 1910 AD 58 72; Jeena v Minister of 
Lands 1955 (2) SA 380 (A) 382; Ruskin NO v Thiergen 1962 (3) SA 737 (A) 744; Henning v Petra 
Meubels Bpk 1947 (2) SA 407 (T) 412; Luwalala v Port Nolloth Municipality 1991 (3) SA 98 (C) 110. 
17 Voet 6.1.24. CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 348; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 244; CG van der Merwe & A Pope 
“Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 539; Goudini 
Chrome (Pty) Ltd v MCC Contracts (Pty) Ltd 1993 (1) SA 77 (A) 82; Gemeenskapsontwikkelingsraad v 
Williams 1977 (2) SA 692 (W) 696. 
18 Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 20. See further Voet 6.1.2; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed 
(1989) 349; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 468; PJ Badenhorst, JM 
Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 243; CG van der 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
14 
  
requirement for the rei vindicatio is that the property must still exist and be 
identifiable.19  
If an applicant succeeded in proving these three requirements the court had a duty to 
grant the rei vindicatio and order the eviction of the defendant from the property, unless 
the defendant could prove a legal basis (or ius possidendi) for being in possession of 
the property or successfully raise one of the recognised defences against the rei 
vindicatio.20 Defences against the rei vindicatio encompass any contestation of the 
facta probanda, including: (i) that the applicant was not the true owner of the 
property;21 (ii) that the property was already destroyed before the action was 
instituted;22 (iii) that the defendant did not have physical control over the property at 
                                                          
Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405-
729 539; Jeena v Minister of Lands 1955 (2) SA 380 (A) 382; Clifford v Farinha 1988 (4) SA 315 (W) 
319. 
19 Voet 6.1.24; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 349; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg 
vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 468; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s 
The law of property 5 ed (2006) 244; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s 
principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 539; Leal and Co v Williams 1906 TS 554 558; 
Unimark Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Erf 94 Silvertondale (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) SA 986 (T) 996. 
20 An ius possidendi refers to a right to be in possession. Thus, if a defendant can prove that she for 
instance has a right of retention or a contractual right in terms of a lease contract to occupy the land, 
the owner will not succeed with the rei vindicatio. The onus will then shift to the owner to prove that the 
alleged ius possidendi has lapsed or has been cancelled. See CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 
349, 350; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 468; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar 
& H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 244; CG van der Merwe & A 
Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 540; Jeena 
v Minister of Lands 1955 (2) SA 380 (A) 382-383; Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 20-21; Graham 
v Ridley 1931 TPD 476; Boshoff v Union Government 1932 TPD 345; Henning v Petra Meubels Bpk 
1947 (2) SA 407 (T) 412. 
21 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 350; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 245; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois 
(ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 540; Ncume v Kula (1905) 19 EDC 338; 
Dreyer v AXZS Industries (Pty) Ltd 2006 (3) SA 13 (A) para 18. 
22 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 350; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois 
(ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 540; South African Railways and 
Harbours v Fisher’s Estate 1954 (1) SA 337 (A) 342; Street v Regina Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1960 (2) 
SA 646 (T) 648. 
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the time the action was instituted;23 and (iv) a defence based on estoppel.24 The 
consequence of a successful eviction order in terms of the rei vindicatio was that the 
owner was able to recover her lost possession,25 which in practice meant that the 
owner could reoccupy her immovable property. 
Therefore, the result of an owner succeeding with the rei vindicatio is that the owner 
would be in the position to take occupation of her land by evicting the unlawful 
occupiers.26 This occurrence is described by Van der Walt as the “normal state of 
affairs” in eviction proceedings.27 This normal state of affairs refers to the assumption 
that it is traditionally accepted that the owner, as a point of departure, will be in 
occupation of her property unless the owner extended permission to another person 
                                                          
23 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
245; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 
ed (2007) 405-729 540. In the event that the defendant denies that she does not have possession of 
the property the court may order that the plaintiff be put in possession of the property even if the plaintiff 
failed to prove that she is the owner of the property. See D 6.1.80; Voet 6.1.25; PJ Badenhorst, JM 
Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 245; Mehlape v 
Minister of Safety and Security 1996 (4) SA 133 (W) 136. 
24 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 350; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed 
(1994) 472; PJ Rabie “Estoppel” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA Vol 9 Part 1 2 ed (2005) para 
667; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed 
(2006) 245; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African 
law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 552-554; JC Sonnekus & PJ Rabie The law of estoppel in South Africa 3 ed 
(2012) 30-34. The defence of estoppel will be available to a defendant to raise against the rei vindicatio 
if the owner of the property intentionally or negligently made the defendant believe that ownership was 
transferred to the defendant, or that a third party had the authority to transfer ownership to the 
defendant, so that the defendant exercised physical control as if he/she was the true owner to his/her 
detriment. In this regard, see Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining and Investment Co (Pty) Ltd 
1976 (1) SA 441 (A) 442; Barclays Western Bank Ltd v Fourie 1979 (4) SA 157 (C) 161-162. 
25 AJ van der Walt & GJ Pienaar Introduction to the law of property 6 ed (2009) 146. 
26 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 350; Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 16. 
27 AJ van der Walt “Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure and eviction orders: A model to evaluate 
South African land reform legislation” 2002 TSAR 254 257. Van der Walt states that “[t]he protection 
afforded by this action [the rei vindicatio] is very strong, as it is based on the ‘normality’ assumption that 
the owner is entitled to exclusive possession of his or her property – this is what is considered the 
‘normal state of affairs’, and what would most likely be upheld in the absence of good reason for not 
doing so.” 
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to occupy the property.28 Therefore, the rei vindicatio was available to the owner to 
restore the status quo (exclusive possession) in the event of it being disrupted by 
unlawful occupation. 
 
2 2 2 The historical and the philosophical roots of the South African rei vindicatio 
2 2 2 1 Roman law 
2 2 2 1 1 The operation of the vindicatio in Roman law 
The action available to an owner in South Africa to restore lost possession of her 
property (the rei vindicatio) has its origins in Roman law.29 The ancient Roman law 
version of the rei vindicatio was known as the vindicatio (vindicatory action) and 
formed part of the legis actio sacramento in rem (proprietary remedies) of ancient 
Rome.30 Although the modern rei vindicatio has its roots in the authentic Roman law 
vindicatio these remedies are not identical.31 The focus in ancient and pre-classical 
Roman law fell on actions (remedies). The relevant principles and rules applicable 
thereto were developed subsequent to these actions.32 This position differs from the 
South African pre-constitutional position where the emphasis was always on rights 
rather than actions.33 
                                                          
28 AJ van der Walt “Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure and eviction orders: A model to evaluate 
South African land reform legislation” 2002 TSAR 254 258. 
29 D 1.1-1.80; G Diosdi Ownership in ancient and pre-classical Roman law (1970) 94; M Kaser 
Römisches Privatrecht (6 ed 1960 translated by R Dannenbring Roman private law 2 ed 1968) 39. 
30 G Diosdi Ownership in ancient and pre-classical Roman law (1970) 94; M Kaser Römisches 
Privatrecht (6 ed 1960 translated by R Dannenbring Roman private law 2 ed 1968) 39. 
31 G Diosdi Ownership in ancient and pre-classical Roman law (1970) 94. 
32 GP Stein “‘Equitable’ remedies for the protection of property” in P Birks (ed) New Perspectives in the 
Roman law of property (1989) 185-194 185; AJ van der Walt “Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium 
en die interpretasies daarvan sedert die vyftiende eeu” (1986) 49 THRHR 303 309; AJ van der Walt 
“Gedagtes oor die herkoms en die ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip (vervolg)” 
(1988) 21 De Jure 306 313. 
33 In South African law, the rei vindicatio is only available to those vested with ownership rights. See for 
instance CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 347; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 
2 ed (1994) 476; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of 
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The prescribed procedure for the application of the ancient rei vindicatio as a legis 
actio sacramento in rem required firstly; that the plaintiff claimed that she was the 
owner of the property.34 Secondly, the defendant also had to claim that she was the 
true owner.35 Thirdly, the court had a duty to declare that the property belongs to one 
of the litigants.36 Finally, both parties had to deposit a wager-sum, which the successful 
litigant received while the unsuccessful litigant forfeited her wager-sum to the state.37 
These procedural rules fail to explain what happened when neither of the parties could 
prove ownership.38 This is interesting, because as a rule the court still had to 
pronounce that the property must be delivered to one of the parties. As a result, it 
could have meant that the vindicatio was not only available to owners, but also 
available to those who could prove any entitlement to possession.39 This can be 
                                                          
property 5 ed (2006) 242; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles 
of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 539. 
34 M Kaser Römisches Privatrecht (6 ed 1960 translated by R Dannenbring Roman private law 2 ed 
1968) 113; G Diosdi Ownership in ancient and pre-classical Roman law (1970) 94; P du Plessis 
Borkowski’s textbook on Roman law 4 ed (2010) 75; AJ van der Walt “Gedagtes oor die herkoms en 
die ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip (vervolg)” (1988) 21 De Jure 306 313. 
However, the plaintiff could choose not to rely on the rei vindicatio and rather institute an actio Publiciana 
in which case the plaintiff would not have to prove ownership. See for instance M Kaser Römisches 
Privatrecht (6 ed 1960 translated by R Dannenbring Roman private law 2 ed 1968) 113. 
35 M Kaser Römisches Privatrecht (6 ed 1960 translated by R Dannenbring Roman private law 2 ed 
1968) 113; G Diosdi Ownership in ancient and pre-classical Roman law (1970) 94. 
36 M Kaser Römisches Privatrecht (6 ed 1960 translated by R Dannenbring Roman private law 2 ed 
1968) 115; G Diosdi Ownership in ancient and pre-classical Roman law (1970) 94.  
37 G Diosdi Ownership in ancient and pre-classical Roman law (1970) 94. Furthermore, where the 
disputed property produced fruits the successful applicant had a further delictual claim against the 
defendant on the basis of false vindication. This delictual claim was for double the value of the fruit the 
defendant took while the property was in her unlawful possession. See M Kaser Römisches Privatrecht 
(6 ed 1960 translated by R Dannenbring Roman private law 2 ed 1968) 113. 
38 G Diosdi Ownership in ancient and pre-classical Roman law (1970) 94-95. 
39 Divergent opinions on what the requirement and underlying theory of the vindicatio were in pre-
classical Roman law developed. Three distinct suggestions were made by Lotmar, Roth and Ihering 
respectively. Lotmar suggests that the supposed contravindicatio (the requirement that the defendent 
also has to prove ownership) was not part of the vindication procedure. Accordingly, the property 
remained with the defendant where the plaintiff failed to prove ownership. Similarly, Roth argues that 
only one of the party’s submissions was examined by the judge, but what makes his argument different 
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ascribed to the fact that in ancient Roman law, ownership was never defined 
properly.40 Borkowski and Du Plessis indicate that the reason why no precise definition 
of ownership existed is due to the fact that the paterfamilias exercised control over the 
persons and things in his household.41 This social structure would accordingly factor 
out possible property disputes by private individuals.42 However, in later classical 
Roman times the Romans coined the institution of ownership as “dominium”, which 
referred to the relationship between the owner and his property.43 
 
                                                          
from Lotmar’s argument is the fact that Roth acknowledges the existence of the contravindiciatio and 
submits that the judge in actual fact only examined the contravindicatio and not the vindicatio. In other 
words, his contention is that after the plaintiff declared that he is the true owner, the court will look to 
the defendant to contravindicate. The defendant will then not only have to declare his ownership, but 
also prove it. Accordingly, where the defendant failed to prove ownership, the property was restored to 
the plaintiff. In contrast, Ihering is of the opinion that both parties were required to declare and prove 
their alleged rights. The judge could then declare that both the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s claims 
were baseless. See for instance, G Diosdi Ownership in ancient and pre-classical Roman law (1970) 
95. 
40 G Diosdi Ownership in ancient and pre-classical Roman law (1970) 51; D Johnston Roman law in 
context (1999) 53; A Borkowski & P du Plessis Textbook on Roman law 3 ed (2005) 157; P Dhliwayo 
A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University (2015) 79. 
41 A Borkowski & P du Plessis Textbook on Roman law 3 ed (2005) 157; P Dhliwayo A constitutional 
analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 
(2015) 79. 
42 A Borkowski & P du Plessis Textbook on Roman law 3 ed (2005) 157; P Dhliwayo A constitutional 
analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 
(2015) 79. 
43 AM Prichard Leage’s Roman private law: Founded on the Institutes of Gaius and Justinian 3 ed 
(1961) 158; G Diosdi Ownership in ancient and pre-classical Roman law (1970) 51; A Borkowski & P 
du Plessis Textbook on Roman law 3 ed (2005) 157; P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access 
rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 80. 
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2 2 2 1 2 The philosophical underpinnings of the vindicatio in Roman law 
The legal philosophical influence that underpinned Roman law was the philosophy of 
ancient natural and moral law.44 Both Gaius and Ulpian, whose legal work informed 
the Digesta of Justinian, were avid classical natural and moral philosophers.45 
Accordingly, the vindicatio was also explained, developed and applied in accordance 
with classical natural and moral notions and ideals.46 Classical natural and moral 
philosophy assumed that the function of law is only to give effect to and sustain the 
rational ordering and structure of the universe.47 According to classical natural law, 
God is this rational order that rules and guides the universe.48 Therefore, all law had 
to align with the standard of right and wrong that is found in the rational order and 
imprinted in nature.49 This explains why the focus in classical Roman law was on 
actions.50 In the event of human conduct that contradicted the rational order, the 
rational order required a suitable counter action to restore the natural order of the 
universe. 
Interestingly, the work of Thomas Aquinas, a classical natural and moral philosopher 
of the thirteenth century, indicates that the classical natural and moral philosophical 
justification for accepting that man can own and control objects in nature is found in 
the belief that nature is impregnated with the rational order of the divine God and that 
                                                          
44 JR Kroger “The philosophical foundations of Roman law: Aristotle, the stoics, and roman theories of 
natural law” 2004 Wis L Rev 905 905; WB le Roux “Natural law theories” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf 
(eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 25-61 40. 
45 D 1.1.3; D 1.1.1.9; JR Kroger “The philosophical foundations of Roman law: Aristotle, the stoics, and 
roman theories of natural law” 2004 Wis L Rev 905 905. 
46 See D 6.1.1; D 6.1.3; D 6.1.5; D 6.1.9; D 6.1.11; D 6.1.15; D 6.1.17; D 6.1.19; D 6.1.22; D 6.1.25; D 
6.1.37; D 6.1.39; D 6.1.41; D 6.1.45; D 6.1.54; D 6.1.68; D 6.1.72; D 6.1.73; D 6.1.75; D 6.1.77; D 
6.6.18; D 6.1.20; D 6.1.24; D 6.1.28; D 6.1.30; D 6.1.36; D 6.1.40; D 6.1.44; D 6.1.76. 
47 JR Kroger “The philosophical foundations of Roman law: Aristotle, the stoics, and roman theories of 
natural law” 2004 Wis L Rev 905 924. 
48 JR Kroger “The philosophical foundations of Roman law: Aristotle, the stoics, and roman theories of 
natural law” 2004 Wis L Rev 905 925. 
49 JR Kroger “The philosophical foundations of Roman law: Aristotle, the stoics, and roman theories of 
natural law” 2004 Wis L Rev 905 924. 
50 T Mautner “How rights became ‘subjective’” (2013) 26 Ratio Juris 111 112. 
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man is made in the image of the divine God.51 Accordingly, man’s position in nature 
allowed him to own and control property at will and restore such property when 
necessary.52 For example: where X occupies Y’s house without Y’s permission, Y 
could institute the vindicatio to eliminate the irrational conduct of X and restore the 
rational order. This example illustrates firstly, the ability of man to hold and control 
objects in nature and secondly, the function of law in classical natural legal 
philosophical terms, which was to sustain the rational order in line with the divine 
reason. 
 
2 2 2 2 Roman-Dutch law 
2 2 2 2 1 The operation of the rei vindicatio in Roman-Dutch law 
The action that was available to an owner of property to restore lost possession in 
Roman-Dutch law was the same action that was available in Roman law, namely the 
vindicatio.53 Grotius explained that “the general rule that an owner may vindicate his 
property from anyone who holds it without title, even though the holder may have 
gotten possession in good faith and for value”54 was received from Roman law into 
Roman-Dutch law.55 
Voet sets out the requirements of the vindicatio in Roman-Dutch law. He identifies that 
in order for an owner to succeed with a vindication claim in terms of the rei vindicatio 
the claimant had to prove that she is the owner of the property.56 In this regard, Voet 
                                                          
51 AJ van der Walt “Gedagtes oor die herkoms en die ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse 
eiendomsbegrip (vervolg)” (1988) 21 De Jure 306 317-318; WB le Roux “Natural law theories” in C 
Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 25-61 40. 
52 AJ van der Walt “Gedagtes oor die herkoms en die ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse 
eiendomsbegrip (vervolg)” (1988) 21 De Jure 306 317-318. 
53 H de Groot Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche rechtsgeleertheyd (1631 translated by RW Lee The 
jurisprudence of Holland 1926, hereafter referred to as “Grotius“) 2.2.5; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 
ed (1989) 346-347. 
54 Grotius 2.2.5. 
55 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 346-347. 
56 Voet 6.1.20; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 347; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 243. 
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was satisfied that all the claimant had to show to comply with this requirement was 
that her predecessor in title was the legal owner of the property and that an appropriate 
legal basis existed for the transfer of the property from the predecessor in title to 
herself.57 In the context of immovable property, proof of registration was sufficient to 
prove ownership.58 Voet further identifies that the second requirement the claimant 
had to satisfy was that the property still existed and was capable of being identified.59 
Voet explains that the final requirement that the owner had to satisfy in terms of the 
rei vindicatio in Roman-Dutch law was proving that the person against whom the 
claimant instituted the rei vindicatio was in possession of the property at the time of 
the proceedings.60 
From the above discussion it becomes evident that in Roman-Dutch law the 
requirements for the rei vindicatio were much clearer than in Roman times, and in fact 
similar to the South African law requirements of the rei vindicatio.61 This might be 
because in Roman-Dutch law the institution of ownership was clearly defined as 
opposed to the position in Roman law where the first definition of ownership was only 
accepted in the fourteenth century when roman jurists adopted Bartolus de 
Saxoferrato’s definition of ownership.62 Bartolus described ownership as “the right to 
                                                          
57 Voet 6.1.24; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 348; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 243-244. 
58 Voet 6.1.24; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 348; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 243-244. 
59 Voet 6.1.24; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 349; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 243-244. 
60 Voet 6.1.2; Voet 2 1 24; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 349; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & 
H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 243-244. 
61 See chapter 2, section 2.2 above. 
62 G Diosdi Ownership in ancient and pre-classical Roman law (1970) 51; D Johnston Roman law in 
context (1999) 53; JRL Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law 
and common law in South Africa (1996) 657-699 692-694; A Borkowski & P du Plessis Textbook on 
Roman law 3 ed (2005) 157; P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ 
right to exclude LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 79. With regard to the first definition of 
ownership in Roman law, see AJ van der Walt “Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium en die 
interpretasies daarvan sedert die vyftiende eeu” (1986) 49 THRHR 305 309. AJ van der Walt 
“Ownership and personal freedom: Subjectivism in Bernhard Windscheid’s theory of ownership” (1993) 
56 THRHR 569 577-578; JRL Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: 
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perfectly dispose of a corporeal object, unless this is prohibited by law.”63 Roman-
Dutch law was subsequently developed on the basis of Bartolus’ definition of 
ownership.64 This is evident in that one of the most prominent Roman-Dutch law 
scholars, Grotius, developed a definition of ownership on the basis of Bartolus’ 
definition.65 Grotius defined ownership as “that which entitles a man to do with a thing 
and for his advantage anything he pleases which is not forbidden by the law.”66 This 
definition of ownership seemed to have had a direct bearing on the owner’s ability to 
vindicate his property in terms of the rei vindicatio; the more clearly defined the right 
of ownership was, the stronger the right to vindicate property. 
 
                                                          
Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 657-699 692; P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of 
access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 81. 
63 D 41.2.17.1; D 45.1.58; AJ van der Walt “Ownership and personal freedom: Subjectivism in Bernhard 
Windscheid’s theory of ownership” (1993) 56 THRHR 569 577-578; JRL Milton “Ownership” in R 
Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 657-
699 692; P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude 
LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 8. 
64 AJ van der Walt “Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium en die interpretasies daarvan sedert die 
vyftiende eeu” (1986) 49 THRHR 305 305; AJ van der Walt “Ownership and personal freedom: 
Subjectivism in Bernhard Windscheid’s theory of ownership” (1993) 56 THRHR 569 577-578; JRL 
Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in 
South Africa (1996) 657-699 692; P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit 
landowners’ right to exclude LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 82. 
65 Grotius 2.3.10; AJ van der Walt “Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium en die interpretasies daarvan 
sedert die vyftiende eeu” (1986) 49 THRHR 305 317; GJ Pienaar “Ontwikkelings in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
eiendomsbegrip in perspektief” 1986 TSAR 295 301; JRL Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman & D 
Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 657-699 692; P Dhliwayo 
A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University (2015) 81. 
66 Grotius 2.3.10; AJ van der Walt “Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium en die interpretasies daarvan 
sedert die vyftiende eeu” (1986) 49 THRHR 305 317; GJ Pienaar “Ontwikkelings in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
eiendomsbegrip in perspektief” 1986 TSAR 295 301; JRL Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman & D 
Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 6657-699 692; P 
Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 81. 
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2 2 2 2 2 The philosophical underpinnings of the rei vindicatio in Roman-Dutch 
law 
The revival of natural law in fifteenth and sixteenth century Netherlands had the most 
significant impact on the development of Roman-Dutch law, due to the natural and 
moral theorist Grotius.67 During this time, Roman-Dutch law developed and was 
interpreted in line with modern natural and moral legal theory.68 Grotius’ reliance on 
and support of modern natural and moral legal theory in his ideas and development of 
Roman-Dutch property law principles informed his interpretation of the Roman law 
concepts.69 Therefore, it is important to understand the developments that influenced 
the way in which Grotius understood concepts of ownership and vindication. 
In the sixteenth century the philosophical underpinnings which informed classical 
natural and moral law were developed. This was evident in the gradual rise of scholars 
with different opinions about the function of law.70 Classical natural and moral law was 
transformed at this stage by nominalists.71 The nominalists moved away from the 
                                                          
67 DH van Zyl Geskiedenis van die Romeins-Hollandse reg (1979) 186. 
68 DH van Zyl Geskiedenis van die Romeins-Hollandse reg (1979) 186. The natural law that revived in 
the Netherland was not the classical natural law of Aquinas and the realists which suffused early Roman 
law, but it was the modern natural law that was developed by Ockham and the nominalists (voluntarists). 
Modern natural law was premised on the view that no divine ethical guidance or rational order can be 
derived from nature, except empirical and scientific facts. It is with this view of nature as a starting point 
that the scholars in the Netherland developed the Roman-Dutch law. For a discussion of the difference 
between classical natural law and modern natural law see WB le Roux “Natural law theories” in C 
Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 25-61 39-41. 
69 Grotius 2.3.10; Grotius 2.22.1; AJ van der Walt “Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium en die 
interpretasies daarvan sedert die vyftiende eeu” (1986) 49 THRHR 303 317; AJ van der Walt “Gedagtes 
oor die herkoms en die ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip (vervolg)” (1988) 21 De 
Jure 306 318-319; JRL Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law 
and common law in South Africa (1996) 657-699 694; WB le Roux “Natural law theories” in C Roederer 
& D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 25-61 40. 
70 T Mautner “How rights became ‘subjective’” (2013) 26 Ratio Juris 111 118. 
71 The rise of the nominalists was the result of the universalia debate which revolved around the 
existence of universals. In this regard two schools, namely the nominalists and realists had different 
opinions concerning the existence of universalities. In the first place, the realists (proponents of the 
classical natural law philosophy) argued in favour of the existence of universals in nature, while the 
nominalists argued the contrary, namely “that universal concepts were only words and that in nature 
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enchanted and mystical ideas brought forward by classical natural law, to a modern 
natural and moral law that relied on rationality and empirical and scientific facts only.72 
They rejected the enchanted view of nature (that the divine rational order is embedded 
in all of nature) and advanced viewing nature as quantifiable and therefore controllable 
by mankind.73 The basis of this development in natural and moral legal philosophical 
thinking is found in the reasoning of the leading nominalist William Ockham.74 Ockham 
rejected the idea of the existence of universals in nature. In this regard, his argument 
was based on the primacy of God’s will.75 He argued that because God is absolute, 
He is not made subject to His own will in that He can change His mind as to what He 
deems right and wrong. Accordingly, no fixed divine reason or universal concepts can 
exist in nature because the will of God is free to change.76 This shift from the realist 
view of the existence of universals (that nature is impregnated with the ability to 
distinguish between right and wrong) to the nominalist view (that universals cannot 
exist because God’s will can change) marked an important development in the 
                                                          
only concrete entities exist”. See WB le Roux “Natural law theories” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf 
(eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 25-61 39-40. 
72 The initial break from the complete support of the universality ideologies of classical natural law was 
brought about by avid nominalist scholar William of Ockham. However, this initial break was still in line 
with his belief in a divine order. Ockham argued that man is incapable of understanding and participating 
in the essence of God. Subsequently, he suggests that humans can only understand the material and 
empirical character of nature. See JWG van der Walt The twilight of legal subjectivity: towards a 
deconstructive republican theory of law LLD dissertation Rand Afrikaans University (1995) 34-38; WB 
le Roux “Natural law theories” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 25-61 40. 
73 WB le Roux “Natural law theories” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 25-61 
40. This scientific approach to nature concerned the realisation that nature can be studied and that from 
the studying of nature logical deductions can be made about nature that in turn allows humans to control 
it. 
74 F Oakley “Medieval theories of natural law: William of Ockham and the significance of the voluntarist 
tradition” (1961) 6 Nat LF 65 65; WB le Roux “Natural law theories” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf 
(eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 25-61 40. 
75 F Oakley “Medieval theories of natural law: William of Ockham and the significance of the voluntarist 
tradition” (1961) 6 Nat LF 65 65; WB le Roux “Natural law theories” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf 
(eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 25-61 40. 
76 F Oakley “Medieval theories of natural law: William of Ockham and the significance of the voluntarist 
tradition” (1961) 6 Nat LF 65 68-69; WB le Roux “Natural law theories” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf 
(eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 25-61 39-40. 
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philosophy of natural and moral legal thinking. Based on the argument that universals 
do not exist the nominalists asserted that due to the non-existence of universalities, 
man has no access to the divine reason of God and could subsequently only have 
knowledge of God’s will through faith.77 This assertion further marked the development 
of subsequent natural legal rationalists’ focus on the human abilities and natural 
sciences because nominalists believed that the only knowledge and reason man can 
attain is knowledge of empirical things.78  
Subsequently, the late Spanish scholistics adopted the nominalist’s view and 
developed it further with the emphasis on man’s ability to own and control objects in 
nature.79 In this regard, the Spanish scholistics used and added to the first formal 
definition of ownership formulated by Bartolus de Saxoferrato in order to assert men’s 
ability to own and control objects.80 The Spanish scholistics emphasised the use 
entitlements of an owner in relation to her property. Van der Walt and Le Roux 
respectively indicate that this emphasis on the comprehensiveness of an owner’s use 
entitlements laid the foundation for the view that man’s ability to own and control 
property is unrestricted of nature.81  
                                                          
77 WB le Roux “Natural law theories” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 25-61 
39-40. 
78 WB le Roux “Natural law theories” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 25-61 
39-40. 
79 AJ van der Walt “Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium en die interpretasies daarvan sedert die 
vyftiende eeu” (1986) 49 THRHR 303 316-317; AJ van der Walt “Gedagtes oor die herkoms en die 
ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip (vervolg)” (1988) 21 De Jure 306 318. 
80 AJ van der Walt “Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium en die interpretasies daarvan sedert die 
vyftiende eeu” (1986) 49 THRHR 303 313; AJ van der Walt “Gedagtes oor die herkoms en die 
ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip (vervolg)” (1988) 21 De Jure 306 318; E van der 
Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property and regulation: A systemic constitutional 
approach LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 54. For Bartolus de Saxoferrato’s definition 
of ownership, see D.41.2.17.1; D 45.1.58. 
81 AJ van der Walt “Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium en die interpretasies daarvan sedert die 
vyftiende eeu” (1986) 49 THRHR 303 313-314; AJ van der Walt “Gedagtes oor die herkoms en die 
ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip (vervolg)” (1988) 21 De Jure 306 318; GJ Pienaar 
“Ontwikkelings in die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip in perspektief” 1986 TSAR 295 304; WB le Roux 
“Natural law theories” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 25-61 40. See also E 
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These developments of the philosophical ideals underpinning the concepts of owning 
and controlling objects in nature inspired the Roman-Dutch legal theorist Grotius’ 
thinking about the concept of ownership.82 One of the most significant developments 
for property law brought about by the natural and moral legal theorist Grotius was his 
description of ownership.83 Grotius distinguished between full ownership and limited 
ownership and emphasised the complete nature of full ownership, specifically with 
regard to an owner’s entitlements in her property.84 In this regard, Grotius ascribed the 
qualities of fullness and completeness (within the legal framework) to ownership as a 
concept.85 It is with this understanding of the conceptual basis of ownership that 
                                                          
van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property and regulation: A systemic constitutional 
approach LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 54. 
82 AJ van der Walt “Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium en die interpretasies daarvan sedert die 
vyftiende eeu” (1986) 49 THRHR 303 317; GJ Pienaar “Ontwikkelings in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
eiendomsbegrip in perspektief” 1986 TSAR 295 303; AJ van der Walt “Gedagtes oor die herkoms en 
die ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip (vervolg)” (1988) 21 De Jure 306 317; JRL 
Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in 
South Africa (1996) 657-699 692. 
83 Grotius 2.3.10; AJ van der Walt “Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium en die interpretasies daarvan 
sedert die vyftiende eeu” (1986) 49 THRHR 305 317; GJ Pienaar “Ontwikkelings in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
eiendomsbegrip in perspektief” 1986 TSAR 295 301; JRL Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman & D 
Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 657-699 692; P Dhliwayo 
A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University (2015) 81; E van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property 
and regulation: A systemic constitutional approach LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 55. 
84 Grotius 2.3.9-2.3.11; Grotius 2.33.1; AJ van der Walt “Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium en die 
interpretasies daarvan sedert die vyftiende eeu” (1986) 49 THRHR 305 317; JRL Milton “Ownership” in 
R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 657-
699 694; E van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property and regulation: A systemic 
constitutional approach LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 55. 
85 JRL Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law 
in South Africa (1996) 657-699 694-695. Grotius defined ownership as “that which entitles a man to do 
with a thing and for his advantage anything he pleases which is not forbidden by law”. Grotius 2.3.10; 
AJ van der Walt “Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium en die interpretasies daarvan sedert die 
vyftiende eeu” (1986) 49 THRHR 303 317; GJ Pienaar “Ontwikkelings in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
eiendomsbegrip in perspektief” 1986 TSAR 295 301; AJ van der Walt “Gedagtes oor die herkoms en 
die ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip (vervolg)” (1988) 21 De Jure 306 318-319; 
AJ van der Walt “Ownership and personal freedom: Subjectivism in Bernhard Windscheid’s theory of 
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Grotius defined ownership as “that which entitles a man to do with a thing and for his 
advantage anything he pleases which is not forbidden by law”.86 Grotius’ modern 
natural legal philosophical ideas in conjunction with his moral philosophical influences 
caused him to move away from the starting point of objects and their characteristics, 
towards the individual and his interests in these objects.87 He described ownership 
with reference to the owner’s entitlements.88 Focussing on individual interests, with 
the emphasis on entitlements to describe ownership, had the unavoidable 
consequence that Grotius explained the difference between entitlements of the owner 
compared to entitlements of non-owners, with reference to the completeness of the 
owner’s rights vis-à-vis the rights or entitlements of non-owners. 
Grotius’ definition of ownership brought about a shift in thinking about property rights 
and entitlements from the idea that multiple forms of ownership exist, to the idea that 
only one full complete type of ownership exists to which all other rights in property are 
                                                          
ownership” (1993) 56 THRHR 569 584; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & 
Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 91; P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights 
that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 82. 
86 Grotius 2.3.10; Grotius 2.22.1; AJ van der Walt “Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium en die 
interpretasies daarvan sedert die vyftiende eeu” (1986) 49 THRHR 303 317; AJ van der Walt “Gedagtes 
oor die herkoms en die ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip (vervolg)” (1988) 21 De 
Jure 306 318-319; JRL Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law 
and common law in South Africa (1996) 657-699 694; WB le Roux “Natural law theories” in C Roederer 
& D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 25-61 40. 
87 The shift in focus from the search for the divine rational order to the empirical study of nature, brought 
about by the nominalists, had the effect that sciences of quantification and characterisation of objects 
came to being. Furthermore, the denouncement of classical natural law beliefs where ethical guidance 
and dignity could be found in the divine rational order had the consequence that the freedom of humans 
to act and deal freely in nature was accepted to be the standard to which human progress and human 
dignity must be measured. It is this fundamental point of the philosophy of modern natural law that 
informed Grotius’s definition of ownership. AJ van der Walt “Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium en 
die interpretasies daarvan sedert die vyftiende eeu” (1986) 49 THRHR 303 317; WB le Roux “Natural 
law theories” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 25-61 40-41. 
88 AJ van der Walt “Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium en die interpretasies daarvan sedert die 
vyftiende eeu” (1986) 49 THRHR 303 317. 
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inferior.89 This development marked the start of viewing rights in a hierarchical 
manner.90  
Furthermore, the function of law in Roman-Dutch law at the time was different from 
the function of law in Roman times. The function of law shifted from the protection of 
the rational order to the protection of individual entitlements. This shift gave rise to the 
focus on rights rather than actions and had a significant impact on the way in which 
an owner could protect his right of ownership. The action available to protect 
ownership remained the rei vindicatio, but the focus of the remedy shifted to the 
enforcement of the entitlements of the owner. In this regard, all the requirements of 
the remedy only focussed on confirming the owner’s rights in her property and 
accordingly excluded any possibility of developing the remedy to take factors other 
than rights into account. 
The above discussion of Roman and Roman-Dutch law shows that the institution of 
ownership in society, and its concomitant impact on the remedies available to the 
owner of property, has not been static. It has undergone various changes and 
developments due to historical, social, political, economic and philosophical 
considerations that in turn resulted in different definitions of ownership, and has 
developed the owner’s ability to vindicate her property.91 Despite different definitions 
                                                          
89 DP Visser “The ‘absoluteness’ of ownership: The South African common law in perspective” 1985 
Acta Juridica 39 41; AJ van der Walt “Unity and pluralism in property theory – A review of property 
theories and debates in recent literature: Part I” 1995 TSAR 15 20-22; E van der Sijde Reconsidering 
the relationship between property and regulation: A systemic constitutional approach LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University (2015) 56. 
90 DP Visser “The ‘absoluteness’ of ownership: The South African common law in perspective” 1985 
Acta Juridica 39 41; AJ van der Walt “Unity and pluralism in property theory – A review of property 
theories and debates in recent literature: Part I” 1995 TSAR 15 20-22; E van der Sijde Reconsidering 
the relationship between property and regulation: A systemic constitutional approach LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University (2015) 56. 
91 DV Cowen New patterns of landownership: The transformation of the concept of ownership as plena 
in re potestas (1984) 7-8; AJ van der Walt “Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium en die interpretasies 
daarvan sedert die vyftiende eeu” (1986) 49 THRHR 303 306; GJ Pienaar “Ontwikkelings in die Suid-
Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip in perspektief” 1986 TSAR 295 295; AJ van der Walt “Gedagtes oor die 
herkoms en die ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip” (1988) 21 De Jure 16 17; JRL 
Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in 
South Africa (1996) 657-699 692-694; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & 
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of ownership, the conceptual basis ascribed to ownership by the institutional writer 
and avid natural and moral legal theorist, Grotius, has remained one of the most 
important developments of the modern ownership concept.92 Any confusion as to who 
had what type of ownership and which one was stronger than the other was 
successfully disposed of. Those with the title of owner were placed in the position to 
easily recover lost possession from any unlawful possessors. Accordingly, Grotius 
ensured that ownership received the status of being the strongest right and in this way 
ensured that the owner’s ability to vindicate her property by way of the rei vindicatio 
was also attributed the same strength. 
 
2 2 2 3 South African law 
The concept of ownership in South African law, together with the proprietary remedy 
of the rei vindicatio, is a direct result of the above historical events.93 Legal rules 
relating to ownership and the protection thereof were inherited from Roman-Dutch 
                                                          
Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 91; E van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship 
between property and regulation: A systemic constitutional approach LLD dissertation Stellenbosch 
University (2015) 34; P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right 
to exclude LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 79. 
92 AJ van der Walt “Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium en die interpretasies daarvan sedert die 
vyftiende eeu” (1986) 49 THRHR 303 317; E van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between 
property and regulation: A systemic constitutional approach LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 
(2015) 55. It should be noted that Grotius derived his definition of ownership from that of Bartolus de 
Saxoferrato’s definition of ownership. In this regard, see D 41.2.17.1; D 45.1.58; AJ van der Walt 
“Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium en die interpretasies daarvan sedert die vyftiende eeu” (1986) 
49 THRHR 303 317; GJ Pienaar “Ontwikkelings in die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip in perspektief” 
1986 TSAR 295 301; AJ van der Walt “Gedagtes oor die herkoms en die ontwikkeling van die Suid-
Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip” (1988) 21 De Jure 16 17; AJ van der Walt “Ownership and personal 
freedom: Subjectivism in Bernhard Windscheid’s theory of ownership” (1993) 56 THRHR 569 577-578; 
JRL Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law 
in South Africa (1996) 657-699 692; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg & Schoeman’s 
The law of property 5 ed (2006) 91; P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit 
landowners’ right to exclude LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 81. 
93 JRL Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law 
in South Africa (1996) 657-699 685. 
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law94 and have been applied more or less consistently in the South African legal 
system.95 The modern natural and moral law notion – that ownership is a full and 
complete right – as well as the rei vindicandi was brought to South Africa by Dutch 
settlers in the 1700s and therefore formed part of the early South African common 
law.96 As a result the work of the Roman-Dutch scholar, Grotius particularly, formed 
the basis of early South African law.97 
However, German scholars also had a significant impact on the interpretation of the 
Roman-Dutch law in South Africa.98 They too relied on modern natural and moral 
philosophy to explain Roman-Dutch rules and principles.99 However, their point of 
departure was a development of the nominalist natural and moral thinking introduced 
by Ockham, towards a more secular, scientific approach to the law.100 This group of 
jurisprudential scholars were referred to as the pandectists.101 The pandectists’ 
                                                          
94 JRL Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law 
in South Africa (1996) 657-699 685. 
95 JM Pienaar “Die beskerming van onroerende eiendom: Nuwe ontwikkelings” in J Smits & G Lubbe 
(eds) Remedies in Zuid-Afrika en Europa (2003) 141-157 143. For the concept of ownership, see Gien 
v Gien 1979 (2) SA 1113 (T) 1120; Graham v Ridley 1931 TPD 476. See also Kemp v Roper, NO (1885-
1906) 2 Buch AC 143; Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 20. 
96 JRL Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law 
in South Africa (1996) 657-699 659. 
97 JRL Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law 
in South Africa (1996) 657-699 659; E van der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property 
and regulation: A systemic constitutional approach LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 34. 
98 AJ van der Walt “Ownership and personal freedom: Subjectivism in Bernhard Windscheid’s theory of 
ownership” (1993) 56 THRHR 569 569; JRL Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) 
Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 657-699 694. 
99 GJ Pienaar “Ontwikkelings in die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip in perspektief” 1986 TSAR 
295 302-303; JRL Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and 
common law in South Africa (1996) 657-699 694. 
100 AJ van der Walt & DG Kleyn “Duplex dominium: The history and significance of the concept of 
divided ownership” in DP Visser (ed) Essays on the history of law (1989) 213-260 247; E van der Sijde 
Reconsidering the relationship between property and regulation: A systemic constitutional approach 
LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 62. 
101 DP Visser “The ‘absoluteness’ of ownership: The South African common law in perspective” 1985 
Acta Juridica 39 47; JRL Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil 
law and common law in South Africa (1996) 657-699 697. 
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philosophical ideas emerged because of the industrial revolution at the time that 
sparked a desire for economic freedom.102 This desire motivated a return to classical 
Roman doctrine, more specifically the Roman law concept of ownership, which would 
support their economic freedom motive.103 Their purpose is evident in the name they 
gave themselves, namely: pandectists (the modern application of the Roman law).104 
The pandectists defined ownership as the complete or absolute legal submission of a 
thing to the will of the owner.105  
The focus of the pandectists, much like that of Grotius, fell on the entrenchment of 
individual rights, by ascribing to ownership the characteristics of completeness. 
However, this group of scholars went further to advance that the characteristics of 
individuality and abstractness flow from the characteristic of completeness attributed 
to ownership.106 Accordingly, the pandectist scholars’ concept of ownership had 
striking similarities with Grotius’ concept thereof (namely complete in nature). 
However, the pandectists added two additional characteristics, namely individuality of 
ownership and abstractness of ownership. This occurred because the work of the 
pandectists was a transformed and expanded version of the work of Grotius.107 The 
pandectists basically refined Grotius’ idea that ownership’s moral function is to 
entrench and ensure the protection of individual liberties into a “comprehensive and 
                                                          
102 GJ Pienaar “Ontwikkelings in die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip in perspektief” 1986 TSAR 295 
301. 
103 GJ Pienaar “Ontwikkelings in die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip in perspektief” 1986 TSAR 295 
302; JRL Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 657-699 694. 
104 DH van Zyl Geskiedenis van die Romeins-Hollandse reg (1979) 237. 
105 AJ van der Walt “Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium en die interpretasies daarvan sedert die 
vyftiende eeu” (1986) 49 THRHR 303 317; AJ van der Walt “Gedagtes oor die herkoms en die 
ontwikkeling van die Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsbegrip (vervolg)” (1988) 21 De Jure 306 318-319; E van 
der Sijde Reconsidering the relationship between property and regulation: A systemic constitutional 
approach LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 63. 
106 JRL Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 657-699 694. 
107 JRL Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 657-699 693. 
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consistent scientific system of subjective rights”.108 The transformation is evident in 
the pandectists’ formulation of the definition of ownership that emphasises the 
characteristics of not only completeness, but also individuality, exclusivity and 
abstractness.109 
After the reception of Roman-Dutch law into the South African legal system the work 
of authoritative Roman-Dutch and German jurists became a very important source of 
reference for the interpretation of the South African common law that includes the 
concept of ownership.110 South African courts had the propensity to refer to and quote 
their interpretations and codifications of classic Roman law.111 Furthermore, their 
methodology and terminology, particularly in the sphere of the law of things, were 
followed and also incorporated into the work of early South African legal authors.112 
This is evident from the definitions of ownership that academic authors of South Africa 
constructed.113 All of these definitions proceed from the stance that ownership is the 
                                                          
108 JRL Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 657-699 693. 
109 JRL Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 657-699 694. 
110 DH van Zyl Geskiedenis van die Romeins-Hollandse reg (1979) 204; DP Visser “The ‘absoluteness’ 
of ownership: The South African common law in perspective” 1985 Acta Juridica 39 47; AJ van der Walt 
“The South African law of ownership: A historical and philosophical perspective” (1992) 25 De Jure 
446 454; R Zimmerman & D Visser “Introduction” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: 
Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 1 11. 
111 DP Visser “The ‘absoluteness’ of ownership: The South African common law in perspective” 1985 
Acta Juridica 39 47; JRL Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil 
law and common law in South Africa (1996) 657-699 693. 
112 JRL Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 657-699 697. Milton explained that “[t]he extent of the adoption of pandectist 
version of property rights is illustrated by the authoritative and influential exposition of the South African 
law of Property provided by CG van der Merwe in his text-book Sakereg. First published in 1979.” 
113 AJ van der Walt “The South African law of ownership: A historical and philosophical perspective” 
(1992) 25 De Jure 446 447. 
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most complete right.114 Also, the characteristics of individuality and abstractness were 
ascribed to ownership in an absolute sense.115  
Academics and courts relied on these authors to understand the rules, principles and 
remedies contained in the Roman-Dutch common law. 116 Accordingly, the South 
African legal professionals (courts and academics) inherited the thoughts, notions, 
explanations and institutions of these legal writers and in this way ensured that they 
continued to exist in the South African legal system. The pandectists can therefore be 
said to have contributed greatly, along with Grotius, to the concept of the pre-
constitutional institution of ownership accepted by South African courts.117 
Understandably, the pre-constitutional South African concept of ownership was 
described with reference to characteristics of completeness, individuality and 
abstractness.118 This conceptual understanding of ownership in turn resulted in the rei 
vindicatio being confined to the function of protecting the rights of owners, and not the 
protection of the rational order as was the case in Roman law. 
 
                                                          
114 See CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 171; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 
2 ed (1994) 248-249; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of 
property 5 ed (2006) 91; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of 
South African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 440. 
115 AJ van der Walt “Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium en die interpretasies daarvan sedert die 
vyftiende eeu” (1986) 49 THRHR 303 317; GJ Pienaar “Ontwikkelings in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
eiendomsbegrip in perspektief” 1986 TSAR 295 301; DP Visser “The ‘absoluteness’ of ownership: The 
South African common law in perspective” 1985 Acta Juridica 39 46-47; JRL Milton “Ownership” in R 
Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 657-
699 693. 
116 JRL Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common 
law in South Africa (1996) 657-699 694.  
117 AJ van der Walt “Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium en die interpretasies daarvan sedert die 
vyftiende eeu” (1986) 49 THRHR 303 318. 
118 AJ van der Walt “The South African law of ownership: A historical and philosophical perspective” 
(1992) 25 De Jure 446 447. 
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2 2 3 The theoretical underpinnings of the rei vindicatio in South African law 
2 2 3 1 Introduction 
The broad power conferred upon the owner, according to the above-mentioned 
conceptual understanding of ownership, would logically require a suitable and equally 
strong protective mechanism. Therefore, the rhetoric behind ownership as a concept 
is the rhetoric that was applied when the court considered the protection of ownership 
by way of the rei vindicatio.119 This section considers firstly, the primary principle that 
underlies the application of the rei vindicatio in South African law and secondly, the 
way in which this principle is informed by the rhetoric and underlying assumptions of 
ownership. The rhetoric and underlying assumptions of ownership in this section are 
informed by such characteristics as individuality, completeness and abstractness. 
 
2 2 3 2 Characteristics and entitlements underlying the rei vindicatio 
There is support in academic literature and case law that exclusivity of ownership 
underpins the availability of the rei vindicatio in South African law.120 Van der Walt 
observes that the notion of exclusivity of ownership “indicate[s] that [a right in property] 
is held and exercised by an individual owner to the exclusion of others, thereby 
providing a guaranteed private sphere of individual freedom”.121 Accordingly, the 
                                                          
119 AJ van der Walt Property in the margins (2009) 34. 
120 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
243. 
121 AJ van der Walt “The South African law of ownership: A historical and philosophical perspective” 
(1992) 25 De Jure 446 447. Interestingly, it becomes evident in academic literature that no consensus 
exists as to the specific nature of the notion of exclusivity. However, Dhliwayo has recently tied 
exclusivity to the characteristic of absoluteness of ownership by highlighting the way in which the 
different aspects of absoluteness, namely completeness, individuality and abstractness denote the 
owner’s right to exclude. See in this regard P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that 
limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 89. Badenhorst, 
Pienaar and Mostert also link the notion of exclusivity of ownership to the individualistic character of 
ownership, however, no author in their discussion of the entitlements of ownership expressly states that 
exclusivity is a characteristic or incident or even an entitlement derived from ownership. It is only in the 
section concerning remedies that the authors on the basis of Chetty v Naidoo link exclusivity of 
ownership with the entitlement to vindicate. Accordingly, exclusivity is derived from an owner’s entitlent 
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owner can exclude anyone from using, enjoying and possessing her property without 
her consent. This idea was brought forth in Chetty v Naidoo122 by Jansen JA where he 
explained that:  
“It may be difficult to define dominium comprehensively (cf. Johannesburg Municipal 
Council v. Rand Townships Registrar and Others, 1910 T.S. 1314 at p. 1319), but there 
can be little doubt (despite some reservations expressed in Munsamy v. Gengemma, 
1954 (4) S.A. 468 (N) at pp. 470H - 471E) that one of its incidents is the right of exclusive 
possession of the res, with the necessary corollary that the owner may claim his property 
wherever found, from whomsoever [is] holding it. It is inherent in the nature of ownership 
that possession of the res should normally be with the owner, and it follows that no other 
person may withhold it from the owner unless he is vested with some right enforceable 
against the owner (e.g., a right of retention or a contractual right).”123 
Interestingly, Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert observe, on the basis of the above 
dictum, that exclusivity is linked to the incident of ownership that entitles an owner to 
vindicate in order to have exclusive possession of her property.124 Stated differently, 
exclusivity of ownership allows the owner of property to exclude anyone from the use 
and enjoyment of her property. Such exclusion extends as far as to allow the owner to 
assert her ownership by means of vindicating her property where her exclusive use of 
the property has been compromised.125 Accordingly, exclusivity of ownership can be 
explained with reference to the established entitlements of ownership but also with 
reference to the characteristics of ownership. With reference to the entitlements of 
ownership, it can be said that exclusivity is a result of the interaction between two 
generally recognised entitlements of ownership, namely the entitlement to occupy your 
                                                          
to claim back her property from any person with unlawful possession thereof. See PJ Badenhorst, JM 
Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 93. 
122 1974 (3) SA 13 (A).  
123 Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 20.  
124 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
243; Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 20. 
125 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
243; Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 20; GM Muller “The legal-historical context of urban forced 
evictions in South Africa” (2013) 19 Fundamina 367368. 
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own property (ius possidendi)126 and the entitlement to claim your own property from 
any unlawful possessors (ius vindicandi).127 In the alternative, one can use the 
characteristics of ownership, which are related to the notion of absoluteness of 
ownership, to explain how exclusivity relates to ownership. In this regard, academic 
literature supports the view that the characteristic of individuality that is ascribed to 
ownership denotes the idea that the owner should have exclusive control over her 
property.128 
Dhliwayo shows that individuality is not the only characteristic of ownership that is 
related to the idea of exclusivity.129 Instead, she argues that exclusivity of ownership 
is related to not one, but in fact all three of the characteristics ascribed to ownership 
by the Grotian-pandectist concept thereof, namely completeness, abstractness and 
individuality.130 Furthermore, Dhliwayo highlights the relationship between exclusivity, 
the characteristics of ownership and the notion of absoluteness of ownership.131 In her 
discussion of the relationship between these characteristics, her starting point is the 
notion of absoluteness. In this regard she considers the characteristics of ownership 
                                                          
126 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 137; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed 
(1994) 249; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 
ed (2006) 93; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South 
African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 470. 
127 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 137; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed 
(1994) 249; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 
ed (2006) 93; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South 
African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 470. 
128 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 175; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg 
and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 92; AJ van der Walt “The South African law of 
ownership: A historical and philosophical perspective (1992) 25 De Jure 446 447; P Dhliwayo A 
constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University (2015) 91-62. 
129 P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 91-62. 
130 P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 89-96. 
131 P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 89. 
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as aspects or different meanings of absoluteness, and she explains how each 
characteristic relates to an owner’s right to exclude. 
Firstly, Dhliwayo shows that the completeness characteristic of ownership is an aspect 
of absoluteness in that completeness denotes that an owner has the most complete 
rights in her property as opposed to other incomplete rights (like limited real rights).132 
Furthermore, she shows that the characteristic of completeness indicates that the 
owner would, in principle, have all the entitlements to the property unless she decides 
to limit those entitlements.133 Accordingly, completeness as an aspect of absoluteness 
signals that the owner has exclusive control because she has all the entitlements to 
the property, unless she decides to transfer some of the entitlements. Therefore, 
exclusivity determines what an owner may do with her property. It is therefore not a 
characteristic of ownership, but rather an entitlement of ownership.134 Consequently, 
a direct relationship exists between the characteristic of completeness of ownership 
and the entitlement of an owner to exclusive use and enjoyment of her property.135  
Dhliwayo also connects exclusivity to the individuality characteristic of ownership.136 
The characteristic of individuality suggests that only one person can be the owner of 
                                                          
132 P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 89. Dhliwayo states that when “referring to ownership as a 
complete real right denotes its fullness in the sense that only ownership includes all the entitlements of 
ownership, whereas a holder of a limited real right or personal right only has a limited entitlement to use 
someone else’s property temporarily”. See further AJ van der Walt Property in the margins (2009) 32; 
PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
92; Gien v Gien 1979 (2) SA 1113 (T) 1120. 
133 P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 90. 
134 This view of Dhliwayo is shared by Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert – see PJ Badenhorst, JM 
Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 243; P Dhliwayo A 
constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University (2015) 89.  
135 P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 89. 
136 P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 91. See further CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 
175; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
38 
  
the property to the exclusion of all others.137 Furthermore, she argues that individuality 
describes the position of the owner with regard to her property in relation to other 
persons.138 This denotes that the person with ownership can enforce her property 
rights against the whole world and that individuality of ownership underpins the 
strength ascribed to the owner’s entitlement to exclude.139  
The third aspect Dhliwayo connects to exclusivity is the abstract character of 
ownership. Abstractness of ownership assumes that “ownership is always more than 
the sum total of its constituent entitlements and that it is not exhausted or eroded by 
the temporary granting of limited real rights or by the temporary imposition of 
restrictions”.140 Abstractness, as a characteristic of ownership therefore has certain 
implications for the manner in which exclusivity of ownership is viewed. Dhliwayo 
suggests that because ownership is perceived to be more than the sum total of all its 
entitlements; ownership as a right is determined in an abstract and static manner void 
of consideration of context.141 This a-contextual view of ownership is accordingly 
                                                          
(2006) 92; AJ van der Walt “The South African law of ownership: A historical and philosophical 
perspective (1992) 25 De Jure 446 447. 
137 P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 91; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 175; AJ van 
der Walt “The South African law of ownership: A historical and philosophical perspective” (1992) 25 De 
Jure 44 447. 
138 P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 92. 
139 P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 92; AJ van der Walt “The South African law of ownership: 
A historical and philosophical perspective (1992) 25 De Jure 446 447. 
140 P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 92. See further CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 
175-176; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 249; CG van der Merwe & A 
Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 470-471; 
AJ van der Walt “The South African law of ownership: A historical and philosophical perspective” (1992) 
25 De Jure 446 447; AJ van der Walt “Ownership and personal freedom: Subjectivism in Bernhard 
Windscheid’s theory of ownership” (1993) 56 THRHR 569 582. 
141 P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 92. 
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transferred to how exclusivity is viewed with the result that the right to exclude is dealt 
with in the same abstract and a-contextual manner.142 
Dhliwayo’s analysis of the way in which the general characteristics of ownership relate 
to the owner’s entitlement or right to exclude, indicates the theoretical underpinnings 
of an owner’s right to exclude (emphasised by his right to evict). It shows how 
exclusivity of ownership receives its strength and force from the generally accepted 
characteristics of ownership; namely completeness, individuality and abstractness. 
Therefore, if these characteristics relate to the right to exclude in this way, it should 
follow that they are also included in the ratio of courts, expressly or by implication, 
when courts deal with cases involving an owner’s right to exclude (right to evict). 
 
2 2 3 3 The courts’ approach to an owner’s right to exclude 
2 2 3 3 1 Introduction 
This section provides an analysis of South African case law in order to determine 
whether the characteristics of ownership; namely completeness, individuality and 
abstractness feature expressly or by implication in the courts’ ratio when courts applied 
and considered the owner’s right to exclude in terms of the rei vindicatio in the pre-
constitutional era. The cases that will be considered to make the above point are Van 
der Merwe v Webb,143 Jeena v Minister of Lands144 and Chetty v Naidoo.145 These 
cases are significant because all of them dealt with the manner in which courts 
approached questions pertaining to the scope of an owner’s right to exclude in terms 
of the rei vindicatio.146 
                                                          
142 P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 92. 
143 Van der Merwe v Webb (1883-1884) 3 EDC 97 97. 
144 Jeena v Minister of Lands 1955 (3) All SA 27 (A). 
145 Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 16. 
146 Both Jeena and Chetty deal specifically with an owner’s right to evict as a form of an owner’s right 
to exclude in terms of immovable property. However, Webb deals with the owner’s right to exclude in 
relation to movable property. Although Webb concerns movable property the principles pertaining to an 
owner’s right to exclude emanating from Webb are equally valid in relation to immovable property. 
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2 2 3 3 2 Case law discussion 
In Webb147 the court had to decide on the scope of the owner’s right to exclude others 
from possession in terms of the rei vindicatio. The plaintiff in Webb as the owner of the 
property instituted the rei vindicatio to recover three stolen oxen from the defendant. 
The defendant was a bona fide purchaser of the property who had bought the property 
at a public market.148 The defendant argued that the owner cannot rely on his 
vindicatory action to recover his stolen oxen that the defendant later bought at a public 
market. In this regard, free market practices prohibited an owner to recover lost 
possession from a person that bought the owner’s property at a public market.149 
Accordingly, the court had to determine whether in South African law the rei vindicatio 
would allow an owner to vindicate her property from a bona fide purchaser of goods 
at a public market. To answer this question the court had to determine whether or not 
the free market practices of Dutch customary law formed part of the South African 
Roman-Dutch law. Berry JP’s point of departure in answering the legal question was 
the concept of ownership. In this regard he held that: 
“But the title to property, whether acquired by possession or otherwise, was 
gradually strengthened, and acquired great solidity and energy when it became to 
be understood that no man should be deprived of his property without his consent, 
and that even the honest purchaser was not safe under a defective title. The 
general principle applicable to the law of personal property throughout civilised 
Europe became therefore and now is, "nemo plus juris ad alium transferre potest 
quam ipse haberet" (Dig., 50, 17,54), preceded by the other maxim, "Id quod 
nostrum est sine facto nostro ad alium transferre non potest," (Dig., 50,17, 11). 
From the latter maxim, the owner cannot be deprived of his right of property by the 
                                                          
147 Van der Merwe v Webb (1883-1884) 3 EDC 97 97. 
148 Van der Merwe v Webb (1883-1884) 3 EDC 97 97. 
149 Van der Merwe v Webb (1883-1884) 3 EDC 97 99; Voet 6.1.12; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed 
(1989) 361; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 476; JRL Milton “Ownership” 
in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 
657-699 686; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 
5 ed (2006) 245; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South 
African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 546-547. 
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wrongful act of anyone who has taken it without title, or who, having it in his 
possession for another purpose, sells it. From the former maxim it follows that the 
thief or borrower cannot give title even to a bon[a] fide purchaser. The original 
owner was entitled to reclaim his property, whether acquired bon[a] or mal[a] fide 
by the purchaser; and the reason that he is bound to give it up is this, not because 
he has done any wrong in buying it, but because it is the untransferred property of 
someone else who cannot be divested of it without his consent. The right of 
property does not go with the possession.”150  
The principles from which the court defined the scope of the owner’s ability to vindicate 
her property are found in these two maxims quoted in the paragraph above.151 Both 
these maxims emphasise the wide protection an owner is afforded by law in respect 
of the relationship between herself and her property. The first maxim, nemo plus juris 
ad alium transferre potest quam ipse haberet, explains that a person without rights 
cannot transfer rights.152 This maxim encourages a wide interpretation and 
understanding of the owner’s right to vindicate as long as the transferee of the thing 
had no rights. However, this maxim also presupposes that the owner has complete 
rights in her property and that those complete rights always vest in the owner unless 
the owner consents to their vesting in another person. The maxim clearly emphasises 
the characteristics of individuality and completeness of ownership.  
From the second maxim, id quod nostrum est sine facto nostro ad alium transferre non 
potest, it is apparent that an owner is allowed to claim back her property in any 
circumstances.153 This maxim emphasises the completeness, individuality and 
abstractness of ownership. These maxims are in favour of a generous interpretation 
of the scope of the owner’s ability to vindicate her property. In other words, they 
support the argument that an owner’s right to vindicate can be enforced against bona 
fide purchasers, in all circumstances including public market transactions. The two 
maxims simply gave an indication of the strong protective power that is assumed to 
                                                          
150 Van der Merwe v Webb (1883-1884) 3 EDC 97 97. 
151 Van der Merwe v Webb (1883-1884) 3 EDC 97 97. 
152 D 50.17.54; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 361; Van der Merwe v Webb (1883-1884) 3 
EDC 97 97. 
153 D 50.17.11; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 361; Van der Merwe v Webb (1883-1884) 3 
EDC 97 97. 
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an owner whose property is transferred against her will and the fact that in those 
circumstances, the owner can claim the property back. This finding of the court 
indirectly impacted on the application of the mobilia non habent sequelam maxim. The 
mobilia maxim provides that the owner can only institute a vindicatory action, where 
the seller voluntarily sold the property to a bona fide purchaser, after the owner paid 
the purchase price back to the defendant.154 The court’s ratio and finding in the Webb 
case implies that in these instances an owner need not pay compensation. 
The court preferred to accept in light of its historical philosophical investigation into the 
origins of ownership and after asserting by implication the characteristics of ownership 
that the maxim nemo plus juris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse haberet and the 
maxim id quod nostrum est sine facto nostro ad alium transferre non potest inform the 
scope of the rei vindicatio.155 Accordingly, the court established that the underlying 
principle of the rei vindicatio is exclusivity of ownership. It did so by choosing the 
maxim id quod nostrum est sine facto nostro ad alium transferre non potest, that 
asserts exclusivity, above the restrictive free market practices that would have 
undermined exclusivity as a central feature of ownership. 
The court’s inclination to give priority to the protection of the owner’s entitlements is 
clear in the starting point of the court’s ratio. This highlights the court’s doctrinal 
preference of the owner’s relatively strong right in its application of the rei vindicatio. 
These are the characteristics of the concept of ownership, namely completeness, 
individuality and abstractness. In defining the scope of the owner’s right to exclusive 
use and possession, the court inherently employed these characteristics to guide it 
into determining the limits of the owner’s right to exclude. Completeness, individuality 
and abstractness favour an absolute right to exclude. Therefore, the judgment of the 
court comes as no surprise. It may further be said that the reasoning of the court in 
relation to the conceptual understanding of ownership played a significant role in the 
                                                          
154 Van der Merwe v Webb (1883-1884) 3 EDC 97 99; Voet 6.1.12; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed 
(1989) 361; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 476; JRL Milton “Ownership” 
in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 
657-699 686; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 
5 ed (2006) 245; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South 
African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 546-547. 
155 Van der Merwe v Webb (1883-1884) 3 EDC 97 97. 
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way in which the court rationalised, understood and ultimately pronounced on the 
scope of the remedy. 
In Jeena, the court also dealt with the scope of an owner’s right to vindicate in terms 
of the rei vindicatio. The government purchased lots 15(a) and 21 of the farm 
Roodekopjes in order for a Mr Scheepers to take occupation of the lots in terms of the 
Land Settlement Act 12 of 1912.156 Lot 21 was occupied by the appellant in terms of 
a valid lease agreement but after the lease agreement was terminated the appellant 
continued to occupy the property unlawfully.157 Accordingly, the government instituted 
eviction proceedings and succeeded by obtaining an eviction order in its favour.158 The 
unlawful occupier appealed to the appellate division arguing that the government as 
owner was not entitled to an eviction order because it had transferred its right of 
possession to Mr Scheepers.159 Consequently, only Mr Scheepers had the right to 
evict and not the government.  
The court’s starting point was the question of ownership. It held that it cannot be 
disputed that the government is the owner of the property and that the occupier was 
in unlawful occupation of the lot.160 In this regard, the court turned to the Graham v 
Ridley161 case in order to assert that the government as owner of property has a valid 
cause of action to evict unlawful occupiers from property.162 In particular, the court 
relied on Greenburg JA’s emphasis in Graham concerning the rights and entitlements 
flowing from ownership: 
“One of the rights arising out of ownership is the right to possession; indeed Grotius 
Introd. 2.3.4., says that ownership consists in the right to recover lost possession. Prima 
facie therefore proof that the appellant is owner and that the respondent is in possession 
entitles the appellant to an order giving him possession, i.e. to an order for ejectment."163 
                                                          
156 Jeena v Minister of Lands 1955 (2) SA 380 (A) 382. 
157 Jeena v Minister of Lands 1955 (2) SA 380 (A) 382. 
158 Jeena v Minister of Lands 1955 (2) SA 380 (A) 382. 
159 Jeena v Minister of Lands 1955 (2) SA 380 (A) 382. 
160 Jeena v Minister of Lands 1955 (2) SA 380 (A) 383. 
161 Graham v Ridley 1931 TPD 476. 
162 Jeena v Minister of Lands 1955 (2) SA 380 (A) 383. 
163 Graham v Ridley 1931 TPD 476; Jeena v Minister of Lands 1955 (2) SA 380 (A) 383. 
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As a result, the court refuted the claim of the occupier that the government cannot 
evict the unlawful occupier.164 It held that the government has the right to evict, 
irrespective of whether or not it bought the lots so that Mr Scheepers could occupy 
them.165 The government is therefore in a position to assert its right and vindicate its 
property as owner.166 
Similar to Webb, the Jeena-judgment illustrates that the court in the pre-constitutional 
era turned to the rights and entitlements that flow from ownership when it had to decide 
on the scope of an owner’s rei vindicatio. The court implicitly entrenched the character 
of completeness and individuality of ownership when it asserted that the government 
will have the right to evict because the legal occupier has not taken occupation of the 
property as yet. This finding confirms that an owner of the property has all the 
entitlements unless she validly limits her entitlements by transferral thereof. The owner 
is clearly the only bearer of ownership entitlements, namely the right to evict in terms 
of the rei vindicatio, unless another overriding right exists. 
Chetty167 is another case that highlights the significance of the courts’ conceptual 
understanding of ownership and shows how such an understanding impacts on its 
approach to the application of the rei vindicatio. In Chetty168 the appellant appealed 
against an eviction order granted against her on the basis that the court a quo’s finding 
pertaining to the onus and burden of proof was wrongly decided.169 Accordingly, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal had to decide whether the plaintiff or the defendant had the 
onus of proving ownership in a vindicatory action. In the process of deciding the legal 
issue, the court set out and confirmed some of the basic principles and requirements 
of the rei vindicatio.170 Jansen JA’s point of departure was the concept of ownership. 
In this respect he held: 
“It may be difficult to define dominium comprehensively (cf. Johannesburg Municipal 
Council v. Rand Townships Registrar and Others, 1910 T.S. 1314 at p. 1319), but there 
                                                          
164 Jeena v Minister of Lands 1955 (2) SA 380 (A) 383. 
165 Jeena v Minister of Lands 1955 (2) SA 380 (A) 383. 
166 Jeena v Minister of Lands 1955 (2) SA 380 (A) 383. 
167 Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 16. 
168 Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 16. 
169 Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 18. 
170 Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 20. 
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can be little doubt (despite some reservations expressed in Munsamy v. Gengemma, 
1954 (4) S.A. 468 (N) at pp. 470H - 471E) that one of its incidents is the right of exclusive 
possession of the res, with the necessary corollary that the owner may claim his property 
wherever found, from whomsoever [is] holding it. It is inherent in the nature of ownership 
that possession of the res should normally be with the owner, and it follows that no other 
person may withhold it from the owner unless he is vested with some right enforceable 
against the owner (e.g., a right of retention or a contractual right).”171 
This passage from Chetty172 highlights the link between ownership and the protection 
thereof by means of the rei vindicatio. Although the court did not go so far as to try and 
provide a definition of ownership, it alluded to the rights that an owner would normally 
have as an owner. These are the right to exclusive use and possession of property 
and the right to claim back (or vindicate) property. The latter right is furthermore 
described as a “necessary corollary” of the former.173 The court stressed the 
importance of the owner’s right to exclusive use and possession as the central feature 
of ownership.174 
The idea that ownership has an exclusive element to it in the context of vindication is 
derived from the Roman maxim ubi rem meam invenio ibi eam vindicio.175 The phrase 
means that an owner is able to vindicate her property wherever she finds it.176 The 
                                                          
171 Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 20.  
172 Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 16. 
173 Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 20. 
174 Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 20; D 6.1.49. See chapter 2, section 2.2.3.1 above; PJ 
Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 243. 
These authors confirm that the idea that ownership is exclusive is derived from the Roman maxim ubi 
rem meam invenio ibi eam vindicio in the context of vindication. 
175 D 6.1.49; D 44.7.25; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 347; JRL Milton “Ownership” in R 
Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 657-
699 686; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed 
(2006) 243; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (eds) Wille’s principles of South African 
law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 539; Morum Bros Ltd v Nepgen 1916 CPD 392; Johaadien v Stanley Porter 
(Paarl) (Pty) Ltd 1970 (1) SA 394 (A) 406; Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 20; Hefer v Van Greuning 
1979 (4) SA 952 (A) 959; Kahn v Volschenk 1986 (3) SA 84 (A) 92. 
176 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 347; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois 
(eds) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 539. 
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reasoning of the court in Chetty177 confirms the reception of such a maxim into South 
African law.178 Therefore, it emphasises the notion of exclusivity of ownership and the 
way in which the application of the rei vindicatio endorses such a notion. The rei 
vindicatio endorses this notion by giving effect to its corollary, the right to vindicate. 
Therefore, the rei vindicatio is ultimately the maxim in the form of a remedy. 
The maxim further indicates the purpose of the remedy, which is to enable the owner 
to recover lost possession from any person. In this way, the maxim also gives an 
indication of the extent of the ability of the owner to regain lost possession. In this 
regard, the owner’s capacity to vindicate her property seems to be unlimited in light of 
the maxim.179 However, the maxim results in direct and indirect limitations to the use 
of the rei vindicatio. The limitation found directly in the maxim is the specific reference 
to an owner. This implies that the right to institute the rei vindicatio is only available to 
owners.180 The indirect limitation of the owner’s right to vindicate can be found in the 
operation of the remedy itself, namely that the owner has to follow due legal process 
to regain possession.181 However, these qualifications do not subtract from the 
owner’s strong position, because courts primarily approach property disputes (more 
                                                          
177 Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 20. 
178 Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 20. 
179 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 361-374; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg 
and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 255-260; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in 
F du Bois (eds) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405 546-555. 
180 Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 20; Voet 6.1.20; 6.1.24; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 
347; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 468; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H 
Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 243; CG van der Merwe & A Pope 
“Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 539; Kemp v 
Roper, NO (1885-1906) 2 Buch AC 143; Judelman v Colonial Government (1906-1909) 3 Buch AC 446 
452-453; Marcus v Stamper and Zoutendijk 1910 AD 58 72; Jeena v Minister of Lands 1955 (2) SA 380 
(A) 383; Ruskin NO v Thiergen 1962 (3) SA 737 (A) 744; Henning v Petra Meubels Bpk 1947 (2) SA 
407 (T) 412; Luwalala v Port Nolloth Municipality 1991 (3) SA 98 (C) 110. Interestingly, Van der Merwe 
points out that a person to whom the right of ownership has been ceded can also institute the rei 
vindicatio. See CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 347; Caledon en Suid-Westelike Distrikte 
Eksekuteurskamer Bpk v Wentzel en Andere 1971 (2) SA 466 (T) 469. However, as previously stated, 
the exercise of this right is subject to legality and restricted to the incidents that still belong to the owner. 
See in this regard, Gien v Gien 1979 (2) SA 1113 (T) 1120. 
181 AJ van der Walt “Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure and eviction orders: A model to evaluate 
South African land reform legislation” 2002 TSAR 254 257. 
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specifically eviction proceedings) with the purpose of ultimately giving effect to the 
owner’s right to vindicate her property,182 subject to the requirements of the remedy.  
The impact of these deep-level assumptions about an owner’s right to evict and the 
courts’ duty to fiercely uphold such a right was revealed in a plethora of case law 
immediately after section 26(3) of the Constitution commenced and the Prevention of 
Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (“PIE”) was 
promulgated to regulate the eviction of unlawful occupiers.183 ABSA Bank Ltd v 
Amod,184 Betta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-epoh 185 and Ellis v Viljoen186 are all 
cases in which the courts had to determine whether the landowners, in the respective 
cases, were entitled to institute the rei vindicatio in order to evict occupiers whose 
occupation rights had lapsed.187 In ABSA Bank the court was satisfied that PIE indeed 
limits the owner’s right to evict, but that such limitation is restricted to the eviction of 
unlawful occupiers constituting ‘classic squatters’.188 It held that if PIE ought to limit a 
landowner’s right to evict tenants holding over such limitation would amount to an 
absurdity.189 This line of thinking was confirmed in Betta Eiedomme where the court 
went further and held that section 26(3) does not limit a landowner’s right to evict at 
all, because both the substantive law concerning the owner’s right to evict and 
procedural issues pertaining to the pleadings are unaffected by section 26(3) of the 
Constitution.190 This conservative approach to limitations imposed on a landowner’s 
right to evict was also employed by the court in Ellis. In Ellis the court upheld and 
confirmed the findings of the above two judgments when it reiterated that a 
                                                          
182 AJ van der Walt Property in the margins (2009) 22. 
183 These cases were decided in the constitutional era. However, they are worthy of mention here as 
they illuminate the pre-constitutional legal culture. JM Pienaar “Die beskerming van onroerende 
eiendom: Nuwe ontwikkelings” in J Smits & G Lubbe (eds) Remedies in Zuid-Afrika en Europa (2003) 
141-157 145-149; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of 
property 4 ed (2003) 229-230. 
184 1999 (2) All SA 423 (W). 
185 2000 (4) SA 468 (W). 
186 2001 (4) SA 795 (C). 
187 See ABSA Bank Ltd V Amod 1999 (2) All SA 423 (W) 426; Betta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-epoh 
2000 (4) SA 468 (W) paras 1-2; Ellis v Viljoen 2001 (4) SA 795 (C) 797. 
188 ABSA Bank Ltd V Amod 1999 (2) All SA 423 (W) 430. 
189 ABSA Bank Ltd V Amod 1999 (2) All SA 423 (W) 430. 
190 Betta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 (W) para 15. 
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landowner’s right to evict cannot be limited by section 26(3) of the Constitution 
because such limitation will infringe on a landowner’s section 25 constitutional property 
right.191 Van der Walt observes that the approach followed by all the above courts, 
with regard to the question of whether section 26(3) of the Constitution and PIE limit a 
landowner’s ability to evict at common law, highlight the deep-level “assumptions 
about the function of the law and the courts to uphold the status quo”.192 
The discussion of all the cases mentioned above shows that courts in the pre-
constitutional era emphasised the characteristics of ownership when they adjudicated 
eviction cases in terms of the rei vindicatio in order to give full force to an owner’s right 
to exclude. It is clear that these characteristics formed part of the courts’ underlying 
reasoning when they interpreted certain entitlements and maxims applicable to the rei 
vindicatio in order to ensure that the strong nature of an owner’s right to exclude was 
not undermined by another right. 
Chetty shows that the court was not required to have regard to the rights of the alleged 
unlawful occupier.193 The court only considered the rights of the owner. This approach 
emphasises the complete, individualistic and abstract character of ownership. It 
highlights the abstract nature of ownership because such understanding of exclusivity, 
as Dhliwayo correctly points out, results in a-contextual application of an owner’s right 
to evict.194  
Van der Walt’s analysis of the South African property regime and his identification of 
the foundations thereof, explains the approach adopted in Chetty in relation to the 
strong right of the owner.195 He suggests that like most other civil law systems South 
                                                          
191 Ellis v Viljoen 2001 (4) SA 795 (C) 807. 
192 AJ van der Walt “Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure and eviction orders: A critical evaluation 
of recent case law” (2002) 18 SAJHR 372 400. 
193 Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 20. 
194 P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 92. For general remarks on the owner’s right to evict and 
the individualistic character of ownership, see PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 94; GM Muller “The legal-historical context of urban forced 
evictions in South Africa” (2013) 19 Fundamina 367 368. 
195 AJ van der Walt Property in the margins (2009) 27. 
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African law operates in a rights paradigm.196 The main objective of the rights paradigm 
is to protect and entrench existing rights so as to ensure stability and certainty.197 It 
does so by protecting rights in a hierarchical scheme in which ownership is always 
seen as the strongest right, followed by limited real rights and personal rights.198 In 
this hierarchy non-rights have no standing. Van der Walt goes further and links this 
rights based property regime in operation in South African law to characteristics such 
as absoluteness, completeness and exclusivity.199 He argues that the result of these 
characteristics being ascribed to ownership is that ownership is not only regarded as 
more valuable and more important than other property interests, but is also protected 
more strongly.200 He explains the syllogism between these characteristics of 
ownership and the idea behind protecting ownership as follows:  
“[S]aying that ownership is absolute also implies that ownership is exclusive; given the 
status of ownership in the property hierarchy, that is tantamount to saying that the 
pinnacle of the property regime exists in the fact that a property owner can exclude 
anybody else from possession or use of that property, unless the other person can prove 
                                                          
196 AJ van der Walt Property in the margins (2009) 27; P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access 
rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 139. 
197 AJ van der Walt Property in the margins (2009) 31. For a discussion of the nature and implications 
of the rights paradigm, see P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ 
right to exclude LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 28. 
198 AJ van der Walt Property in the margins (2009) 27. 
199 AJ van der Walt Property in the margins (2009) 32. 
200 AJ van der Walt Property in the margins (2009) 34. This position was altered by the Constitution. 
See chapters three and four below for a detailed discussion of the way in which the Constitution has 
changed this position.  In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 
23 Sachs J held that:  
“[T]he Constitution imposes new obligations on the courts concerning rights relating to property 
not previously recognised by the common law. It counter poses to the normal ownership rights 
of possession, use and occupation, a new and equally relevant right not arbitrarily to be deprived 
of a home. The expectations that ordinarily go with title could clash head on with the genuine 
despair of people in dire need of accommodation. The judicial function in these circumstances is 
not to establish a hierarchical arrangement between the different interests involved, privileging in 
an abstract and mechanical way the rights of ownership over the right not to be dispossessed of 
a home, or vice versa. Rather it is to balance out and reconcile the opposed claims in as just a 
manner as possible taking account of all the interests involved and the specific factors relevant 
in each particular case.” 
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a valid and enforceable right to possess or use, derived from either legislation or the 
consent of the owner and her predecessors in title”.201 
Furthermore, this approach that favoured ownership above all other rights and non-
rights is also reflected in the administration and recording systems of deeds 
registration and regulated in the Deeds Registries Act 45 of 1937. In South African 
property law a distinction is made between real rights, and other rights in land for 
registration purposes.202 A real right refers to the most complete right a person can 
have in relation to property. Ownership is the only complete real right that exists in 
property law because it is the only right that provides holders with complete 
entitlements. However, other types of rights in property also exist, namely limited real 
rights and personal rights. A holder of a limited real right only has some entitlements 
in the property of another. Personal rights are rights enforceable against a person for 
performance. Personal rights ordinarily do not have third party effect.203 Interestingly, 
section 63(1) of the Deeds Registration Act 47 of 1937 only provides for the registration 
of real rights and limited real rights.Personal rights are only recorded in support of real 
rights.204 So, apart from the fact that ownership is protected strongly, its administration 
and registration with regard to the recording of rights are also prioritised. It shows that 
administrative and support systems in South African law are designed to serve real 
rights (firstly, ownership and secondly, limited real rights) only. This accordingly feeds 
the deep-level assumptions that exist with regard to the superiority of ownership and 
the superiority of the owner’s right to vindicate. All of this supports Van der Walt’s 
explanation of the “normal state of affairs” where ownership and individual title are 
paramount. 
                                                          
201 AJ van der Walt Property in the margins (2009) 34. (Footnotes omitted). 
202 Section 63(1) of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 208. 
203 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 58-60; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg 
and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 47-48; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F 
du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 427-428. 
204 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
50; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 
ed (2007) 405-729 427-428. 
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The common law eviction remedy in the pre-constitutional era only concerned itself 
with the question of who had the strongest and most complete right in the relevant 
property.205 Adjudication in the eviction context was consequently centred on giving 
effect to that right. Van der Walt further points out that the common law rei vindicatio 
presupposed that the owner was entitled to be in occupation of her property.206 This 
again reiterates that the function of the remedies employed to protect ownership was 
aimed at protecting the status quo.207 Van der Walt explains that: 
“Although the owner is not allowed at common law to evict without legal process, the 
protection afforded by this action is very strong, as it is based on the ‘normality’ 
assumption that the owner is entitled to exclusive possession of his or her property – 
this is what is considered the ‘normal state of affairs’, and what will most likely be upheld 
in the absence of good reason for not doing so.”208 
The basis for this convention can be linked to the protection of the exclusivity and 
completeness of ownership.209 In line with this observation, Pienaar argues that the 
approach employed by the courts in the pre-constitutional era was a conventional 
approach because it sought to entrench and protect existing property rights by means 
of the conventional method, namely evictions.210 She notes that this approach 
automatically prioritised the owner’s rights above the interests of non-owners.211 
The above discussion shows that it is only when ownership’s complete, individualistic 
and abstract nature is acknowledged that the “normal state of affairs” will continue 
without any interferences. Accordingly, Van der Walt ties these main contentions 
                                                          
205 AJ van der Walt Property in the margins (2009) 34. 
206 AJ van der Walt Property in the margins (2009) 58. See also T Roux The politics of principle: The 
first South African constitutional court, 1995-2005 (2013) 326. See also Port Elizabeth Municipality v 
Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 23. 
207 AJ van der Walt Property in the margins (2009) 31. 
208 AJ van der Walt “Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure and eviction orders: A model to evaluate 
South African land reform legislation” 2002 TSAR 254 257. 
209 AJ van der Walt Property in the margins (2009) 59. 
210 JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 668. 
211 JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 668. 
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flowing from the Grotian-pandectists’ natural and moral legal thinking to the preserving 
of the current state of affairs. 
 
2 3 Statutory eviction remedies 
2 3 1 The historical roots of the statutory eviction remedies 
While the rei vindicatio was available to owners of land to evict unlawful occupiers 
throughout the pre-constitutional era, the government of South Africa at the time also 
developed apartheid land law for the ideological goal of racial segregation which 
dramatically changed the pre-constitutional eviction law landscape.212 The pursuance 
of this ideology resulted in a plethora of legislative measures promulgated to effect 
evictions.213 Essentially, two broad categories of legislative measures emerged: (a) 
measures aimed at regulating eviction specifically; and (b) measures aimed at 
regulating various matters incidental to occupation, thereby impacting on evictions 
indirectly. The War Measure Act 13 of 1940 (“WMA”), the Prevention of Illegal 
Squatting Act 52 of 1951 (“PISA”) and the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment 
Act 92 of 1976 (“Amendment Act”) specifically allowed for the state and private owners 
to evict unlawful occupiers. Eviction remedies in these statutes were an alternative 
option to the common law rei vindicatio. 
The Native Urban Areas Act 21 of 1923 (“NUAA”) and the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 
(“GAA”) worked together with the subsequent PISA and the Amendment Act thereof 
                                                          
212 AJ van der Walt “Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure and eviction orders: A model to evaluate 
South African land reform legislation” 2002 TSAR 254 259; S Liebenberg Socio-economic rights 
adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 269; GM Muller The impact of section 26 of the 
Constitution on the eviction of squatters in South African law LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 
(2011) 9; GM Muller “The legal-historical context of urban forced evictions in South Africa” (2013) 19 
Fundamina 367 369; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 622-663.  
213 AJ van der Walt “Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure and eviction orders: A model to evaluate 
South African land reform legislation” 2002 TSAR 254 259; S Liebenberg Socio-economic rights 
adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 269; GM Muller The impact of section 26 of the 
Constitution on the eviction of squatters in South African law LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 
(2011) 9-12; GM Muller “The legal-historical context of urban forced evictions in South Africa” (2013) 
19 Fundamina 367 370; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 664. 
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in order to ensure that private parties and the state could evict unlawful occupiers with 
ease.214 These statutes formed part of a bigger framework that was aimed at realising 
the ideology of apartheid by respectively allocating certain areas of land to specific 
race groups;215 restricting free movement of residents between these areas (so-called 
influx control);216 and facilitating forced removals from such areas of land not allocated 
to the relevant race group.217  
The state, as public authority, also evicted occupiers belonging to certain race groups 
from land through seemingly neutral regulatory measures.218 These measures 
included the Physical Planning Act 88 of 1967 (“PPA”), the Health Act 63 of 1977 
(“HA”) and the Slums Act of 1979 (“SA”). They were invariably aimed at controlling 
movement and settlement in and around allocated areas but were not per se aimed at 
eviction. The combined operation of these statutes and PISA had the result that 
occupiers of land were forcibly removed from their homes and relocated onto other 
land, invariably in new underdeveloped areas.219 While relocation and re-ordering of 
                                                          
214 AJ van der Walt “Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure and eviction orders: A model to evaluate 
South African land reform legislation” 2002 TSAR 254 259; GM Muller The impact of section 26 of the 
Constitution on the eviction of squatters in South African law LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 
(2011) 9-12; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 664. 
215 Group Areas Act 41 of 1950; Group Areas Act 77 of 1957; Group Areas Act 36 of 1966. See also AJ 
van der Walt “Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure and eviction orders: A model to evaluate South 
African land reform legislation” 2002 TSAR 254 259; GM Muller The impact of section 26 of the 
Constitution on the eviction of squatters in South African law LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 
(2011) 10; GM Muller “The legal-historical context of urban forced evictions in South Africa” (2013) 19 
Fundamina 367 375; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 107.  
216 Native Urban Areas Act 21 of 1923; Native Urban Areas Consolidation Act 25 of 1945. See also GM 
Muller “The legal-historical context of urban forced evictions in South Africa” (2013) 19 Fundamina 367 
383; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 105.  
217 GM Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution on the eviction of squatters in South African 
law LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2011) 43; GM Muller “The legal-historical context of urban 
forced evictions in South Africa” (2013) 19 Fundamina 367 375; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 687. 
218 JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 112. 
219 GM Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution on the eviction of squatters in South African 
law LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2011) 70; GM Muller “The legal-historical context of urban 
forced evictions in South Africa” (2013) 19 Fundamina 367 394; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 789-
795. 
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settlement and occupation in this context were guided by land use planning and 
sanitation measures, the ideological goal of racial segregation formed the underlying 
motive.220  
In 1940 the legislator promulgated the WMA and subsequently, the War Measure of 
1944 which for the first time expressly dealt with the eviction process.221 The WMA 
conferred upon the court (magistrate) the authority to make an order for the immediate 
eviction of unlawful occupiers. It found application in the situation where the 
government sought to evict unlawful occupiers, occupying land without the permission 
from the person in charge or the owner of the land. Accordingly, the rei vindicatio was 
not the remedy applied by the state; only by private owners in such situations. The 
WMA ultimately proved to be inadequate due to the tendency of evicted occupiers to 
simply move on to other vacant land. Accordingly, the measure was not working 
towards decreasing unlawful occupation but in reality only relocating the unlawful 
occupation.222  
In response to the above shortfall parliament enacted PISA. With the promulgation of 
PISA, together with the GAA, the statutory regulation of evictions changed.223 PISA 
not only empowered the state and the landowner to approach a court for the eviction 
                                                          
220 GM Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution on the eviction of squatters in South African 
law LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2011) 70; GM Muller “The legal-historical context of urban 
forced evictions in South Africa” (2013) 19 Fundamina 367 394; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 789-
795. 
221 GM Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution on the eviction of squatters in South African 
law LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2011) 54; GM Muller “The legal-historical context of urban 
forced evictions in South Africa” (2013) 19 Fundamina 367 382. 
222 GM Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution on the eviction of squatters in South African 
law LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2011) 54; GM Muller “The legal-historical context of urban 
forced evictions in South Africa” (2013) 19 Fundamina 367 382. 
223 The difference between WMA and PISA can be found in the scope of the requirement of 
unlawfulness. Unlawfulness in terms of the WMA was only restricted to the situation where the owner 
did not consent to the occupation by the occupier, while PISA extended the definition to any unlawful 
ground. This unlawful reason was informed by what legislation proclaimed to be unlawful. See GM 
Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution on the eviction of squatters in South African law LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (2011) in this regard. 
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of the unlawful occupier(s), it also criminalised the unlawful occupation of land.224 
According to Van der Walt, this statutory eviction remedy founded on this “overly 
ideological goal of racial segregation”,225 created an alternative remedy for landowners 
(including the state) to obtain eviction. He states that “the private-law, Roman-Dutch 
legal organisation of and control over the land rights of white South Africans was by 
and large left untouched by apartheid law, while the law relating to black land rights 
was removed from the sphere of Roman-Dutch private law and largely supplanted  […] 
by the (public-law) statutory provisions of the new land laws.”226 Accordingly, 
depending on the circumstances, both the statutory mechanism and the common law 
rei vindicatio were in principle available to landowners to evict unlawful occupiers.  
Consequently, two separate legal eviction remedies, based on two distinct modus 
operandi and applicable to two different race groups respectively, existed in the pre-
constitutional era.227 This meant that courts in the pre-constitutional era adjudicated 
eviction cases based on either the rei vindicatio or PISA, depending on the race of the 
occupier(s). The rei vindicatio was for the most part relied on and applied in the event 
of the unlawful occupation by a white occupier, while PISA was generally relied upon 
and applied where a landowner sought an eviction order against a black unlawful 
                                                          
224 AJ van der Walt “Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure and eviction orders: A model to evaluate 
South African land reform legislation” 2002 TSAR 254 258; GM Muller The impact of section 26 of the 
Constitution on the eviction of squatters in South African law LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 
(2011) 54; GM Muller “The legal-historical context of urban forced evictions in South Africa” (2013) 19 
Fundamina 367 382. 
225 AJ van der Walt “Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure and eviction orders: A model to evaluate 
South African land reform legislation” 2002 TSAR 254 258. 
226 AJ van der Walt “Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure and eviction orders: A model to evaluate 
South African land reform legislation” 2002 TSAR 254 258. 
227 AJ van der Walt “Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure and eviction orders: A model to evaluate 
South African land reform legislation” 2002 TSAR 254 258. This was the situation because in specific 
areas in South Africa, black persons could not acquire ownership or rights in land in the private law 
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occupier.228 In the latter situation PISA enabled eviction,229 while at the same time 
ensuring the criminal conviction of the unlawful occupier for allegedly having 
contravened section 1 of PISA. 
Interestingly, despite the different “channels” to effect an eviction, the result of both 
the common law and the statutory mechanisms would be similar in that the owner’s 
lost possession would be restored and the owner’s right to exclude would enjoy 
priority. Therefore, the same type of hierarchical approach was adopted in the context 
of the rei vindicatio and the statutory eviction remedies in the pre-constitutional period. 
However, some differences were apparent, specifically in relation to the actual 
procedure and process involved, and the final standing of the unlawful occupier. The 
process in terms of PISA was less complex and more expedient, especially after the 
promulgation of the Amendment Act in 1976.230 Pienaar notes, however, that both 
owner and unlawful occupier were regulated strictly.231 Section 3B of PISA empowered 
local authorities and private owners to evict unlawful occupiers summarily without a 
court order.232 The Amendment Act also prohibited owners of land from consenting or 
allowing race groups, not designated to stay in the residential area of the owners, to 
occupy the land of such owners. The Act criminalised this type of consent, thereby 
forcing owners to evict such occupiers.233 The Act furthermore successfully ousted the 
                                                          
228 AJ van der Walt “Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure and eviction orders: A model to evaluate 
South African land reform legislation” 2002 TSAR 254 261. 
229 AJ van der Walt “Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure and eviction orders: A model to evaluate 
South African land reform legislation” 2002 TSAR 254 259; GM Muller The impact of section 26 of the 
Constitution on the eviction of squatters in South African law LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 
(2011) 55; GM Muller “The legal-historical context of urban forced evictions in South Africa” (2013) 19 
Fundamina 367 383; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 687. 
230 GM Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution on the eviction of squatters in South African 
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231 JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 688. 
232 AJ van der Walt “Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure and eviction orders: A model to evaluate 
South African land reform legislation” 2002 TSAR 254 259-260; GM Muller “The legal-historical context 
of urban forced evictions in South Africa” (2013) 19 Fundamina 367 386. 
233 Section 3A of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Act 92 of 1976. See further GM Muller 
The impact of section 26 of the Constitution on the eviction of squatters in South African law LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (2011) 56; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 687. 
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courts’ jurisdiction to grant relief.234 Muller observes that the ouster clause sought to 
avoid the situation where unlawful occupiers could persuade a court to find in their 
favour.235 The ouster of courts also ensured that courts had no interpretive function in 
these instances.236 Courts were obliged to order an eviction once it was established 
that the occupier was an unlawful occupier for purposes of PISA.237 Under PISA, an 
unlawful occupier committed a statutory offence by virtue of the unlawful occupation 
of the property, whereas an unlawful occupier under the rei vindicatio remained an 
unlawful occupier only and the unlawful occupation was not deemed to be a crime. 
 
2 3 2 The theoretical underpinnings of the statutory eviction remedies 
The pre-constitutional era was therefore characterised by the existence of a plethora 
of remedies (legislative and common law) that enabled the state and private owners 
to evict unlawful occupiers.238 Although eviction in terms of the various statutes 
                                                          
234 Section 3B(4)(a) of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Act 92 of 1976. 
235 GM Muller The impact of section 26 of the Constitution on the eviction of squatters in South African 
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available did not stipulate similar requirements as the rei vindicatio, it seemed to be 
premised on the same rationale. The rationale behind evictions in general (in terms of 
both the legislation and the common law) was that ownership trumps all lesser rights 
and interests,239 and therefore an owner was ordinarily entitled to an eviction order.240 
The presence of this rationale in the application of the apartheid eviction legislation 
was illustrated in Vena v George Municipality.241 The court in Vena held that the only 
defence the unlawful occupier opposing the eviction in terms of PISA could raise in 
order to resist eviction was a right to occupy the land.242  
According to Van der Walt, the Roman-Dutch eviction convention was extended and 
enhanced by apartheid land law pertaining to eviction.243 Therefore, the apartheid 
government expanded the convention in order to facilitate arbitrariness and the abuse 
of state power, linked to the realisation of the apartheid ideology.244 Accordingly, if the 
apartheid eviction legislation was based on the common law rei vindicatio convention 
that ownership will always trump lessor rights, it can also be argued that the statutory 
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of the Constitution on the eviction of squatters in South African law LLD dissertation Stellenbosch 
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eviction framework likewise entrenched the Grotian-pandectist view of ownership. This 
observation is in line with Pienaar’s description of the approach that applied to unlawful 
occupation as a top down approach that favoured and entrenched private ownership 
rights.245 The further implication of this convention applying to both the common law 
remedy and the statutory remedy for eviction is that the characteristics of 
completeness, individuality and abstractness also played a role in the way in which 
the court approached and applied the statutory instructions in eviction legislation. 
 
2 4 The interpretive and procedural approach to eviction remedies 
2 4 1 Introduction 
The procedural framework within which courts adjudicate disputes impacts on how 
courts approach and apply legal rules, principles and remedies.246 It is on the basis of 
this assumption that I attempt to look at different aspects of the judicial process to 
determine what impact prescribed rules and practices pertaining to the courts’ function 
and the judicial process, had on the manner in which courts applied remedies in 
general and then more specifically, the way in which courts applied eviction remedies 
in the pre-constitutional era. The specific aspects of the judicial process that will enjoy 
attention are firstly, the rules and principles pertaining to the interpretation of statutory 
and common law remedies and secondly, the prescribed procedural approach that 
determined what role the court played in proceedings. This analysis will allow me to 
draw conclusions about the type of judicial attitudes and assumptions that existed 
regarding the courts’ role; the prescribed manner in which courts were expected to 
adjudicate cases; and how these considerations influenced the judicial mind. In other 
words, it would allow me to determine the type of legal culture these attitudes and 
assumptions created.247 This in turn may indicate the way in which such legal culture 
                                                          
245 JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 668. 
246 D Bhana “The role of judicial method in contract law revisited” (2015) 132 SALJ 122 124. 
247 In this respect, see KE Klare “Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 
146 149. Klare defines legal culture as the “inarticulate premises culturally ingrained and historically 
ingrained.” This definition is similar to the definition or description Dugard ascribes to legal culture in 
CJR Dugard “The judicial process, positivism and civil liberty” (1971) 88 SALJ 181 188. 
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influenced the manner in which presiding officers, and therefore courts, approached 
and applied pre-constitutional eviction remedies. 
Klare confirms that the courts, in their approach to the interpretation and therefore the 
application of legal rules and principles (and remedies), are always confronted with 
the “conflicting pulls and tensions (formerly referred to ‘the dialectic’) of freedom and 
constraint”.248 Legal culture (one component of the unarticulated premises of judges) 
forms part of this dialect, and directs the way in which courts go about the judicial 
process.249 It causes courts to approach adjudication and therefore the application of 
remedies in a specific way based on amongst other things, their specific legal training, 
“professional sensibilities, habits of mind and intellectual reflexes.”250 Dugard251 
explains that legal culture can be described as the unarticulated premises or 
concealed stimuli of any judicial process. Arguably, this forms an important part of a 
particular judge’s methodology in interpreting text, considering factors or 
circumstances and, ultimately, deciding on and applying a specific remedy in a 
particular manner.252  
 
2 4 2 The interpretive function of courts 
When confronted with an eviction application in terms of the rei vindicatio or apartheid 
eviction legislation, the court had to interpret the requirements of the remedies and 
determine, based on the facts of the case, whether the requirements had been met. 
The interpretation exercise the court employed depended on which remedy (common 
law rei vindicatio or legislation PISA) it dealt with. This is important, as the rules of 
interpretation for private law issues differ from the prescribed rules of statutory 
                                                          
248 KE Klare “Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 146 149. 
249 See CJR Dugard “The judicial process, positivism and civil liberty” (1971) 88 SALJ 181 188. (citing) 
J Frank Law and the modern mind (1930) 105. 
250 KE Klare “Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 146 166. 
251 CJR Dugard “The judicial process, positivism and civil liberty” (1971) 88 SALJ 181 181. Dugard 
focusses on the court’s interpretation of parliamentary statutes and argues that it is unreasonably 
constrained by courts’ obedience towards positivism. This study is not isolated to determining the courts’ 
approach to its interpretive function, instead it also purports to determine the manner in which the courts 
apply the remedies. 
252 AJ van der Walt Property in the margins (2009) 18. 
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interpretation. The rule that dominated in the interpretation of parliamentary statutes 
was the intention of the legislator-rule.253 This rule advanced that the “sole task of the 
court in interpreting a statute is to discover the legislator’s intention”.254 Under this rule, 
courts had to ascertain the legislator’s intention by using subsidiary rules, called rules 
of interpretation or canons of construction.255 In this regard, a court had no power to 
ascribe to the provisions a meaning it deemed fair or appropriate,256 or a meaning 
other than what was purportedly intended by the legislator. This constituted a narrow 
approach to the judicial interpretive function, leading to the court executing its judicial 
functions in a relatively mechanical manner.257 As a result, evictions in terms of PISA, 
before the Amendment Act was promulgated, were subject to a mechanical approach 
where courts were obliged to give effect only to the provisions of the statute and ask 
no questions about the potential implications of enforcing the provisions. 
The judicial function in the interpretation of common law rules and principles was 
generally regarded as more flexible.258 Stated differently, when a court interpreted the 
common law and found the outcome did not do justice to the parties involved, it had 
the power to develop the common law to eliminate the possibility of such principles or 
rules having such an unwanted effect.259 In principle the application of the rei vindicatio 
should also have been subject to this flexible approach. However, it was not applied 
in this way as courts generally applied the rei vindicatio without having regard to 
whether or not its application had harsh or arbitrary effects on the unlawful 
occupier(s).260  
                                                          
253 CJR Dugard “The judicial process, positivism and civil liberty” (1971) 88 SALJ 181 183; LM du 
Plessis Re-interpretation of statutes (2002) 94. This intention of the legislator rule formed part of the 
common law cannons of statutory interpretation. See HR Hahlo & E Khan The South African legal 
system and its background (1968) 178; LM du Plessis Re-interpretation of statutes (2002) 92. 
254 CJR Dugard “The judicial process, positivism and civil liberty” (1971) 88 SALJ 181 182; LM du 
Plessis Re-interpretation of statutes (2002) 94. 
255 HR Hahlo & E Khan The South African legal system and its background (1968) 178; LM du Plessis 
Re-interpretation of statutes (2002) 92. 
256 CJR Dugard “The judicial process, positivism and civil liberty” (1971) 88 SALJ 181 186. 
257 CJR Dugard “The judicial process, positivism and civil liberty” (1971) 88 SALJ 181 186. 
258 CJR Dugard “The judicial process, positivism and civil liberty” (1971) 88 SALJ 181 183. 
259 Daniels v Daniels 1958 (1) SA 513 (A) 522. 
260 See chapter 2, section 2.4.2 below for case law that illustrates this point. 
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These respective rules of interpretation were established rules, introduced and 
engraved onto the judicial mind by means of legal education, which is also regarded 
as part of the legal culture of judges.261 Legal culture is influenced by legal education, 
which in turn, is a product of schools of thought which judges were trained and 
schooled in. Therefore, to determine a specific legal culture one would need to 
determine which school of thought was most prominent at the time of the training of 
judges when both the rei vindicatio and apartheid eviction legislation were available to 
enable eviction.  
Positivism was regarded as the courts’ “jurisprudential guide”262 to the interpretation 
and application of law in the pre-constitutional South Africa. In other words, the courts’ 
approach to the law (application of rules and principles) was informed by the theory of 
positivism.263 Positivism “can be said to be based on two cardinal beliefs: first, the truth 
of the theory of command, and secondly, the need for the strict separation of law and 
morality”.264 The latter required that a “strict division be maintained between law as it 
is and law as it ought to be”.265 Bongopi v Chairman of the Council of State, Ciskei266 
is one example of a South African judgment in which the courts’ approach to the law 
and its legal rules and principles is expressly based on positivism. In Bongopi267 the 
court held unequivocally that “[t]his court has always stated openly that it is not the 
maker of laws. It will enforce the law as it finds it”.268 In light of this ratio of the court, it 
seems as though positivism was the jurisprudential guide in the pre-constitutional era. 
Positivism infiltrated the South African legal system during the eighteenth to nineteenth 
century when South Africa was colonised by the United Kingdom (“UK”).269 During this 
                                                          
261 CJR Dugard “The judicial process, positivism and civil liberty” (1971) 88 SALJ 181 188; D Bhana 
“The role of judicial method in contract law revisited” (2015) 132 SALJ 122 143. 
262 CJR Dugard “The judicial process, positivism and civil liberty” (1971) 88 SALJ 181 183; D Bhana 
“The role of judicial method in contract law revisited” (2015) 132 SALJ 122 127. 
263 CJR Dugard “The judicial process, positivism and civil liberty” (1971) 88 SALJ 181 183; D Bhana 
“The role of judicial method in contract law revisited” (2015) 132 SALJ 122 127. 
264 CJR Dugard “The judicial process, positivism and civil liberty” (1971) 88 SALJ 181 183. 
265 CJR Dugard “The judicial process, positivism and civil liberty” (1971) 88 SALJ 181 184. 
266 1992 (3) SA 250 (CKG). 
267 Bongopi v Chairman of the Council of State, Ciskei 1992 (3) SA 250 (CKG) 265. 
268 Bongopi v Chairman of the Council of State, Ciskei 1992 (3) SA 250 (CKG) 265. 
269 CJR Dugard “The judicial process, positivism and civil liberty” (1971) 88 SALJ 181 184. 
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period positivism was the dominating legal philosophy in England.270 Accordingly, 
“English judges, university law schools and the inns of court, where most barristers 
received their legal education, fell under this influence”.271 Therefore, when the UK 
colonised South Africa it brought with it legal positivism and influenced the legal 
training of South African law scholars with positivist legal philosophy.272  
According to Dugard, the influence of positivism in the South African legal system, as 
illustrated by the Bongopi273 case is responsible for the development of judicial 
formalism.274 Schauer describes formalism as “decision making according to the rule” 
without having regard to the effect or outcome of such decision making.275  
Consequently, the mechanical application of legal rules and principles has to be seen 
in light of these developments.276  
The Webb case, set out above,277 concerned the owner’s right to exclude in terms of 
movable property. Accordingly, Webb was not an eviction case.278 However, it is an 
important case nevertheless as it illustrates the court’s interpretive exercise in early 
case law dealing with the scope of an owner’s entitlement to vindicate her property. 
The court’s point of departure was the history of the concept of ownership and its 
entitlements in Roman and Roman-Dutch law.279 In this regard, the court focussed on 
the general rule that owners are entitled to claim back their property because of their 
right to exclusive use and enjoyment of their property.280 However, the court 
                                                          
270 CJR Dugard “The judicial process, positivism and civil liberty” (1971) 88 SALJ 181 184. 
271 CJR Dugard “The judicial process, positivism and civil liberty” (1971) 88 SALJ 181 184-185.  
272 CJR Dugard “The judicial process, positivism and civil liberty” (1971) 88 SALJ 181 184-185. 
273 Bongopi v Chairman of the Council of State, Ciskei 1992 (3) SA 250 (CKG) 265. 
274 CJR Dugard “The judicial process, positivism and civil liberty” (1971) 88 SALJ 181 184-185. 
275 F Schauer “Formalism” (1987) 97 YLJ 509 510. 
276 CJR Dugard “The judicial process, positivism and civil liberty” (1971) 88 SALJ 181 185. 
277 Van der Merwe v Webb (1883-1884) 3 EDC 97 98. See chapter 2, section 2.2.3 above for a 
discussion of the facts of the case. 
278 See chapter 2, section 2.2.3 above; Van der Merwe v Webb (1883-1884) 3 EDC 97 98. 
279 See chapter 2, section 2.2.3 above; Van der Merwe v Webb (1883-1884) 3 EDC 97 101-113. 
280 See chapter 2, section 2.2.3 above; Van der Merwe v Webb (1883-1884) 3 EDC 97 102. See further 
Voet 6.1.22; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 347; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg 
vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 476; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s 
The law of property 5 ed (2006) 242; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s 
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acknowledged that certain restrictions existed in Dutch law pertaining to the 
entitlement of the owner to vindicate her property from a person who purchased the 
owner’s property at a public market.281 In particular, the court had to decide whether 
Dutch free market practices limited the scope of the owner’s ability to vindicate his 
stolen property.282  
The court in Webb had to interpret the Roman-Dutch law concept of ownership and 
Roman-Dutch maxims that might find application. In this regard, the starting point was 
the nature of ownership with reference to Roman and Roman-Dutch authorities. The 
court interpreted these authorities by ascribing to them their ordinary meaning and 
determining the context within which they were applied in both jurisdictions. It then 
moved on to determine what the impact of the respective maxims were on the owner’s 
entitlements in South African law and finally came to a conclusion that would not 
undermine, but strengthen the concept of ownership as received. 283 
Accordingly, Webb illustrates that the interpretation of Roman and Roman-Dutch 
authorities led the court to ascribe to the relevant text (a) its ordinary meaning in (b) 
the context in which it was used in Roman or Roman-Dutch times, respectively. This 
is in accordance with the cannons of interpretation of literalism and objectivism 
respectively.284 Webb furthermore, indicates that the court chose an interpretation that 
                                                          
principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 539; Wainwright and Co v Trustee Assigned Estate 
S Hassan Mahomed (1908) 29 NLR 619 626-627; Mngadino v Ntuli NO and Others 1981 (3) SA 478 
(D) 485. 
281 Van der Merwe v Webb (1883-1884) 3 EDC 97 103. 
282 See chapter 2, section 2.2.3 above; Voet 6.1.12; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 361; JC 
Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 476; JRL Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman 
& D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 657-699 686; PJ 
Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 245; 
CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed 
(2007) 405-729 546-547. 
283 Van der Merwe v Webb (1883-1884) 3 EDC 97 105. 
284 Literalism concerns the interpretation exercise of ascertaining the meaning of the text from the 
ipsissma verba in which the text is laid down, irrespective of an illogical or absurd result. In contrast, 
objectivism deals with the interpretation exercise where meaning is ascribed to statutory text on the 
basis that the text takes up an objective existence separate from the intention of the legislator after 
promulgation. See LM du Plessis Re-interpretation of statutes (2002) 83-98. 
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would strengthen ownership, rather than undermine it. This suggests that on the basis 
of the courts’ understanding of the nature of ownership, it deemed it just to uphold 
ownership entitlements rather than to restrict them.285 
Similarly, the court in Jeena followed the same interpretive exercise when it had to 
interpret the common law rules pertaining to when an owner can institute eviction 
proceedings against an unlawful occupier in terms of the rei vindicatio.286 In this case 
the court had to decide whether an owner who had transferred occupation to another 
party could evict a tenant holding over (unlawful occupier) from its property before the 
lawful occupant could take occupation.287 The court confirmed the Roman and Roman-
Dutch law authorities on the owner’s entitlement to evict.288 It held that the owner is 
entitled to evict the unlawful occupier because the lawful occupier has not taken 
occupancy of the property as yet.289 Here, the court also applied the cannon of 
objectivism and was satisfied with its outcome. 
Betta Eiendomme is a case decided in the constitutional era, but is relevant for 
purposes of this chapter because it illustrates the pre-constitutional approach to 
interpretation of the owner’s right to exclude when this right collides with section 26(3) 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The applicant sought the 
eviction of the respondent pursuant to the termination of the lease agreement between 
the applicant and the respondent. The termination of the lease agreement was due to 
the failure of the respondent to pay the agreed rent.290 The magistrate’s court failed to 
grant the applicant relief in terms of the common law rei vindicatio on the basis of the 
decision of Ross v South Peninsula Municipality.291 On appeal, the court confirmed 
                                                          
285 Van der Merwe v Webb (1883-1884) 3 EDC 97 106. 
286 See chapter 2, section section 2.2.3 above for a discussion of the facts of the case. 
287 Jeena v Minister of Lands 1955 (2) SA 380 (A) 382. 
288 Jeena v Minister of Lands 1955 (2) SA 380 (A) 382. 
289 Jeena v Minister of Lands 1955 (2) SA 380 (A) 383; Graham v Ridley 1931 TPD 476. 
290 Betta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 (W) para 1. 
291 Betta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 (W) para 1. In Ross, the court found that 
proof of ownership and unlawful occupation on the part of the defendant is insufficient to comply with 
the requirements for eviction. It held that in terms of section 26(3) all relevant circumstances should be 
considered before an order for eviction can be made. See Ross v South Peninsula Municipality 2000 
(1) SA 589 (C) 596. 
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the owner’s common law position.292 It reasserted that the owner’s common law 
entitlement to be in possession of her property stands.293 In this regard, the court 
emphasised that this position of the owner can only be deviated from in light of clear 
legislative provisions to that effect.294  
The court only considered the impact of section 26(3) on the owner’s right after 
establishing the owner’s supposedly strong position at common law.295 It interpreted 
section 26(3) in a restrictive manner by supposedly determining the ordinary meaning 
of section 26(3) and construing it in the context in which it had been drafted and the 
purpose for which it had been drafted.296 In this regard, the court placed considerable 
emphasis on the interpretation rule that provides that where limitations on rights are 
not clear from the relevant text, courts are obliged to apply an interpretation that 
favours the application of rights free from limitations.297 The court held that the correct 
interpretation of section 26(3) shows that the purpose of the section is aimed at 
protecting people against arbitrary eviction from their home and that “home” in the 
ordinary sense refers to where a person stays and has a right to stay.298 Section 26(3) 
is accordingly aimed at protecting right holders against arbitrary evictions. Therefore, 
in terms of the ordinary meaning and context interpretation rules squatters or people 
holding over are excluded from the ambit of section 26(3).299 
As a result, the court was satisfied that section 26(3) imposed no burden on the 
owner’s right to possession of her property in the current situation.300 It held that the 
Ross-case was incorrectly decided and that the court a quo in the current matter erred 
                                                          
292 Betta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 (W) para 6. 
293 Betta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 (W) para 6. 
294 Betta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 (W) para 6. 
295 Betta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 (W) para 7. 
296 Betta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 (W) para 7; AJ van der Walt “Exclusivity 
of ownership, security of tenure and eviction orders: A critical evaluation of recent case law” (2002) 18 
SAJHR 398. 
297 Betta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 (W) para 10. 
298 Betta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 (W) para 6. 
299 Betta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 (W) para 7. 
300 Betta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 (W) para 10; AJ van der Walt “Exclusivity 
of ownership, security of tenure and eviction orders: A critical evaluation of recent case law” (2002) 18 
SAJHR 397. 
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in refusing to grant an eviction order.301 To its mind the owner’s right to possession 
still had full force and had to be enforced accordingly.302 
The cases discussed in this section illustrate that courts in the pre-constitutional era 
interpreted common law authorities and cases impacting on the owner’s rei vindicatio 
by (a) attributing the ordinary meaning to the texts (literalist cannon of interpretation) 
and (b) by determining how the specific principle, concept or maxim was applied in 
Roman or Roman-Dutch times (objectivist cannon of interpretation). Interestingly, they 
also show that courts potentially regarded the outcome where the owner’s entitlements 
are protected strongly as the most just outcome. This might explain why they never 
deemed it necessary to look at surrounding circumstances, because to their minds 
where the owner’s right was protected the outcome was always just. Van der Walt 
points out that this approach of courts can be described as reactionary and 
conservative due to the fact that it highlights the deep-level assumption harboured by 
courts that the “existing property holdings, the status quo, is basically inviolate and to 
be accepted, protected and upheld unless any aspect of it changed clearly and for 
good cause”.303 
The formalistic manner in which courts approached questions of interpretation also 
comes out strongly in the cases discussed above because in all three cases the court 
was ultimately only interested in ascertaining rights and giving effect to those rights. 
It is furthermore interesting to consider the application of eviction remedies in the pre-
constitutional era, given the above-mentioned comments and case law about the way 
in which legal education and legal background possibly influenced the adjudication 
process. Courts in line with positivism only gave effect to the law as it was, and not 
how it should have been. When courts were confronted with an eviction application in 
terms of the rei vindicatio the court only set out to find out what the principles and 
requirements of the rei vindicatio remedy were, and consequently evaluated whether 
the requirements in a given case were met. Using the flexibility of its interpretive 
function in the application of the rei vindicatio, to maybe develop the remedy, was 
                                                          
301 Betta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 (W) paras 13-15 
302 Betta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 (W) para 10. 
303 AJ van der Walt “Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure and eviction orders: A critical evaluation 
of recent case law” (2002) 18 SAJHR 399. 
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never considered. Therefore, considerations other than the strict requirements of the 
respective remedies would consequently have resulted in interpreting the law as it 
ought to be, which would have been in direct conflict with positivism.304 
 
2 4 3 The prescribed role of courts 
During the British occupation of South Africa, in the nineteenth century, British civil 
procedure and criminal procedure law infiltrated the South African legal system.305 
Prior to the British occupation of South Africa, the procedural law that operated in 
South Africa was Roman-Dutch procedural law in accordance with the civil law 
tradition.306 This was the result of the Dutch East India Company’s annexation 
activities in the Cape.307 However, at the time the British occupation began British 
authorities were dissatisfied with the existing procedural law in South Africa.308 
Subsequently they incorporated English procedural rules, principles and practices into 
the South African legal system. Therefore, the civil procedure law that operated in the 
pre-constitutional South African legal system had its roots in the English common law 
tradition.309 English civil procedure law dictated all relevant factors, including the role 
of courts, the hierarchy of courts and the scope of the powers and jurisdiction of the 
courts.310 The most outstanding characteristic of the common law tradition that the 
South African legal system inherited in the sphere of procedural law was the 
adversarial approach to court proceedings. The inquisitorial approach to court 
                                                          
304 HR Hahlo & E Khan The South African legal system and its background (1968) 23. 
305 HJ Erasmus “The interaction of substantive law and procedure” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) 
Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 141-161 146. 
306 HJ Erasmus “The interaction of substantive law and procedure” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) 
Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 141-161 145. Roman-Dutch jurists 
explained Roman-Dutch civil procedure. Their work was relied on heavily by South African courts. 
307 HJ Erasmus “The interaction of substantive law and procedure” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) 
Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 141-161 143. 
308 HJ Erasmus “The interaction of substantive law and procedure” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) 
Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 141-161 146. 
309 HJ Erasmus “Historical foundations of the South African law of civil procedure” (1991) 108 SALJ 
265 265. 
310 HJ Erasmus “The interaction of substantive law and procedure” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) 
Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 141-161 146. 
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proceedings differs from the common law adversarial approach in that the inquisitorial 
nature of the civil law tradition requires judges to take up an active role in court 
proceedings.311 Both private law and statutory eviction remedies in the pre-
constitutional era were dealt with in an adversarial manner. 
An adversarial approach, or as it is referred to in procedural law “adversarial 
procedure”, is premised on the following three common law features: (a) that oral 
evidence and cross examination are two integral elements of a trial; (b) that the parties 
in dispute bring and argue their own cases; and (c) that the adjudicator is required to 
play a passive role.312 It is this last feature of the adversarial system that I will be 
focussing on further in this discussion. This feature that requires judges to play a 
passive role in the adjudication process has its own policy consideration (or rather 
underlying rationale) for purposes of the law of evidence. This policy consideration is 
found in the second feature mentioned above, which dictates that parties must argue 
and make their own cases in court.313 For example; where parties in a dispute have to 
decide upon the relief they would prefer and the legal rules, facts and arguments they 
have to rely on to obtain the sought relief, there is no need for the court to do the same. 
It is possible that the passive role courts played in eviction proceedings had no 
connection with the substantive outcome of such cases. For example, where parties 
frame their case in a specific way and focus on specific facts more than others so as 
to satisfy the requirements of the remedy/relief they want and the court at the end of 
proceedings in its chambers decides the case on what has been placed before it; it 
does not mean that just because the court did not conduct the proceedings (decide on 
the main issues and arguments) that the substantive outcomes of the case would be 
                                                          
311 JA Jolowicz “Adversarial and inquisitorial models of civil procedure” (2003) 52 ICLQ 281 290. 
312 PJ Schwikkard & SJ van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 2 ed (2002) 9. See also HJ Erasmus 
“Historical foundations of the South African law of civil procedure” (1991) 108 SALJ 265 265 where he 
states that “[t]he forms of procedure devised under the First and Second Charters of Justice of 1828 
and 1834 for the Supreme Court of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope display the fundamental 
features characteristic of proceedings at common law, namely, the adversarial character of the system 
and the predominant role of the parties in the conduct of the litigation, the passive and neutral role of 
the court, and the 'orality, immediacy and publicity of its proceedings.” (Footnotes omitted). This 
underlying rationale refers to the belief that when parties bring their own case the contested, 
oppositional presentations of "facts" will bring the truth to light. 
313 PJ Schwikkard & SJ van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 2 ed (2002) 9. 
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a-contextual and unjust. However, I argue that in the context of evictions this was the 
case. This is illustrated in Khuzwayo v Dludla314 and Betta Eiendomme. Khuzwayo 
concerned a case in which the Land Claims Court had to decide whether it had 
automatic review jurisdiction in terms of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 
1997 (“ESTA”) in a case decided in terms of the rei vindicatio.315 Khuzwayo was 
decided in the constitutional era, however, it is significant for purposes of this section 
because it highlights the way in which the court perceived its role in eviction cases in 
the pre-constitutional era. The court held on the basis of Skhosana and Others v Roos 
T/A Roos se Oord and Others316 that it would only have jurisdiction in the matter if the 
occupiers raised a defence against the eviction in terms ESTA.317 In the court of first 
instance the plaintiff’s cause of action was the common law rei vindicatio in terms of 
his ownership and the defendants’ only defence was that they were not in unlawful 
occupation of the property.318 On the basis of the parties’ pleadings the court found 
that the occupiers had raised no defence in terms of ESTA and that it therefore had 
no automatic review jurisdiction.319 The court emphasised that in terms of the 
adversarial system that regulated the role of presiding officers, it is not the duty of 
courts to direct applicants to amend proceedings.320 Interestingly, the court observed 
that such an approach leaves those occupiers that ESTA and PIE purport to protect 
without protection and therefore vulnerable to eviction.321 However, after recognising 
this gap, it nevertheless went on to decline to review the application.322 
Similarly, in Betta Eiendomme certain remarks were made concerning the role of 
courts in eviction cases.323 The court expressed strong statements with regard to the 
                                                          
314 2001 (1) SA 714 (LCC). 
315 Khuzwayo v Dludla 2001 (1) SA 714 (LCC) para 1. 
316 2000 (4) SA 561 (LLC). 
317 Khuzwayo v Dludla 2001 (1) SA 714 (LCC) para 10; Skhosana and Others v Roos T/A Roos SE 
Oord and Others 2000 (4) SA 561 (LLC) para 22. 
318 Khuzwayo v Dludla 2001 (1) SA 714 (LCC) paras 1-4. 
319 Khuzwayo v Dludla 2001 (1) SA 714 (LCC) para 12. 
320 Khuzwayo v Dludla 2001 (1) SA 714 (LCC) para 13. 
321 Khuzwayo v Dludla 2001 (1) SA 714 (LCC) para 13. 
322 Khuzwayo v Dludla 2001 (1) SA 714 (LCC) para 13. 
323 Betta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 (W) para 15. 
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role of the court in eviction cases324 and emphasised that the court’s role is not to look 
for defences for parties where they do not expressly raise such defences.325 The 
phrase “all circumstances” in terms of section 26(3) only applies to those 
circumstances included in the pleadings.326 A court is accordingly obliged only to refer 
to the defences raised in the pleadings in section 26(3) cases.327 In this regard the 
court reiterated that there is no duty on courts to go beyond the pleadings.328 
These cases illustrate the way in which courts understood their role when applying 
eviction remedies. It also illustrates that the passive approach due to the adversarial 
system led courts to make decisions in a conservative manner, even after it became 
clear that an eviction order would be unjust. 
Accordingly, the passive role of the court supported and entrenched the already 
formalistic and conservative approach employed when interpreting the facts and 
applying the principles of the remedies. In this context an approach was entrenched 
where procedure was regarded more important than asking relevant questions about 
substance, and where adjudication encompassed the objective and mechanical 
application of rules. 
 
2 5 Concluding remarks 
It is clear that the natural and moral legal understanding and institution of ownership 
was adopted by the South African society because of the strong influence Grotius and 
the pandectist scholars had on the development of South African common law.329 It 
caused characteristics such as completeness and exclusivity to dominate the 
conceptual understanding of ownership. This was particularly true for how courts and 
academics interpreted the institution of ownership and as a result how they interpreted 
and applied the rei vindicatio as the primary mechanism to protect ownership. The 
                                                          
324 Betta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 (W) para 15. 
325 Betta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 (W) para 15. 
326 Betta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 (W) para 15. 
327 Betta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 (W) para 15. 
328 Betta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 (W) para 15. 
329 See chapter 2, section 2.2.2 above.  
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decisions of Chetty, Jeena, and Webb are evidence of this conceptual understanding. 
These cases indicate how the identified characteristics of completeness, individuality 
and abstractness informed an absolutist view of the right to exclude that was ultimately 
visible in the courts’ approach to the rei vindicatio. Therefore, the underlying rationale 
of the rei vindicatio remedy relates directly to a strong right to exclude, with the focus 
being on the owner and the protection of her rights vis-à-vis the others. 
In line with Van der Walt’s normality assumption, one can argue that the acceptance 
of completeness and exclusivity of ownership led to the pre-constitutional acceptance 
by South African courts (and society) of the idea that the normal state of affairs entails 
the situation where the owner of immovable property is always in occupation of her 
property, unless the owner consents to the occupation of the property voluntarily; 
however, this was seen as a temporary, abnormal state of affairs.330 In other words, 
the theoretical framework that made up the rights paradigm not only informed the 
rules, requirements and principles of the rei vindicatio, but also informed the courts’ 
doctrinal, rhetorical and logical assumptions behind the application of the remedy. 
Therefore, the courts in the pre-constitutional era, approached the application of the 
common law rei vindicatio remedy with a conservative and supposedly objective 
attitude, meaning that the owner’s position, and therefore ownership, had to be 
defended as a point of departure. 
The chapter also shows that the statutory eviction remedies that were available to 
landowners in the pre-constitutional era, alongside the rei vindicatio, were founded on 
the same conceptual foundation upon which the rei vindicatio was based. This 
conceptual basis attributed completeness, individuality and abstractness to ownership 
and created the basis for an absolute right to vindicate her property from unlawful 
occupiers. This was the case even though its ideology was racially-orientated in the 
form of entrenching apartheid.331 Also in this context a conservative attitude was 
exhibited by courts in their approach to statutory eviction provisions, to ensure that the 
                                                          
330 See chapter 2, section 2.2.3 above. 
331 See chapter 2, section 2.2.2 above. 
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institution of ownership is not easily undermined by something like a flexible approach 
to statutory provisions which could potentially prohibit eviction.332  
The analysis of the judicial function and its procedural approach to eviction remedies 
brought to light the fact that the court in eviction proceedings adopted a very passive 
and uninvolved stance. In the first instance this passive and uninvolved approach is 
ascribed to the fact that positivism was the courts’ jurisprudential guide on how to 
approach and apply the law generally, including eviction remedies.333 This 
jurisprudential guide, in turn created the institution of judicial formalism in the courts’ 
application of both statutory and common law eviction remedies. While courts were 
generally in no position to resist this formalistic mandate in the context of statutory 
interpretation, they may have had a more creative interpretive function in their 
application of the common law rei vindicatio.334  
In the second instance, the adversarial approach to court proceedings which became 
part of the South African civil procedure law due to British occupation, furthermore 
contributed to the passive and uninvolved stance the court took in the context of 
eviction remedies by expressly requiring the court not to become involved in the 
proceedings.335 Accordingly, in the pre-constitutional era, the institution of ownership, 
based on the natural legal philosophical notions of completeness, individuality and 
abstractness, together with the courts’ jurisprudential guide that was informed and 
directed by positivist legal philosophy and the adversarial system, caused the courts 
to approach the application of eviction remedies in a conservative, objective and 
formalistic manner. 
                                                          
332 See chapter 2, section 2.2.2 above. 
333 See chapter 2, section 2.4.2 above. 
334 See chapter 2, section 2.4.2 above. 
335 See chapter 2, section 2.4.3 above. 
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Chapter 3: The courts’ approach to eviction 
remedies in the constitutional era 
 
3 1 Introduction 
The displacement of non white citizens through forced removals is a lasting effect of 
the apartheid regime.1 In response to this historical reality of South Africa, the process 
of evictions and removals in the post-constitutional era has to take cognisance of this 
history.2 Furthermore, the process should also strive to promote the founding values 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the “Constitution”) and 
applicable rights in the Bill of Rights, so as to heal the divisions created by the past 
and prevent such gross violations of human rights from reoccurring in the future.3 With 
the advent of the Constitution in 1996, the Bill of Rights consequently contains section 
26(3) that aims to prohibit the arbitrary eviction of people from their homes without an 
order of court.4 This provision explicitly requires judicial oversight and control where 
evictions from homes are concerned.5 However, this role ascribed to courts assumes 
that the legal culture, judicial processes and procedures of courts are already aligned 
                                                          
1 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 10. 
2 See First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 
49; Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) paras 8-13. See further JM 
Pienaar & J Brickhill “Land” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 
2 ed (RS 6 2014) 48-5 for a discussion of the historical context requirement for the interpretation of land 
legislation. 
3 See First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 
49; Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) paras 14-23. See further JM 
Pienaar & J Brickhill “Land” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 
2 ed (RS 6 2014) 48-5; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 661 for a discussion of the constitutional context 
requirement for the interpretation of land legislation. 
4 S 26(3) of the Constitution. See further K McLean “Housing” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional law of South Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 55-42; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 688. 
5 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 18. 
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with relevant constitutional values and goals. In this regard Van der Walt points out 
the possibility of a flaw in such an assumption: 
“In a legal system where interpretation of the law depends upon professional judicial 
skills that are traditionally shaped and honed in the province of uncodified common law, 
this problem becomes critical, even (or especially) when the new democratic legislator 
introduces lavish amounts of new and innovative legislation in an attempt to force 
through the necessary reforms. In these instances legal tradition can play a major role 
in determining and circumscribing real and effective change. Politically necessary and 
constitutionally or statutory authorised social and economic change could be frustrated 
by interpretive reluctance or doctrinal immobility shaped or informed by a legal culture 
that was developed in a supposedly apolitical environment but that was nevertheless 
almost certainly influenced by pre-reform (and very likely political discredited) social and 
political thinking and attitudes.”6 
The quote by Van der Walt explains the ratio for this chapter and the bigger question 
this research attempts to answer. It describes the important, but often underestimated, 
impact that professional judicial skills, (forming part of legal tradition, legal education 
and ultimately the legal culture of judges) have on the successful operation of a legal 
system with specific reform goals in mind.7  
The purpose of this chapter is to determine the courts’ approach to eviction remedies 
in the constitutional era after the promulgation of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from 
and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (“PIE”). The focus will fall on 
determining the legal culture that currently informs the courts’ approach to eviction 
cases and the impact that the legal culture has on the courts’ ability to adequately deal 
with eviction cases in the constitutional era. This is necessary because, as explained 
above in the quote by Van der Walt, an underestimated and sometimes overlooked 
aspect is the legal culture within which a court applies laws. Accordingly, it is argued 
that it is not only the seemingly neutral application of the requirements of remedies 
and the unique facts of each case that steer the court in deciding upon whether an 
eviction order should be granted or not. In this chapter the courts’ approach is given a 
                                                          
6 AJ van der Walt Property in the margins (2009) 18. 
7 See CJR Dugard “The judicial process, positivism and civil liberty” (1971) 88 SALJ 181 188 (citing) J 
Frank Law and the modern mind (1930) 105. 
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wide definition that includes not only the impact of the remedies and their requirements 
on the courts’ approach, but also involves identifying the legal culture with which the 
courts apply eviction remedies in the constitutional era. This will provide a holistic view 
of the courts’ approach to eviction remedies in light of constitutional requirements for 
evictions. 
Bhana ascribes to legal culture a broad definition.8 Her definition of legal culture 
advances that a society’s legal education and personal experiences of the law, as 
informed by a wide range of factors, shapes the attitude and conceptual understanding 
with which legal minds approach the law.9 These factors include the “highly theoretical 
legal conceptions put forward by jurisprudential scholars to ‘the professional 
sensibilities, habits of mind [,]… intellectual reflexes’ and ensuing standard practices 
of judges and lawyers, [and] even the more pragmatic perceptions of bureaucrats and 
lay persons”.10 In this chapter the courts’ understanding and attitude towards the right 
to vindicate are described through both the identification of the (a) highly theoretical 
conceptions of eviction remedies that courts embrace; and (b) the courts’ standard 
practices and procedures that courts inherited from the pre-constitutional era and 
which now find application when courts adjudicate eviction cases in the constitutional 
era. 
This chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part sets out the historical and the 
political background that led to the promulgation of PIE, as well as the philosophical 
framework as couched by courts that must inform the approach of courts in the 
application of PIE. This allows for inferences to be made about the type of legal culture 
that the right to vindicate in terms of PIE envisaged in the constitutional era. The first 
part of the chapter also sets out the theoretical underpinnings of PIE as reflected in 
the Act itself and developed and given flesh to in case law. This part determines the 
courts’ actual approach to the application of the procedural and substantive 
                                                          
8 D Bhana “The role of judicial method in contract law revisited” (2015) 132 SALJ 122 124. See also 
chapter 2, section 2.1 above. 
9 D Bhana “The role of judicial method in contract law revisited” (2015) 132 SALJ 122 124. See also 
chapter 2, section 2.1 above. 
10 D Bhana “The role of judicial method in contract law revisited” (2015) 132 SALJ 122 124, quoting 
Klare’s description of legal culture. (Footnotes omitted). See also KE Klare “Legal culture and 
transformative constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 146 166. 
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requirements of PIE. This is to ascertain whether or not the required philosophical 
approach is indeed present when courts apply PIE in the process of eviction 
adjudication. This allows for inferences to be made about the nature of the legal culture 
of courts that is present when courts apply PIE. 
The second part of the chapter focusses on determining the prescribed role and 
function of courts, when they apply the eviction measures as set out in PIE. Firstly, 
section two identifies the way in which courts are generally required to interpret the 
law in the constitutional era. Secondly, the section identifies the prescribed procedural 
approach with which presiding officers in eviction cases must abide. 
Finally, the findings pertaining to (a) the philosophical underpinnings of the 
constitutional eviction remedy; and (b) the interpretive and procedural functions of the 
courts are utilised to draw conclusions about the legal culture within which courts 
applied eviction remedies in the pre-constitutional era as opposed to the approach 
courts adopt currently in post-apartheid land law in South Africa. 
 
3 2 The constitutional eviction remedy: PIE 
3 2 1 Background to the promulgation of PIE  
Apartheid land law coupled with eviction legislation in the pre-constitutional era 
resulted in large scale evictions and relocations of non white citizens.11 The Group 
Areas Act 41 of 1950 (“GAA”) effectively disqualified certain race groups from 
occupying certain areas. These unwanted occupiers were referred to as “disqualified 
persons” in the GAA. 12 Disqualification had the effect that a disqualified person 
                                                          
11 In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Peoples Dialogue on Land and Shelter and Others 2000 (2) SA 1074 
(SE) 1079-1080; Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 9 where 
both the High Court and the Constitutional Court explained the implications of the apartheid land law. 
See further C O’Regan “The prevention of illegal squatting act” in C Murray & C O’Regan (eds) No 
place to rest: Forced removals and the law in South Africa (1990) 162-179 162; JM Pienaar Land reform 
(2014) 687 for an in-depth discussion of how the eviction measure PISA affected evictions in the pre-
constitutional era. See also chapter 2, section 2.3 above. 
12 See M Robertson “Dividing the land: An introduction to apartheid land law” in C Murray & C O’Regan 
(eds) No place to rest: Forced removals and the law in South Africa (1990) 122-136 126; JM Pienaar 
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occupying land in an area not allocated for her specific race group was guilty of an 
offence and could be dealt with accordingly.13 Once unlawfulness was established, 
occupiers were removed swiftly without any hassle.14 The Prevention of Illegal 
Squatting Act 52 of 1951 (“PISA”) criminalised squatting to this end. It ensured that 
the eviction process of disqualified persons and therefore unlawful occupiers could be 
carried outas quickly as possible through criminal prosecution and conviction followed 
by a default eviction order.15 Non white persons generally found themselves without 
any statutory or common law occupational protection, which made them vulnerable 
and subject to the power of the government and the rights of the white minority.16 
At the end of the apartheid era, the government had succeeded in creating a South 
Africa segregated upon racial lines.17 The white minority generally lived in affluent 
areas while the black and coloured majority lived in areas allocated for black and 
coloured people respectively.18 In this way, the apartheid system also created 
separate countries, referred to as “homelands” for different race groups within South 
Africa.19 These results were reached, inter alia, by impairing the dignity of people of 
                                                          
“‘Unlawful occupier’ in perspective: History, legislation and case law” in H Mostert & MJ de Waal (eds) 
Essays in honour of CG van der Merwe (2011) 309-329 312. 
13 Section 23 of the Group Areas Act 41 of 1950. See also AJ van der Walt “Exclusivity of ownership, 
security of tenure and eviction orders: A model to evaluate South African land reform legislation” 2002 
TSAR 254 260; JM Pienaar “‘Unlawful occupier’ in perspective: History, legislation and case law” in H 
Mostert & MJ de Waal (eds) Essays in honour of CG van der Merwe (2011) 309-329 312; JM Pienaar 
Land reform (2014) 106-107. The designation, separation and disqualification of race groups brought 
about by the 1950 Act, was further reinforced in the subsequent Group Areas Act 36 of 1996. 
14 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 8. Judge Sachs J 
emphasised the arbitrariness of this by explaining: 
“[E]ven if they had been born on the land and spent their whole lives there, persons from whom 
permission to remain on land had been withdrawn by new owners were treated as criminals and 
subjected to summary eviction.” 
15 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 8; JM Pienaar “‘Unlawful 
occupier’ in perspective: History, legislation and case law” in H Mostert & MJ de Waal (eds) Essays in 
honour of CG van der Merwe (2011) 309-329 315. 
16 S Liebenberg Socio-economic rights adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 267. 
17 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 9. 
18 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 10. 
19 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 9. For a detailed 
discussion of how these separate areas were created see M Robertson “Dividing the land: An 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
79 
colour through forced removals and relocations to poor, over-crowded areas, far from 
cities and work opportunities.20 Non white persons could only reside in urban areas if 
the labour needs of the white minority required it.21 Accordingly, at the beginning of 
South Africa’s constitutional democracy the aftermath of apartheid left the majority of 
the previously oppressed groups socially and economically marginalised. In this 
regard Horn J in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Peoples Dialogue on Land and Shelter22 
explained the plight of the homeless in the new South Africa that led to the need for 
the promulgation of PIE: 
“With the lifting of the racial restrictions as to where people could live and work, 
many of the unemployed in the former homelands migrated to the cities. They went 
in search of work, taking their families with them. The shortage of accommodation 
in the urban areas forced them to live in shack towns or squatter camps on open 
land. Their plight should be recognised and should be treated with awareness and 
understanding. Humane action is needed, not a sledgehammer.”23 
 
                                                          
introduction to apartheid land law” in C Murray & C O’Regan (eds) No place to rest: Forced removals 
and the law in South Africa (1990) 122-136 125-132. 
20 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 10; Residents of Joe 
Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC) para 98. See 
also A Claassens “Rural land struggles in the Transvaal in the 1980’s” in C Murray & C O’Regan (eds) 
No place to rest: Forced removals and the law in South Africa (1990) 27-65 27. 
21 S Liebenberg Socio-economic rights adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 267. 
Access to white areas based on labour needs was made possible by the Natives (Urban Areas) Act no 
21 of 1923 and later on by the Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945. In this regard, see 
M Robertson “Dividing the land: An introduction to apartheid land law” in C Murray & C O’Regan (eds) 
No place to rest: Forced removals and the law in South Africa (1990) 122-136 131; JM Pienaar 
“‘Unlawful occupier’ in perspective: History, legislation and case law” in H Mostert & MJ de Waal (eds) 
Essays in honour of CG van der Merwe (2011) 309-329 311-312. 
22 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Peoples Dialogue on Land and Shelter and Others 2000 (2) SA 1074 
(SE). 
23 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Peoples Dialogue on Land and Shelter and Others 2000 (2) SA 1074 
(SE) 1079. See also JM Pienaar “‘Unlawful occupier’ in perspective: History, legislation and case law” 
in H Mostert & MJ de Waal (eds) Essays in honour of CG van der Merwe (2011) 309-329 314. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
80 
3 2 2 The theoretical underpinnings of PIE 
3 2 2 1 The purpose and function of PIE  
The inclusion of section 26(3) in the final Constitution established the Constitution’s 
commitment to the plight of the homeless and the vulnerable in the context of eviction. 
Section 26(3) requires that “no one may be evicted from their home, or have their 
home demolished, without an order of Court made after considering all the relevant 
circumstances”.24 Based on this constitutionally entrenched right to non-arbitrary and 
court ordained evictions, PIE was promulgated to give effect to section 26(3) of the 
Constitution and was therefore set in place to regulate evictions in the constitutional 
dispensation.25 With regard to residential property, PIE expressly replaced both pre-
constitutional eviction remedies, namely the rei vindicatio and PISA.26 The owner’s 
right to evict in terms of the common law has been codified in PIE and made subject 
to substantive and procedural requirements to ensure that the process of evicting 
unlawful occupiers is not arbitrary.27 Therefore, PIE is a constitutionally ordained 
eviction measure promulgated to ensure that the rights and interests of both the owner 
and the unlawful occupier are protected in the process of evictions. 
Section 2 of PIE sets out the application scope of the Act. It states that PIE applies to 
all land in the country. However, section 1 (the definition clause) expressly excludes 
two categories of occupiers from the application scope of PIE. Occupiers who enjoy 
the procedural and substantive protection under the Extension of Security of Tenure 
Act 62 of 1997 (“ESTA”) and those occupiers who are protected in terms of the Interim 
                                                          
24 Section 26(3) of the Constitution. 
25 Sections 26 and 25 of the Constitution. See also PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg 
and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 242; S Liebenberg Socio-economic rights adjudication 
under a transformative constitution (2010) 270; AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 
91; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 661; Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 
217 (CC) para 11. 
26 Section 4(1) of PIE; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of 
property 5 ed (2006) 242; S Liebenberg Socio-economic rights adjudication under a transformative 
constitution (2010) 270; JM Pienaar “‘Unlawful occupier’ in perspective: History, legislation and case 
law” in H Mostert & MJ de Waal (eds) Essays in honour of CG van der Merwe (2011) 309-329 316; JM 
Pienaar Land reform (2014) 688. 
27 CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed 
(2007) 405-729 549. 
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Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 31 of 1996 (“IPILA”) are specifically excluded 
from the protection of PIE.28 In this regard, section 2 of ESTA limits ESTA’s application 
scope to rural areas and particularly land used and zoned for agricultural purposes.29 
IPILA, in turn, regulates tenure security that includes security from evictions in rural 
areas.30 Accordingly, the application scope of PIE is not unlimited; it is limited to private 
and public land in residential urban and township areas to evictions from what the 
unlawful occupier regards as her home.31 However, because PIE has national 
application it will also apply to evictions from agricultural land where ESTA would not 
find application due to the facts.32 
An eviction measure in terms of the common law is ordinarily only expected to protect 
the owner’s right to exclude, inherent in ownership.33 Accordingly, the primary function 
                                                          
28 PIE does not expressly exclude occupiers to whom the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 
(LRA) applies. However, the LRA regulates evictions pertaining to labour tenants with labour tenancy 
agreements. See section 9(1)(a)-(b) of the LRA for the requirements a person has to meet before such 
a person will be regarded as labour tenant for purposes of LRA. For a discussion of the limitations on 
eviction caused by LRA see PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The 
law of property 5 ed (2006) 599; S Liebenberg Socio-economic rights adjudication under a 
transformative constitution (2010) 272; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 432-433. 
29 Section 2 of ESTA. To qualify for protection under ESTA an occupier has to comply with certain 
requirements. These are: firstly, that the occupier has to “reside on land which belongs to another 
person”; secondly, the occupier’s income may not exceed R5000.00 per month; and finally, the 
occupation must be for residential purposes and not for any personal commercial endeavours. See 
further Mkangeli and Others v Joubert and Others 2001 (2) SA 1191 (CC) paras 7-11 where the court 
expressly held that ESTA applies only to rural land or agricultural land. See also PJ Badenhorst, JM 
Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 608-610; JM Pienaar 
Land reform (2014) 399-416. 
30 JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 795-796. Pienaar explains that section 2(1) of IPILA provides holders 
of informal rights in terms of IPILA protection against eviction by providing such holders with protection 
against deprivation of even informal rights. 
31 See PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed 
(2006) 248-249; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 701-712. 
32 Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters and Another 2001 (4) SA 385 (W) is an 
example of a case where PIE was applied to evict a community of unlawful occupiers from farm land. 
33 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 347; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 242-243; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du 
Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 539; JM Pienaar Land reform 
(2014) 668. These sources show that the rei vindicatio had no alternate function, but to protect an 
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of an eviction remedy such as the rei vindicatio was to ensure that landowners can 
evict unlawful occupiers swiftly, provided the requirements were met. However, in the 
pre-constitutional era PISA showed that an eviction measure can also promote a 
secondary policy goal.34 This is evident in that PISA functioned as both an eviction 
remedy and a measure to effect racial segregation in the apartheid era (predominantly 
as a spatial racial planning mechanism).35  
With the advent of the Constitution, parliament in its attempt to rectify the injustices of 
apartheid forced removals and evictions, enacted PIE.36 Much like PISA, PIE also has 
a dual function. The Constitutional Court in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various 
Occupiers37 explained that PIE’s secondary goal is exactly the opposite of what PISA 
primarily sought to achieve.38 Sach’s J explained that: 
“PIE not only repealed PISA but in a sense inverted it: squatting was decriminalised and the 
eviction process was made subject to a number of requirements, some necessary to comply with 
certain demands of the Bill of Rights. The overlay between public and private law continued, but 
in reverse fashion, with the name, character, tone and context of the statute being turned around. 
Thus the first part of the title of the new law emphasised a shift in thrust from prevention of illegal 
squatting to prevention of illegal eviction. The former objective of reinforcing common law 
remedies while reducing common law protections, was reversed so as to temper common law 
remedies with strong procedural and substantive protections; and the overall objective of 
facilitating the displacement and relocation of poor and landless black people for ideological 
purposes was replaced by acknowledgment of the necessitous quest for homes of victims of past 
                                                          
owner’s right to exclusive use and enjoyment of her property by ordering recovery of the property in the 
owner’s favour. See chapter 2, section 2.3 above. 
34 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 9. See further AJ van der 
Walt “Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure and eviction orders: A model to evaluate South African 
land reform legislation” 2002 TSAR 254 258; AJ van der Walt Property in the margins (2009) 60-70 
where Van der Walt argues that evictions in the apartheid era had a political agenda linked to it, namely 
to realise racial segregation. See further JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 660 where Pienaar explains 
that evictions together with the group areas legislation and influx control measures constituted the three 
pillars of apartheid. See chapter 2, section 2.3 above. 
35 See AJ van der Walt “Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure and eviction orders: A model to 
evaluate South African land reform legislation” 2002 TSAR 254 258; AJ van der Walt Property in the 
margins (2009) 65-66; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 660. 
36 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 11. 
37 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 37. 
38 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 12. 
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racist policies. While awaiting access to new housing development programmes, such homeless 
people had to be treated with dignity and respect. Thus, the former depersonalised processes 
that took no account of the life circumstances of those being expelled were replaced by 
humanised procedures that focused on fairness to all. People once regarded as anonymous 
squatters now became entitled to dignified and individualised treatment with special 
consideration for the most vulnerable.”39 
PIE operates as an eviction remedy but at the same time it must ensure the orderly 
resettlement of those left homeless and displaced by the apartheid regime.40 These 
two opposing aims are based on two distinct constitutional clauses, namely the 
property clause in section 25(1) of the Constitution and the housing clause in section 
26(3) of the Constitution.41 
As a result, PIE is a legislative measure aimed at protecting the status quo whilst also 
promoting the transformative thrust of the Constitution.42 The preamble of PIE makes 
this objective clear. PIE states that it protects both sections 25 and 26(3) of the 
Constitution by prohibiting arbitrary deprivation of property and by prohibiting evictions 
or demolition of homes without an order of court. Furthermore, it requires that both the 
rights of the landowner and the unlawful occupiers, in particular children, woman, 
disabled persons and the elderly, are considered in eviction cases. In this way PIE 
regulates the eviction of unlawful occupiers in a fair manner, while also providing the 
owner with a mechanism to apply for an eviction order. 
As is evident from the above, PIE aims to promote two constitutional rights, which in 
the context of evictions are also conflicting rights.43 From an owner’s perspective 
section 25 requires protection of property rights, while section 26(3) in certain 
circumstances allows for the temporary infringement of some of those entitlements of 
                                                          
39 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 12. 
40 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Peoples Dialogue on Land and Shelter and Others 2000 (2) SA 1074 
(SE) 1082-1083; Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) paras 12-13. 
41 Section 25(1) sets out to protect property rights and section 26(3) seeks to protect persons from 
arbitrary evictions. See Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) paras 
14-23. 
42 The preamble of PIE emphasis both section 25(1) and section 26(3) of the Constitution. See also JM 
Pienaar Land reform (2014) 660. 
43 JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 661. 
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property.44 From an unlawful occupier’s perspective, section 26(3) protects vulnerable 
occupiers from arbitrary evictions and ensures that evictions take place in a humane 
manner. Due to the nature of these opposing rights,45 it is of paramount importance 
that PIE is applied with a sensitive and balanced approach.46 Such an approach must 
align with the aims and underlying philosophical ideals of PIE. This will ensure that the 
Act will be applied with the necessary sensitivity towards the applicable context of the 
parties and that an appropriate balance is struck between the opposing interests of 
the parties. A discussion of the PE Municipality judgment follows, in particular the 
reasoning of the court pertaining to the manner in which courts should apply PIE. This 
discussion will provide the basis for determining how eviction cases should be 
approached in the constitutional era. 
 
3 2 2 2 The approach to evictions in terms of PIE 
As indicated above, PIE involves the protection of two constitutional rights embodied 
respectively in sections 25 and 26(3) of the Constitution. In this regard, the 
Constitutional Court judgment in PE Municipality described how courts should 
approach eviction cases in order to ensure that the outcome of each eviction case 
                                                          
44 JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 661. Dhliwayo and Van der Walt argue that section 25 allows 
considerable room for recognition of an (inherent) limitation on the right of the owner to exclude. In this 
regard, see AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 91; P Dhliwayo A constitutional 
analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 
(2015) 204-206. See also First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 
(4) SA 768 (CC) paras 49-50; Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) 
para 16 where the Constitutional Court in both instances emphasised that the protection of individual 
property rights entrenched in section 25 of the Constitution is not absolute. Individual rights, including 
owner’s property rights, under the 1996 Constitution, are all subject to societal considerations. 
Furthermore, the court held that section 25 must be applied in a manner that takes cognition of the 
history of land in South Africa. 
45 S Liebenberg Socio-economic rights adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 273; 
311-312; AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 521; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 
661. 
46 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 35; Ndlovu v Ngcobo; 
Bekker v Jika 2003 (1) SA 113 (SCA) para 56. 
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protects the rights and interests of both the landowner and the unlawful occupier(s).47 
There is support in academic literature that PE Municipality provides courts and 
lawyers with a methodology for approaching and understanding the process of eviction 
of unlawful occupiers in terms of PIE, under the Constitution.  
PE Municipality is the first case in which the Constitutional Court had an opportunity 
to decide on an eviction matter.48 In this regard, the Constitutional Court took full 
advantage of this opportunity by providing a comprehensive account of the historical 
context that led to the promulgation of PIE;49 the constitutional matrix within which PIE 
must be understood and interpreted;50 and finally some context with regard to the 
specific provisions and requirements of PIE.51 The judgment concerned an appeal to 
the Constitutional Court against an order of the Supreme Court of Appeal that the 
unlawful occupiers should not be evicted before it had been established that the 
unlawful occupiers would have some tenure security where they were to be relocated 
to. The circumstances of the case indicated that the land which was unlawfully 
occupied was private land.52 The occupiers had been occupying the property for two 
to eight years.53 They further submitted that the reason for their unlawful occupation 
was because they had no alternative accommodation.54 Therefore, the unlawful 
occupiers argued that an eviction could only take place once alternative 
accommodation was secured by the government.55  
The court considered all relevant circumstances such as (a) the lengthy period that 
the occupiers occupied the land without objection; (b) the fact that neither the 
municipality nor the landowner was in immediate need to use the property and; (c) that 
they had failed to meaningfully engage with the occupiers regarding the situation; (d) 
                                                          
47 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC). See further S Liebenberg 
Socio-economic rights adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 273, 311-312; AJ van 
der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 521; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 770-771. 
48 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 5. 
49 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) paras 8-10. 
50 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) paras 11-25. 
51 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) paras 26-47. 
52 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 1. 
53 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 2. 
54 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 2. 
55 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 2. 
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the fact that the occupiers were a small group of people; and finally that the occupiers 
would become homeless if evicted. After considering all these relevant factors the 
court ordered that it would not be just and equitable to evict the unlawful occupiers. 
Van der Walt interprets PE Municipality as exemplifying that the Constitution requires 
a fundamental shift in how courts think about property rights in eviction cases.56 He 
explains that a mental shift from an abstract, and rights-based, thinking to context-
sensitive and non-hierarchical thinking of property rights is required in light of the 
decision.57 This shift in how courts are required to think about property rights in the 
context of evictions is brought about by section 26(3) of the Constitution and its 
corollary statute, PIE.58 Van der Walt argues that PE Municipality does not only 
illuminate that a shift in thinking is required, but it also shows a framework aimed at 
shaping the courts’ understanding of property rights in the context of evictions. This 
framework consists of the historical and constitutional context of evictions.59 In this 
regard, the court indicated that the historical context of evictions refers to the eviction 
measures and legislation of the pre-constitutional era60 and a proper understanding of 
how the relationship between sections 25(1) and 26(3) provide the constitutional 
context within which courts have to adjudicate eviction cases in post-apartheid South 
Africa.61 A proper understanding of the constitutional relationship between these two 
fundamental rights includes understanding that these sections are in fact inter-
dependent (intertwined).62 Such an understanding of the relationship between these 
provisions will automatically conflict with an application of property rights in the 
traditional, abstract and hierarchical manner, similar to the way adjudication took place 
                                                          
56 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 521. 
57Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 13. See further AJ van 
der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 521. 
58 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 521. 
59 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 521-522. 
60 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 13. See further AJ van 
der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 521. 
61 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 13. See further AJ van 
der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 522. 
62 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 19. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
87 
in this context in the pre-constitutional period. Therefore, a non-hierarchical and 
context-sensitive approach is required when PIE is applied.  
Pienaar and Brickhill also support such an interpretation of PE Municipality. They 
suggest that PE Municipality established a new approach to land law. This new 
approach requires that the application of PIE takes cognisance of the historical context 
of South African land relations.63 In other words, the vast land injustices, which 
occurred in accordance with colonial and apartheid land legislation, have to be taken 
into account when constitutional land legislative measures such as PIE, are interpreted 
and applied. Consequently, PIE should also be understood and applied within the 
constitutional context.64 In this regard, the founding values and the rights in the Bill of 
Rights should constitute the constitutional context for the interpretation of PIE.65 The 
values of human dignity, freedom and equality together with the constitutional principle 
of the rule of law must be upheld when courts interpret and adjudicate eviction cases 
in terms of PIE.66In addition, the PE Municipality judgment established that the African 
philosophy of ubuntu is a value central to the constitutional context for the 
interpretation of PIE.67 Sachs AJ explained that: 
                                                          
63 JM Pienaar & J Brickhill “Land” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South 
Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 48-1 48-5. 
64 JM Pienaar & J Brickhill “Land” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South 
Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 48-1 48-5. 
65 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 5. Section 10 (the right 
to dignity), section 26 (the right to adequate access to housing), section 32 (the right of access to 
information) and section 33 (the right to administrative justice) also forms part of the constitutional 
context that any court which has the task of interpreting land legislation should take into account. 
66 JM Pienaar & J Brickhill “Land” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South 
Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 48-1 48-5. See further Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 
(1) SA 217 (CC) paras 15, 20. 
67 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 37; JM Pienaar & J 
Brickhill “Land” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 2 ed (RS 6 
2014) 48-1 48-6. For a discussion of the different facets of ubuntu, see M Pieterse “’Traditional’ African 
jurisprudence” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 438-462 442; Y Mokgoro 
“Ubuntu and the law in South Africa” in D Cornell & N Muvangua (eds) Ubuntu and the law: African 
ideals and post-apartheid jurisprudence (2012) 317-323 318; T Bekker “The re-emergence of ubuntu: 
A critical analysis” in D Cornell & N Muvangua (eds) Ubuntu and the law: African ideals and post-
apartheid jurisprudence (2012) 377-387 378. 
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“The Constitution and PIE require that in addition to considering the lawfulness of the 
occupation the court must have regard to the interests and circumstances of the 
occupier and pay due regard to broader considerations of fairness and other 
constitutional values, so as to produce a just and equitable result. Thus, PIE expressly 
requires the court to infuse elements of grace and compassion into the formal structures 
of the law. It is called upon to balance competing interests in a principled way and 
promote the constitutional vision of a caring society based on good neighbourliness and 
shared concern. The Constitution and PIE confirm that we are not islands unto 
ourselves. The spirit of ubuntu, part of the deep cultural heritage of the majority of the 
population, suffuses the whole constitutional order. It combines individual rights with a 
communitarian philosophy.”68 
Accordingly, ubuntu together with the other above-mentioned founding values of the 
Constitution has to inform how courts understand the relationship between sections 
25(1) and 26(3) of the Constitution, and ultimately how courts apply PIE. In this regard, 
a discussion of ubuntu follows to provide an idea of how ubuntu should be informing 
the courts’ application of PIE. However, this discussion does not aim to provide an in-
depth analysis of ubuntu within the broader parameters of the law. Rather, it purports 
to explore ubuntu as an African philosophy in so far as it has been mentioned, and 
therefore may influence, the application of PIE within the particular context of eviction. 
 
3 2 3 The requiste approach to the provisions of PIE 
3 2 3 1 Ubuntu 
3 2 3 1 1 The meaning of ubuntu 
Academic literature and case law show that the meaning of ubuntu cannot adequately 
be captured in a single definition.69 Accordingly, this part sets out to ascribe meaning 
                                                          
68 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 37. 
69 See M Pieterse “’Traditional’ African jurisprudence” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) 
Jurisprudence (2004) 438-462 442; Y Mokgoro “Ubuntu and the law in South Africa” in D Cornell & N 
Muvangua (eds) Ubuntu and the law: African ideals and post-apartheid jurisprudence (2012) 317-323 
318; T Bekker “The re-emergence of ubuntu: A critical analysis” in D Cornell & N Muvangua (eds) 
Ubuntu and the law: African ideals and post-apartheid jurisprudence (2012) 377-387 378 for reasons 
why defining ubuntu is challenging. Pieterse argues that the difficulty courts face when attempting to 
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to ubuntu by firstly, describing the philosophical doctrine that is ubuntuism and then 
secondly, identifying the central tenets of the concept in its capacity as an African 
philosophy and concept applicable to South African eviction jurisprudence. 
Ubuntuism as a philosophical doctrine advances that the universe and everything in 
the universe are metaphysical forces that work together to form a unified field of 
force.70 These forces are unique in their own way; they are dependent on each other 
and work together, not only to survive, but to excel individually and collectively.71 As a 
result, human beings are also seen as individual and unique forces that interact and 
function inseparably from other forces in the universal field of forces.72 God is the 
creator of all forces and the creator of the causal link between all forces, because all 
forces are regarded to be united in the one sovereign creator they share.73 In this 
regard, ubuntu functions as this causal link and energy that keeps the forces in 
equilibrium.74 
Pieterse suggests that this African world view, which makes up the philosophical 
doctrine of ubuntu, is central to understanding what the notion of ubuntu has to offer.75 
He identifies that ubuntu on the one hand, encapsulates universal human inter-
dependence through solidarity, reciprocity and communalism. On the other hand, 
ubuntu offers the protection of human dignity through mutual respect, compassion and 
humaneness.76  
                                                          
incorporate ubuntu into the formal structures of law, arise because they grapple with the concept as a 
“uni-dimensional” concept rather than a philosophical doctrine. 
70 For a more detailed explanation of the field of forces theory advanced by ubuntuism, see M Pieterse 
“’Traditional’ African jurisprudence” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 438-462 
445; A Shutte Philosophy for Africa (1993) 52-58. 
71 M Pieterse “’Traditional’ African jurisprudence” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence 
(2004) 438-462 445. 
72 A Shutte Philosophy for Africa (1993) 54-56. 
73 A Shutte Philosophy for Africa (1993) 53. 
74 M Pieterse “’Traditional’ African jurisprudence” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence 
(2004) 438-462 445; A Shutte Philosophy for Africa (1993) 54-56. 
75 M Pieterse “’Traditional’ African jurisprudence” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence 
(2004) 438-462 444. 
76 M Pieterse “’Traditional’ African jurisprudence” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence 
(2004) 438-462 445; Y Mokgoro “Ubuntu and the law in South Africa” in D Cornell & N Muvangua (eds) 
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The above understanding of the notion of ubuntu seems to be compatible with the 
Constitutional Court’s understanding thereof. For instance, in S v Makwanyane and 
Another three judges of the Constitutional Court, namely Langa J, Mohammed J and 
Mokgoro J attempted to define ubuntu. All three definitions recognised that human 
inter-dependence and human dignity together with other related values underlie 
ubuntu.77 I submit, after an analysis of the judges’ definitions that all values associated 
with ubuntu flow from these two main values, namely human inter-dependence and 
human dignity. For example, value,78 respect,79 acceptance,80 love,81 humanness,82 
personhood,83 morality84 and compassion85 can all be understood to flow from the 
central value of human dignity. Furthermore, group solidarity86 and reciprocity87 can 
be understood to flow from human inter-dependence. This approach of first identifying 
the central values of ubuntu, namely human inter-dependence and human dignity, and 
then identifying what subsidiary values are relevant to the case before a court, would 
provide a principled and coherent approach to the application of ubuntu in case law.88 
 
                                                          
Ubuntu and the law: African ideals and post-apartheid jurisprudence (2012) 317-323 318. For more on 
the human inter-dependence aspect of ububtu, see L Ackerman Human dignity: Lodestar for equality 
in South Africa (2012) 80. 
77 See S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) paras 224-225 for Langa J’s definition; para 
263 for Mohammed J’s definition and para 308 for Mokgoro J’s definition of ubuntu. The definitions in 
the Makwanyane case also include other values, such as personhood, morality, compassion, 
humanness, love towards each other, value, respect and reciprocity. 
78 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 224. 
79 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) paras 224, 378. 
80 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 224. 
81 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 263. 
82 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) paras 263,378. 
83 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 378. 
84 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 308. 
85 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 308. 
86 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) paras 224, 308. 
87 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) paras 225, 263. 
88 See M Pieterse “’Traditional’ African jurisprudence” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) 
Jurisprudence (2004) 438-462 444. Pieterse explains that the potential for the use of ubuntu in case 
law has been crippled by the unprincipled and incoherent application of the notion by the courts. 
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3 2 3 1 2 The role of ubuntu in the constitutional order and eviction jurisprudence 
The Constitutional Court has declared that ubuntu constitutes a source of 
constitutional values.89 In the eviction context the Constitutional Court held that ubuntu 
pervades the entire constitutional order and that the Constitution and PIE mandate 
courts in their application of PIE to promote the tenets of ubuntu.90 In other words, the 
tenets of ubuntu are implied to form part of the values underlying the Constitution.91 
This link between ubuntu and the values underlying the Constitution provides a starting 
point for determining what role ubuntu is deemed to play in constitutional 
jurisprudence. According to Fowkes, values underlying the Constitution, such as those 
found in the preamble and section 1 of the Constitution, have a very specific role in 
constitutional adjudication.92 The role of these values is to assist with constitutional 
interpretation and constitutional description of rights.93 In this regard, a distinction 
should be drawn between the role of the values found in the preamble of the 
Constitution and the role of the values found in section 1 of the Constitution. The 
                                                          
89 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) paras 365-374. This statement of the 
Constitutional Court was in accordance with the Interim Constitution’s express recognition of the 
importance of ubuntu in the new South Africa. However, ubuntu has subsequently not been included in 
the final Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Interestingly, ubuntu continues to play a 
significant role in South African jurisprudence, as the lower and higher courts have referred to ubuntu 
numerous times after the final Constitution came into force. See IJ Kroeze “Doing things with values: 
The case of ubuntu” in D Cornell & N Muvangua (eds) Ubuntu and the law: African ideals and post-
apartheid jurisprudence (2012) 334-343 335; S v Mandela 2001 (1) SACR 156 (C) para 145; 
Pharmaceutical Society of South Africa and Others v Tshabalala-Msimang and Another NNO, New 
Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Health and Another 2005 (3) SA 238 (SCA) paras 38, 51; Port 
Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 37; Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 (6) 
SA 235 (CC) para 69; Masethla v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2008 (1) SA 
566 (CC) para 238; Koyabe and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2010 (4) SA 327 (CC) 
para 61; Joseph and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC) para 46. 
90 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 37. 
91 Y Mokgoro “Ubuntu and the law in South Africa” in D Cornell & N Muvangua (eds) Ubuntu and the 
law: African ideals and post-apartheid jurisprudence (2012) 317-323 320. 
92 J Fowkes “Founding provisions” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South 
Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 13-1 - 13-66. 
93 See J Fowkes “Founding provisions” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of 
South Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 13-4 and 13-13. 
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preamble-values constitute constitutional values that are relevant to determine the 
purpose of rights in the Bill of Rights when the purposive approach to the interpretation 
of rights in the Bill of Rights is employed.94 In contrast, the role of the founding values, 
as set out in section 1 of the Constitution, is more controversial and uncertain because 
of the Constitutional Court’s inconsistent application thereof.95 However, Fowkes 
suggests that if the section 1-values are not merely regarded as values but rather as 
principles, the different approaches employed by the Constitutional Court might be 
reconcilable.96 He argues that values as principles are capable of bearing and 
transposing obligations on rights in the Bill of Rights when these principles are used 
to interpret such rights.97 
In PE Municipality the court confirmed that the function of ubuntu in eviction cases is 
interpretive of nature when it held that “[ubuntu] combines individual rights with an 
communitarian philosophy” and that “[i]t is a unifying motif of the Bill of Rights, which 
is nothing if not a structured, institutionalised and operational declaration in our 
                                                          
94 See S v Mhlungu 1995 (2) SACR 277 (CC) para 112; Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) paras 72-73. See also, J Fowkes “Founding 
provisions” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 
13-3 where Fowkes illuminates that the preamble of the Constitution does not constitute in itself a 
source of enforceable rights and duties. For more on the interpretative function of the preamble, see I 
Currie and J de Waal The Bill of Rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 136-140. 
95 See J Fowkes “Founding provisions” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of 
South Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 13-9 – 13-24. Fowkes sets out the two different approaches followed by 
the court. He shows that the court in Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention 
and the Reintegration of Offenders (NICRO) 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC) para 23 expressly held that the 
provisions in section 1 do not constitute enforceable rights but that their role is only interpretive in nature. 
In contrast, the court in President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery 
(Pty) Ltd 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) paras 46-47 approached and applied the relevant section 1-values as if 
they ascribed to the relevant right in the Bill of Rights certain obligations. Fowkes reconciles these two 
approaches by suggesting that section 1-values constitute obligation creating principles when these 
values are used to interpret rights in the Bill of Rights. 
96 See J Fowkes “Founding provisions” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of 
South Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 13-9 – 13-24. 
97 See J Fowkes “Founding provisions” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of 
South Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 13-12; Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention 
and the Reintegration of Offenders (NICRO) 2005 (3) SA 280 (CC) paras 65-67; President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) paras 46-47. 
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evolving new society of the need for human inter-dependence, respect and concern.”98 
From the first dictum an inference can be made that courts should consider ubuntu in 
their interpretation of the relevant individual rights, namely sections 25(1) and 26(3) of 
the Constitution. The second dictum further supports the suggestion that ubuntu is an 
important constitutional value to consider, especially where two rights stand in conflict 
with each other. Pienaar and Brickhill support this contention and suggest that PE 
Municipality established that the African philosophy of ubuntu is a value central to the 
constitutional context.99 Accordingly, the role of ubuntu is to assist the court with its 
interpretation of the provisions of PIE, especially the interpretation of what justice and 
equity would require in a specific eviction case.100 
The question that now remains is how ubuntu should be applied in the interpretation 
exercise of the court. More specifically: Should ubuntu be treated as a preamble-value 
or as a section 1-value? In PE Municipality the court expressly stated that in our 
constitutional dispensation ubuntu must be employed to ascribe to individual rights a 
communitarian nature.101 At the least, this means that when courts in eviction cases 
interpret what justice and equity require in a particular case, courts are mandated to 
take ubuntu into consideration when they interpret the relevant individual rights. In this 
regard, they are required to ensure that the formal structures of the law and the 
outcome of the cases reflect compassion and grace.102 Accordingly, ubuntu has the 
ability to not only dictate which values must be considered but also has the capacity 
to place duties on the parties, and the court,  in eviction cases.103 For example, the 
court might order parties to mediate or it might require the owner to be patient for a 
                                                          
98 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 37. 
99 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 37. See also JM Pienaar 
& J Brickhill “Land” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 2 ed (RS 
6 2014) 48-1 48-6. For a discussion on the different facets of ubuntu, see M Pieterse “’Traditional’ 
African jurisprudence” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 438-462 442. 
100 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) paras 36-37. The court held 
that the Constitution and PIE require that the tenets of ubuntu should pervade any court’s conclusion 
on what justice and equity require in a given eviction case. 
101 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 37. Sachs AJ held: 
“It combines individual rights with a communitarian philosophy.” 
102 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) paras 36-37. 
103 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) paras 36-37. 
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while rather than deciding to endorse an eviction, immediately.104 Evidently, the notion 
of ubuntu is not a mere interpretive aid; its role in eviction jurisprudence is the same 
as that of the founding values or founding “principles” in the courts’ interpretation 
exercise.105 
 
3 2 3 1 3 Nature of ubuntu in eviction jurisprudence 
As already identified above, ubuntu encapsulates human inter-dependence and 
human dignity. Accordingly, its aims as a philosophical doctrine and principle are to 
advance human inter-dependence and human dignity within the context that it is used. 
Ubuntu is used as an interpretive principle in eviction jurisprudence and its function is 
therefore to serve as an interpretive tool when a court has to establish the appropriate 
relationship between sections 25(1) and 26(3). As a result, the aim of ubuntu in the 
eviction context is to ensure that the courts’ understanding of the constitutional matrix, 
in which it has to balance opposing interests, protects human inter-dependence as 
well as the human dignity of all parties involved. 
In terms of ubuntu individualism and communalism are in themselves inter-dependent 
of each other.106 Pieterse shows that ubuntu does not automatically favour the 
community over the individual, or the other way around.107 Rather, it illuminates that 
the interest of the individual can only adequately be protected if the community’s 
interest is also protected. Accordingly, the survival of the one leads to the survival of 
the other.108 Mokgoro’s description of ubuntu supports this view.109 It shows that one 
can only claim dignity for oneself if one acknowledges and respects the dignity of 
                                                          
104 See Occupiers of Mooiplaats v Golden Thread Ltd and Others 2012 (2) SA 337 (CC). 
105 J Fowkes “Founding provisions” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South 
Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 13-24. 
106 M Pieterse “’Traditional’ African jurisprudence” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence 
(2004) 438-462 444. 
107 M Pieterse “’Traditional’ African jurisprudence” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence 
(2004) 438-462 443-444. 
108 Y Mokgoro “Ubuntu and the law in South Africa” in D Cornell & N Muvangua (eds) Ubuntu and the 
law: African ideals and post-apartheid jurisprudence (2012) 317-323 317. 
109 Y Mokgoro “Ubuntu and the law in South Africa” in D Cornell & N Muvangua (eds) Ubuntu and the 
law: African ideals and post-apartheid jurisprudence (2012) 317-323 318. 
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others.110 Accordingly, each person is clothed with dignity and that should be reflected 
in the relationships of members of society. This element of dignity is central to the 
philosophy of ubuntu, the Constitution and PIE.111 
In the eviction paradigm these signal qualities of ubuntu oppose the purely 
individualistic and neo-liberal capitalistic approach that has been a salient character 
of eviction remedies and adjudication.112 Ubuntu’s communal nature challenges the 
liberal individual nature of our legal system.113 It requires one to look at the legal 
system and its relationships from a different point of departure: starting at “us” and 
then ending with “I”. The point of departure that focusses on society is the complete 
opposite of the point of departure that focusses solely on the individual owner. This is 
because the philosophy of ubuntu advances that an individual will excel only if her 
community excels.114 Accordingly, ubuntu has the potential to eliminate the harsh 
effects of a purely individualistic approach to legal issues by identifying and 
illuminating the reciprocities and inter-dependencies in relationships, whilst also 
protecting individual rights because of the human dignity component thereof. 
Accordingly, when courts are applying PIE and looking for an appropriate balance 
between sections 25 and 26(3) they should give effect to the nature of ubuntu, which 
means that courts should balance the opposing interests in the spirit of ubuntu. The 
spirit of ubuntu calls for an understanding that all forces are dependent on each other, 
therefore all relevant circumstances must be considered and weighed against each 
other to ensure that the core values of human dignity and human inter-dependence 
are recognised and advanced in each individual eviction case. 
 
                                                          
110 L Ackerman Human dignity: Lodestar for equality in South Africa (2012) 80. 
111 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 37. 
112 M Pieterse “’Traditional’ African jurisprudence” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence 
(2004) 438-462 448. 
113 See A Shutte Philosophy for Africa (1993) 90-91; M Pieterse “’Traditional’ African jurisprudence” in 
C Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 438-462 448; P Lenta “Just gaming? The case 
for postmodernism in South African legal theory” (2001) 17 SAJHR 173 180. 
114 M Pieterse “’Traditional’ African jurisprudence” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence 
(2004) 438-462 445; L Ackerman Human dignity: Lodestar for equality in South Africa (2012) 80. 
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3 2 3 1 3 Ubuntu, socialism, communitarianism and humanitarianism 
Both the High Court in Peoples Dialogue and the Constitutional Court in PE 
Municipality referred to some western philosophies in the context of evictions.115 As a 
result, this subsection sets out very briefly what these philosophical doctrines are and 
whether or not they are comparable with the philosophical doctrine of ubuntu. 
In Peoples Dialogue the court characterised PIE as a socialistic, welfare-orientated 
and humanitarian legislative measure.116 Horn AJ in Peoples Dialogue117 described 
PIE as an: 
“[E]ssentially socialistic […] piece of welfare legislation formulated upon humanitarian 
lines.”118 
Firstly, a socialistic-orientated legislative measure could refer to legislation based on 
the principles of socialism or that aims to advance the goals of socialism. Socialists 
strive for the advancement of equal distribution of wealth by placing the economy 
under public ownership.119 Although socialism takes different forms, a detailed 
explanation of the different types of socialism will not be of value to this discussion.120 
However, in line with the philosophy of ubuntu, it might have been the court’s intention 
in Peoples Dialogue to refer to socialism in its communal sense rather than its 
economic sense. Hence, the emphasis on welfare in its dictum. Interestingly, Pieterse 
shows that even the communal aspect of western socialism differs from the communal 
                                                          
115 See Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 37; Port Elizabeth 
Municipality v Peoples Dialogue on Land and Shelter and Others 2000 (2) SA 1074 (SE) 1082. 
116 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Peoples Dialogue on Land and Shelter and Others 2000 (2) SA 1074 
(SE) 1082. 
117 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Peoples Dialogue on Land and Shelter and Others 2000 (2) SA 1074 
(SE) 1082. 
118 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Peoples Dialogue on Land and Shelter and Others 2000 (2) SA 1074 
(SE) 1082. 
119 T Metz “Justice and the law: Liberals, redistribution, capitalists and their critics” in C Roederer & D 
Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 382-411 400. 
120 For a more detailed discussion of the basic tenets of socialism, see T Metz “Justice and the law: 
Liberals, redistribution, capitalists and their critics” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence 
(2004) 382-411 400-401. 
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aspect of ubuntu.121 This difference is evident in that Western socialism concerns itself 
with the relationship between individuals and property while ubuntu concerns itself 
with the relationships between people.122 However, African socialism is a type of 
socialism that contains a deep rooted communal aspect.123 African socialism is the 
philosophy which links socialism with community and solidarity.124 It is founded on the 
ideology of a unified, non-racial, one-party, welfare society.125 This broader African 
ideology, much like ubuntu, advances the idea that the starting point must be the 
collective and not the individual. However, it does not regard the protection of 
individual human rights as taboo.126 It recognises the need for the protection of 
individual rights because of the importance of protecting each person’s human 
dignity.127 Accordingly, for African socialism the protection of individual rights is central 
to the protection of human dignity. Similar to ubuntu, the human dignity concept 
inherent in African socialism is far removed from an individualistic ideology. African 
socialism can accordingly be said to be a synonym of ubuntu. 
Secondly, humanitarianism refers to the human morality in favour of showing empathy, 
care and love and the provision of aid to the most vulnerable.128 It is a philosophical 
doctrine that acknowledges the inherent human dignity of all beyond race or borders 
and the importance of protecting such dignity.129 These basic tenets of 
                                                          
121 M Pieterse “’Traditional’ African jurisprudence” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence 
(2004) 438-462 444. 
122 M Pieterse “’Traditional’ African jurisprudence” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence 
(2004) 438-462 444. 
123 L Praeg A report on ubuntu (2014) 139. 
124 A Sanders “On African socialism and the rule of law” (1982) 15 CILSA 299 300; L Praeg A report on 
ubuntu (2014) 139. 
125 A Sanders “On African socialism and the rule of law” (1982) 15 CILSA 299 300; L Praeg A report on 
ubuntu (2014) 143. 
126 A Sanders “On African socialism and the rule of law” (1982) 15 CILSA 299 304; L Praeg A report on 
ubuntu (2014) 139. 
127 A Sanders “On African socialism and the rule of law” (1982) 15 CILSA 299 304; L Praeg A report on 
ubuntu (2014) 143. 
128 C Douzinas “The many faces of humanitarianism” 2007 Parrhesia Journal 1 4. 
129 C Douzinas “The many faces of humanitarianism” 2007 Parrhesia Journal 1 4. 
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humanitarianism tie in with the ideals of ubuntu in that ubuntu also advocates for the 
protection of human dignity by means of a caring and compassionate society.130 
Thirdly, the philosophy referred to in PE Municipality and which ties in with all the 
above values is communitarianism.131 Communitarian philosophies in their most basic 
form can be described as community- rather than individual-focussed.132 A 
communitarian theorist, MacIntyre, explains that communitarianism is premised on the 
idea that the “individual’s achievement of her common good is inseparably linked to 
the achievement of the shared goods of practices and contributing to the common 
good of the community as a whole”.133 Hence the advancement of the community’s 
good as a point of departure. Human inter-dependence is also a salient feature of the 
ideology of communitarianism. 
The above discussion has indicated that African socialism, humanitarianism and 
communitarianism all share the basic tenets of ubuntu. In this way, it can be inferred 
that the reference to these philosophical doctrines supports and reinforces the 
importance of ubuntu in eviction adjudication. 
Accordingly, courts are called upon to apply PIE in a manner that will ensure that all 
parties are treated equally and with dignity. In light of all the above ideologies, it seems 
that courts are mandated to ensure that the approach advocated by PIE is not only 
visible in their dealings with the parties before them, when adjudicating eviction cases, 
but also that the result and consequences of their orders resonate with the ideals of 
ubuntu. PIE has a built-in mechanism to ensure that these values are achieved. This 
mechanism is found in the requirement of “just and equitable” in sections 4 and 6 of 
PIE. A court may only grant an eviction order if it is satisfied that such an order would 
be just and equitable in the circumstances of the case.134 In light of the above what is 
just and equitable in practical terms is a court judgment that reflects the values of 
                                                          
130 M Pieterse “’Traditional’ African jurisprudence” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence 
(2004) 438-462 445. 
131 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 25. 
132 K van Marle “Communitarian and civic republic theories” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) 
Jurisprudence (2004) 412-437 412. 
133 K van Marle “Communitarian and civic republic theories” in C Roederer & D Moellendorf (eds) 
Jurisprudence (2004) 412-437 417. 
134 Sections 4 and 6 of PIE. 
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ubuntu (human inter-dependence and human dignity). A court order will only be able 
to adequately protect both parties’ interests if the court applies a context-sensitive 
approach to PIE evictions. Accordingly, ubuntu as philosophical underpinning and 
interpretive aid, in eviction cases, is supposed to reinforce and support a context-
sensitive and balanced approach to evictions.  
The section below considers both the procedural and substantive requirements of PIE 
in order to establish whether the approach courts employ to the application of PIE 
reflects the above-mentioned values of ubuntu. In light of the above, a context-
sensitive approach will be indicative of whether courts apply PIE with the underlying 
philosophy of ubuntu. 
 
3 2 3 2 The requirements of PIE 
The basic principles of PIE have been laid down by courts over the last sixteen 
years.135 In this section both the procedural and substantive requirements of PIE will 
be set out as developed in case law. This will be used to determine the type of attitude 
and thought framework employed by the court when confronted with difficult questions 
pertaining to the application and scope of PIE. The hypothesis is that a context-
sensitive approach will be indicative of whether courts apply PIE within the 
constitutional framework in the constitutional era. 
 
                                                          
135 The most important cases that laid down the basic principles discussed in this section are Port 
Elizabeth Municipality v Peoples Dialogue on Land and Shelter and Others 2000 (2) SA 1074 (SE); 
Cape Killarney Property Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mahamba 2001 (4) SA 1222 (SCA); Ndlovu v Ngcobo; 
Bekker v Jika 2003 (1) SA 113 (SCA); Unlawful Occupiers, School Site v City of Johannesburg 2005 
(4) SA 199 (SCA); Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC); Eagle Valley 
Properties 250 CC v Unidentified Occupants of Erf 952, Johannesburg Situated at 124 Kerk Street 
Johannesburg (0/04599) [2011] ZAGPJHC 3 (17 February 2011); Kanescho v Realtors (Pty) Ltd v 
Maphumulo and three similar cases 2006 (5) SA 92 (D); City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 
(Pty) Ltd and Others 2012 (6) SA 294 (SCA). 
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3 2 3 2 1 Threshold requirements 
PIE primarily has four threshold requirements. These are: locus standi; the application 
scope of PIE; the service of a notice of motion and joinder of interested parties. The 
section below discusses all of the above threshold requirements with the view to 
determining the type of approach that courts have endorsed when considering the 
threshold requirements of PIE. 
 
(a) The standing requirement 
Section 4(6) establishes the first hurdle for a private owner looking to evict unlawful 
occupiers. This is the threshold requirement for locus standi in terms of PIE. In order 
for a person to apply for an eviction order in terms of PIE she must firstly be able to 
prove that she has locus standi. In other words, that she is the person in charge of the 
property or the owner of the property.136 Secondly, it must be established that the 
occupiers are indeed unlawful.137 The satisfaction of these two requirements will allow 
an owner or person in charge of property to institute proceedings in terms of PIE. 
However, proof these two requirements do not guarantee that an eviction order will be 
granted. 
The requirement that the applicant should be the owner of property in order to evict 
unlawful occupiers, has not been significantly altered by PIE. There are only two small 
changes to this requirement. The first one is that the owner is no longer the only person 
with locus standi to institute an eviction application, as was the case with the 
application of the pre-constitutional eviction remedies.138 PIE provides that the person 
in charge is also able to institute an eviction application.139 The inquiry pertaining to 
whether or not the applicant is the owner or person in charge is a primary standing 
question. Accordingly, if the applicant fails to prove that she is the owner of the land 
                                                          
136 Section 4(1) of PIE; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 717; Red Stripe Trading 68 CC v Mahlomola & 
Another (2011/06 [2006] ZAGPHC 39 (28 April 2006) para 15. 
137 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others 2010 (3) SA 
454 (CC) para 36. 
138 See chapter 2, section 2.2 above. 
139 Sections 4(1) and 6 of PIE; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 717; Red Stripe Trading 68 CC v 
Mahlomola & Another (2011/06 [2006] ZAGPHC 39 (28 April 2006) para 15. 
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or person in charge of the land, the court will hold that she does not have standing to 
rely on PIE for an eviction order in her favour.140 
Case law has shown that the same approach to proving ownership for purposes of 
establishing locus standi in the pre-constitutional era applies in the constitutional 
era.141 In Red Stripe Trading 68 CC v Mahlomola142 the applicant was a purported 
cessionary of certain rights in the land, and not the owner of the land.143 The court in 
this case referred back to the common law rules to ascertain whether the applicant 
had locus standi to apply for an eviction order in terms of PIE. Subsequently, the court 
investigated the requirements for proving ownership under the common law rei 
vindicatio.144 It found that where the applicant could not prove a real right (ownership) 
or a contractual right (permission from the owner to be in charge of the land) the 
applicant had no locus standi and could not rely on PIE for the relief sought.145 In 
practical terms, ownership of immovable property is proven by furnishing the court with 
the deed of registration in which the applicant’s name is reflected as owner.146 
The locus standi of a person in charge of the property looking to evict unlawful 
occupiers is also subject to pre-constitutional common law rules pertaining to contract 
law and property law.147 An applicant who institutes an eviction application in terms of 
                                                          
140 Red Stripe Trading 68 CC v Mahlomola & Another (2011/06 [2006] ZAGPHC 39 (28 April 2006) para 
14-16; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 718. 
141 See Red Stripe Trading 68 CC v Mahlomola & Another (2011/06 [2006] ZAGPHC 39 (28 April 2006); 
Red Stripe Trading 68 CC v Khumalo (31039/04) [2005] ZAGPHC 31 (23 March 2005). 
142 Red Stripe Trading 68 CC v Mahlomola & Another (2011/06 [2006] ZAGPHC 39 (28 April 2006) para 
18. 
143 Red Stripe Trading 68 CC v Mahlomola & Another (2011/06 [2006] ZAGPHC 39 (28 April 2006) para 
14. 
144 Red Stripe Trading 68 CC v Mahlomola & Another (2011/06 [2006] ZAGPHC 39 (28 April 2006) para 
9. 
145 Red Stripe Trading 68 CC v Mahlomola & Another (2011/06 [2006] ZAGPHC 39 (28 April 2006) para 
9. 
146 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 347-348; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg 
and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 244. 
147 Red Stripe Trading 68 CC v Khumalo (31039/04) [2005] ZAGPHC 31 (23 March 2005). See 
Hendricks v Hendricks and Others 2016 (1) SA 511 (SCA) paras 6-7 where the court held that the 
appellant’s common law habitation right conferred on her the necessary legal authority as required in 
terms of PIE to provide or refuse to provide consent to persons wanting to reside on the property. As a 
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PIE on the basis of the allegation that she is in charge of the property, will have to 
prove that she had permission from the registered owner to be in charge of property. 
In other words, the applicant must show that she had been granted the legal authority 
to give permission to another person to enter or reside upon the owner’s land.148 
Interestingly, in Hendricks v Hendricks and Others149 the court held that a person in 
charge in terms of a right of habitation does have locus standi to evict and can even 
evict the owner of such property in terms of PIE, in the event where the owner occupies 
the property without the consent of the holder of the right of habitation.150 
The second change pertaining to the requirement that the applicant must prove 
ownership or a legal right to be in charge of property is with regard to the weight of 
such rights. Ownership only qualifies an owner to apply for an eviction order in terms 
of PIE.151 It is no longer the only deciding factor for whether a court should grant an 
eviction order or not.152 PE Municipality has indicated that ubuntu underlies PIE.153 As 
mentioned already, ubuntu encapsulates the universal values of human inter-
dependence, solidarity and communalism.154 Accordingly, the values underlying the 
notion of ubuntu have expressly been built into the structure and provisions of PIE. 
PIE provides us with an eviction remedy that does not prioritise the protection of 
                                                          
result, the appellant with a right to habitation is a person in charge in terms of PIE and has locus standi 
to apply for the eviction of any persons occupying the property without her permission.  
148 In terms of section 1 of PIE a person in charge of land is defined as “a person who has legal authority 
or at the relevant time had legal authority to give permission to a person to enter or reside upon the 
land in question”. 
149 2016 (1) SA 511 (SCA). 
150 Hendricks v Hendricks and Others 2016 (1) SA 511 (SCA) paras 6-7. The court explained that the 
occupier’s right to habitation of the house constituted a limited real right which accordingly limited the 
owner’s right to occupy her property. Therefore, where the owner decides to occupy the said property 
that she has burdened by extending a right to habitation to another, the owner’s occupation would be 
unlawful where she does so without consent of the holder of the habitation right. The holder of the right 
to habitation would have the legal authority to evict the owner from the said property in terms of PIE. 
See also JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 719-720. 
151 FHP Management (Pty) Ltd v Theron and Another 2004 (3) SA 392 (C) 401. 
152 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 23. 
153 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 37. 
154 See chapter 3, section 3.2.2 above. M Pieterse “’Traditional’ African jurisprudence” in C Roederer & 
D Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 438-462 441. 
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ownership entitlements. Rather, PIE requires the court to have due regard to broader 
societal considerations acknowledging ideals like human inter-dependence while also 
striving to protect the human dignity of all parties involved.155 Sachs J in PE 
Municipality held that:  
“[the c]onstitution imposes new obligations on the courts concerning rights relating to 
property not previously recognised by the common law. It counterposes to the normal 
ownership rights of possession, use and occupation, a new and equally relevant right 
not [to be] arbitrarily […]  deprived of a home. The expectations that ordinarily go with 
title could clash head on with the genuine despair of people in dire need of 
accommodation. The judicial function in these circumstances is not to establish a 
hierarchical arrangement between the different interests involved, privileging in an 
abstract and mechanical way the rights of ownership over the right not to be 
dispossessed of a home, or vice versa. Rather it is to balance out and reconcile the 
opposed claims in as just a manner as possible taking account of all the interests 
involved and the specific factors relevant in each particular case.”156 
The dictum reiterates the context-sensitivity that PIE requires where all relevant 
considerations are taken account of and factored into the courts ultimate decision. 
Furthermore, it shows that the hierarchical approach has been replaced with a context-
sensitive approach. 
Overall, the above discussion of the locus standi threshold requirement indicates that 
courts approach questions of standing with a context-sensitivity. This is evident in that 
the protection of PIE is extended to people in charge and by eliminating the direct 
relationship between proving ownership and a court order in a landowner’s favour. 
 
(b) The unlawfulness question 
PIE replaced all eviction remedies that were available to owners to evict unlawful 
occupiers in the pre-constitutional context.157 Much like its predecessor, PISA, PIE 
                                                          
155 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 32. 
156 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 32. 
157 Section 4(1) of PIE provides that “[n]otwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law or 
the common law, the provisions of this section apply to proceedings by an owner or person in charge 
of land for the eviction of an unlawful occupier.” This subsection will consider the unlawfulness 
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applies only to the eviction of unlawful occupation of residential land, therefore 
requiring unlawfulness before owners can rely on PIE to obtain eviction orders.158 After 
the promulgation of PIE the requirement of unlawful occupation created considerable 
uncertainty amongst courts,159 specifically with regard to the category of persons that 
would qualify as unlawful occupiers.160 This uncertainty can be ascribed to the fact 
that PIE does not expressly state whether or not persons such as tenants holding over, 
where consent to occupy was revoked, would qualify as unlawful occupiers for 
purposes of PIE. Courts had to give content to what the legislator meant with “unlawful 
occupier” in section 1 of PIE.161 At first courts decided to interpret unlawful occupation 
of land narrowly.162 This was illustrated in ABSA Bank v Amod163 and confirmed in 
Ellis v Viljoen.164 In both instances the respective courts held that unlawful occupiers 
did not refer to tenants holding over and that PIE only had classical squatting cases in 
mind.165 This stance was later rejected by the majority of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
                                                          
requirement as the threshold requirement for PIE to apply to a given case. The substantive aspects of 
the unlawfulness requirement in PIE will be discussed in section 3.2.3.2.2 below. 
158 Section 4(1) of PIE. See Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 
32. The court held that “the existence of unlawfulness is the foundation for the inquiry” into unlawful 
occupation of land. See also JM Pienaar “‘Unlawful occupier’ in perspective: History, legislation and 
case law” in H Mostert & MJ de Waal (eds) Essays in honour of CG van der Merwe (2011) 309-329 
316-327; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 702-709 for a detailed discussion of the requirement of 
unlawfulness. 
159 See AJ van der Walt “Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure and eviction orders: A critical 
evaluation of recent case law” (2002) 18 SALJ 386. See ABSA Bank v Amod 1999 (2) All SA 423 (W); 
Ellis v Viljoen 2001 (4) SA 795 (C); Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker v Jika 2003 (1) SA 113 (SCA). 
160 JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 691. 
161 JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 690. 
162 AJ van der Walt “Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure and eviction orders: A critical evaluation 
of recent case law” (2002) 18 SALJ 387. 
163 ABSA Bank v Amod 1999 (2) All SA 423 (W). 
164 Ellis v Viljoen 2001 (4) SA 795 (C). 
165 In ABSA Bank v Amod 1999 (2) All SA 423 (W) para 11 the court held that “[s]ection 4 of the 1998 
Act limits the common-law right of an owner of land to evict an unlawful occupier from his or her 
land. An unlawful occupier in turn means ‘a person who occupies land without the express or tacit 
consent of the owner’. In the context of the Act and notwithstanding the definition of ‘evict’ the 
meaning I give to these words is that the person referred to is a person who has without any 
formality or right moved on to vacant land of another and constructed or occupied a building or 
structure thereon. Had it been the intention of the legislature to affect the common–law right of 
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in Ndlovo v Ngcobo and Bekker and Another v Jika,166 where the court held that all 
eviction applications concerning unlawful occupiers of dwellings, residential property 
or property used for shelter, including tenants holding over, must be subject to the 
procedures and requirements set out in PIE.167 The court explained that the starting 
point for the interpretation of PIE should be the spirit and purport of the Constitution. 
PIE is aimed at protecting the most vulnerable of persons from being arbitrarily evicted 
from their homes. Therefore, it would be contrary to the aims of PIE if tenants, holding 
over, are excluded from the definition of unlawful occupiers for purposes of PIE. In 
some instances tenants hold over because of their poor financial positions. As a result, 
judicial oversight in these instances is of paramount importance.168 Accordingly, after 
Ndlovu, any person seeking to evict unlawful occupiers from residential premises has 
to institute proceedings in terms of PIE and is not able to rely on the rei vindicatio to 
obtain an eviction order. 
The court decision to include tenants holding over in the protective ambit of PIE was 
based on the social and historical context of South Africa. Accordingly, the approach 
exhibited by the court in Ndlovo can be described as context-sensitive. 
 
(c) The service of the notice of motion requirement 
The service aspect of an eviction application in terms of PIE was received with a great 
deal of uncertainty, primarily because the new procedure prescribed by PIE deviated 
from the procedural rules that applied under the pre-constitutional eviction remedy, the 
rei vindicatio. The rei vindicatio, which an owner could institute to obtain a court order 
                                                          
property owners, to which I have referred, the definition of unlawful occupier would have 
included a person who, having had a contractual right to occupy such property, is now in 
unlawful occupation by reason of the termination of the right of occupation. The absence of such 
a provision must affect the extent to which it can be said that the 1998 Act was intended to 
affect persons’ common-law right to determine who may occupy their immovable property in 
terms of agreements.” This was confirmed in Ellis v Viljoen 2001 (4) SA 795 (C) 801. 
166 Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker v Jika 2003 (1) SA 113 (SCA). 
167 Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker v Jika 2003 (1) SA 113 (SCA) para 23. 
168 Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker v Jika 2003 (1) SA 113 (SCA) para 16. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
106 
for the eviction of unlawful occupiers,169 was subject to action proceedings. However, 
the PIE Act now compels an owner or person in charge to institute eviction 
proceedings against unlawful occupiers in accordance with PIE’s requirements and 
procedures.170 
There are two possible forms of court proceedings in terms of the South African 
common law. The first possibility is action (or trial) proceedings and the second is 
application (or motion) proceedings.171 An owner who instituted proceedings for the 
eviction of unlawful occupiers in terms of the rei vindicatio was required to institute 
action proceedings in accordance with section 29(1) of the Magistrates’ Court Act 32 
of 1944 (“MCA”) and the Uniform Rules of Court.172 All action proceedings were 
subject to these procedural requirements. 
However, with the advent of the Constitution and the promulgation of PIE the whole 
procedural landscape for the eviction of unlawful occupiers changed. PIE requires that 
                                                          
169 See chapter 2 section 2.2 above. 
170 Cape Killarney Property Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mahamba 2001 (4) SA 1222 (SCA) para 1; Unlawful 
Occupiers, School Site v City of Johannesburg 2005 (4) SA 199 (SCA) para 22. 
171 JTM Paterson Eckard’s principles of civil procedure in the magistrate courts (2005) 42. There are 
fundamental differences between these two types of proceedings. On the one hand action proceedings 
provide for the resolution of material disputes pertaining to the facts that can only be resolved by a 
court. In this regard, action proceedings provide for the service of summons, together with the 
particulars of claim within which the cause of action, that gives rise to the proceedings, is set out. The 
defendant then has an opportunity to file opposing documents that may lead to a trial during which the 
parties provide oral evidence. Application proceedings, on the other hand, commence when the 
applicant files and serves the notice of motion with the applicant’s affidavit attached to the notice. This 
may be followed by the respondent filing an answering affidavit. A date for hearing is set down in a 
motion court and the matter is decided on the basis of the facts in front of the court as contained in the 
affidavits. 
172 Section 29(1)(b) of the MCA directs the owner to follow action proceedings, which starts with the 
issue of an ordinary summons in accordance with Form 2 and subsequent service on the defendant. 
This form, together with Rules 5 and 6 of the Uniform Rules of Court, requires the summons to disclose 
certain information to the defendant. The service of the summons can occur in different ways, such as 
personal service, service upon an agent, service at a residence, service at the defendant’s place of 
employment, service at the defendant’s domicilium citandi or service by registered post. The defendant 
will then have the opportunity, within ten days, to enter appearance and then file her opposing plea. 
This is followed by the exchange of documents until a date is set for a hearing. See JTM Paterson 
Eckard’s principles of civil procedure in the magistrate courts (2005) 80, 81, 100-101. 
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an owner follow application proceedings as opposed to the action proceedings an 
owner would have followed under the rei vindicatio.173 Section 4(1) to 4(5) of PIE and 
Rule 6 of the Uniform Rules of Court, are peremptory and set out the procedural 
requirements an applicant has to follow pertaining to the service of the notice of motion 
in order to ensure eviction.174 Kanescho Realtors (Pty) Ltd v Maphumulo and three 
similar cases175 is a case in which the court explained how the PIE eviction procedure 
for service of the notice of motion should be applied in practice.176 Kruger J identified 
general rules applicable and distinguished between three scenarios. These were 
unopposed eviction applications, partly opposed eviction applications and fully 
opposed eviction applications.177 In all these instances, Rule 6 of the Uniform Rules 
of Court, together with Form 2A of the First Schedule, are peremptory and the 
fourteen-day-period required in section 4(2) of PIE finds application.178  
                                                          
173 This shift from action proceedings to application proceedings may have implications for an owner 
and her right to exclude. Courts have held that PIE has placed more burdensome procedures on an 
owner, which in turn negatively impacts an owner’s right to exclude. See in this regard Port Elizabeth 
Municipality v Peoples Dialogue on Land and Shelter and Others 2000 (2) SA 1074 (SE) 1081; Ndlovu 
v Ngcobo; Bekker v Jika 2003 (1) SA 113 (SCA) para 47. 
174 Cape Killarney Property Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mahamba 2001 (4) SA 1222 (SCA) para 11; 
Kanescho Realtors (Pty) Ltd v Maphumulo and three similar cases 2006 (5) SA 92 (D) para 5. Section 
4(5)(a) - (d) provides that:  
“(5) The notice of proceedings contemplated in subsection (2) must- 
(a) state that proceedings are being instituted in terms of subsection (1) for an order for 
the eviction of the unlawful occupier; 
(b) indicate on what date and at what time the court will hear the proceedings; 
(c) set out the grounds for the proposed eviction; and 
(d) state that the unlawful occupier is entitled to appear before the court and defend the 
case and, where necessary, has the right to apply for legal aid.” 
175 Kanescho Realtors (Pty) Ltd v Maphumulo and three similar cases 2006 (5) SA 92 (D) para 11. 
176 Kanescho Realtors (Pty) Ltd v Maphumulo and three similar cases 2006 (5) SA 92 (D) para 12. 
177 Kanescho Realtors (Pty) Ltd v Maphumulo and three similar cases 2006 (5) SA 92 (D) para 10. 
178 Kanescho Realtors (Pty) Ltd v Maphumulo and three similar cases 2006 (5) SA 92 (D) paras 4, 6, 
11. The application procedure starts with the applicant serving a Form 2A notice of motion on the 
respondent and the registrar of the court. A partly opposed eviction application would be instituted in 
the situation where the unlawful occupier responds to the notice of motion by filing a notice of intention 
to defend but fails to follow through. In this situation the same process and requirements explained 
above apply. After the applicant receives a notice of intention to defend, the applicant has to wait a 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
108 
The court in Kanescho gave flesh and clarity to the service provisions of PIE by setting 
out the above procedural steps in these three different scenarios. The court highlighted 
the aims of PIE and indicated that PIE’s procedural requirements pertaining to the 
service of pre-hearing application documents are different from normal application 
proceedings.179 In this regard, PIE is not merely promulgated to provide for the 
prohibition of unlawful evictions. Instead, it is also promulgated to provide unique 
procedures for such evictions.180 This finding was followed by a confirmation that 
section 4(2) of PIE, which requires an extra fourteen-day notice period before the 
hearing, is a peremptory provision.181  As a result, people should be afforded more 
opportunity to prepare for their case where such persons could possibly be evicted 
from their homes.182 Therefore, PIE provides for a justifiable extended process. The 
court also highlighted the requirements for the notice prescribed in section 5 of PIE.183 
The court further declared that where an applicant follows a procedure void of any of 
the specifics contained in section 5 of PIE or fails to follow section 4(2), such an 
                                                          
minimum of fifteen days for the unlawful occupiers to file their responding affidavits. If the respondents 
fail to file their affidavits, the applicant can only then approach the court for a section 4(2) authorisation. 
This section explicitly requires the court to serve written and effective notice of the hearing on the 
unlawful occupiers and the municipality with jurisdiction fourteen days before the hearing. This notice 
is in addition to the Rule 6 notice in accordance with the Uniform Rules of Court. In other words, Rule 
6 and section 4(2) do not refer to the same notice of motion. Accordingly, at this stage the applicant 
would be able to approach the court for such process to commence. The hearing will then be scheduled 
to commence fourteen days after the section 4(2) authorisation took place. The content of the section 
4(2) notice is set out in section 4(5)(a)-(d) of PIE. A fully opposed eviction application refers to the 
situation where the unlawful occupiers filed all the necessary documentation for them to defend in 
accordance with the procedural rules. In other words, the unlawful occupiers reacted to the notice of 
motion by timeously filing a notice of intention to defend and then timeously filing their responding 
affidavits as well. At this stage the applicant will be able to file a replying affidavit not more than ten 
days after receiving the unlawful occupiers’ responding affidavit. When the pleadings close, the 
applicant will then be able to approach the court for a section 4(2) authorisation, so that a date can be 
set for the hearing. 
179 Kanescho Realtors (Pty) Ltd v Maphumulo and three similar cases 2006 (5) SA 92 (D) para 3. 
180 Kanescho Realtors (Pty) Ltd v Maphumulo and three similar cases 2006 (5) SA 92 (D) para 3. 
181 Kanescho Realtors (Pty) Ltd v Maphumulo and three similar cases 2006 (5) SA 92 (D) para 14. 
182 Kanescho Realtors (Pty) Ltd v Maphumulo and three similar cases 2006 (5) SA 92 (D) para 6; 
Unlawful Occupiers, School Site v City of Johannesburg 2005 (4) SA 199 (SCA) para 22. 
183 Section 5 of PIE provides for urgent eviction applications. 
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applicant’s application will be procedurally defective.184 Only after the applicant 
followed the procedures of PIE, will she be entitled to approach the court for an eviction 
order.185 
There are a number of cases that indicate the extent to which applicants are able to 
deviate from the service and notice rules and still meet the procedural requirements 
of PIE. In Cape Killarney Property Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mahamba,186 the court held 
that the procedural requirements of PIE (which include the requirements of the Uniform 
Rules) are peremptory and must be followed strictly.187 Accordingly, this finding of the 
court demands strict adherence to the requirements of PIE with no room for flexibility. 
However, the same court held in Unlawful Occupiers, School Site v City of 
Johannesburg188 that deviation from the procedural requirements is acceptable to the 
extent that the procedures followed still give effect to the aims of PIE for service and 
notice.189 The question of whether the procedures followed by the applicant indeed 
give effect to the aims of PIE, can only be answered with reference to the 
circumstances of the particular case to be adjudicated by the court.190 This flexible 
approach was also followed in Kanescho where the court reiterated that the 
procedures followed by applicants must give effect to the express goals of PIE in 
relation to procedure.191 Accordingly, procedural fairness for purposes of PIE is also 
subject to a context-sensitive analysis. The underlying idea is that the respondents (a) 
                                                          
184 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Peoples Dialogue on Land and Shelter and Others 2000 (2) SA 1074 
(SE) 1081. 
185 FHP Management (Pty) Ltd v Theron and Another 2004 (3) SA 392 (C) 401. 
186 Cape Killarney Property Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mahamba 2001 (4) SA 1222 (SCA) para 11. 
187 Cape Killarney Property Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mahamba 2001 (4) SA 1222 (SCA) para 11. 
188 Unlawful Occupiers, School Site v City of Johannesburg 2005 (4) SA 199 (SCA) para 22. 
189 Unlawful Occupiers, School Site v City of Johannesburg 2005 (4) SA 199 (SCA) para 22. 
190 Cape Killarney Property Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mahamba 2001 (4) SA 1222 (SCA) para 28. 
191 Kanescho Realtors (Pty) Ltd v Maphumulo and three similar cases 2006 (5) SA 92 (D) para 3. The 
High Court in Kanescho had to decide whether a procedural practice for the service of documents was 
consistent with PIE. The court held that the developed practice was not a valid practice because it did 
not give effect to the provisions and underlying purposes of PIE. Section 4(4) of PIE sets out the 
procedural aims of PIE. See also S Liebenberg Socio-economic rights adjudication under a 
transformative constitution (2010) 272. 
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must know that the case is instituted against them so that (b) they can prepare 
accordingly.  
 
(d) The joinder of interested parties-requirement 
Joinder in the context of PIE has also been a procedural aspect that has increasingly 
enjoyed attention by the courts since the promulgation of PIE.192 This is not because 
joinder is an express requirement in terms of PIE, but rather because the effective 
operation and application of PIE in some instances requires that interested parties be 
joined to eviction proceedings.193 Joinder plays an important role in ensuring that the 
quality and quantity of information presented to the court allows the court to adequately 
adhere to its constitutional duty to have regard to all relevant circumstances.194 
Furthermore, joinder also impacts on the eventual execution of an eviction order, 
where relevant. The question would be whether joinder of the local municipality is 
always a procedural requirement when dealing with eviction from privately owned land. 
As a point of departure, the joinder of a party would only be necessary if the party has 
or would have a direct or substantial interest in the outcome of the case.195 Therefore, 
if it is clear from the facts of the case that the municipality would not have an interest, 
joinder would not be necessary.196 Joinder is required by PIE to ensure that all relevant 
                                                          
192 The joinder of interested parties to eviction cases is not a pre-requisite of PIE. However, case law 
has shown that joinder of interested parties plays an important role in eviction cases, especially because 
PIE requires the court to take into consideration all relevant circumstances so as to come to a just and 
equitable outcome in each case. See Lingwood v The Unlawful Occupiers of R/E of Erf 9 Highlands 
2008 (3) BCLR 325 (W); Sailing Queen Investments v Occupants of La Colleen Court (4480 / 07) [2008] 
ZAGPHC 15 (25 January 2008); Occupiers of Erf 101, 102, 104 and 112, Shorts Retreat, 
Pietermaritzburg v Daisy Dear Investments & Others 2009 (4) All SA 410 (SCA) paras 6-9. 
193 Occupiers of Erf 101, 102, 104 and 112, Shorts Retreat, Pietermaritzburg v Daisy Dear Investments 
& Others 2009 (4) All SA 410 (SCA) paras 6-9. See also S Liebenberg Socio-economic rights 
adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 286. 
194 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 32. 
195 City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd and Others 2012 (6) SA 294 (SCA) para 37. 
196 See Drakenstein Municipality v Hendricks 2010 (3) SA 248 (WCC) para 25. Blignault J held that “Not 
one of the Cashbuild, Sailing Queen or Shorts Retreat cases is therefore authority for the proposition 
that the municipality must be joined in all cases, even where reporting to the court or mediation is not 
required”. 
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circumstances would be placed before the court. In eviction jurisprudence there have 
been a number of judgments turning on the question of whether or not the municipality 
should always be joined to private eviction proceedings. Occupiers of Erf 101, 102, 
104 and 112, Shorts Retreat, Pietermaritzburg v Daisy Dear Investments & Others197 
dealt with this question. Joinder was ordered by the Supreme Court of Appeal after 
the court a quo ordered the eviction of a community of unlawful occupiers, who had 
nowhere else to go.198 This order was made in favour of the applicant-owner without 
the court having adequate information before it, specifically with regard to the 
availability of alternative accommodation.199 The Supreme Court of Appeal stressed 
that the joinder of the municipality in this case was of utmost importance because of 
the substantial interest the municipality had in the matter.200 This substantial interest 
is found in its constitutional duty to provide temporary suitable alternative 
accommodation in these circumstances and because the municipality is in possession 
of information regarding its ability to provide such accommodation.201 Furthermore, the 
court reiterated that such joinder is also important in this case because joinder could 
allow for mediation to be considered, which the court deemed appropriate in the 
circumstances of the case.202 Accordingly, courts would only be in a position to make 
just and equitable orders, if the relevant municipalities are joined to the proceedings. 
After Daisy Dear Investments, subsequent cases developed the question even further. 
They indicated that the joinder of the relevant municipality with jurisdiction in a 
particular case is mandatory in the context where the unlawful occupiers in a specific 
                                                          
197 Occupiers of Erf 101, 102, 104 and 112, Shorts Retreat, Pietermaritzburg v Daisy Dear Investments 
& Others 2009 (4) All SA 410 (SCA) para 16; Drakenstein Municipality v Hendricks 2010 (3) SA 248 
(WCC) paras 21-25. 
198 Occupiers of Erf 101, 102, 104 and 112, Shorts Retreat, Pietermaritzburg v Daisy Dear Investments 
& Others 2009 (4) All SA 410 (SCA) para 3. 
199 Occupiers of Erf 101, 102, 104 and 112, Shorts Retreat, Pietermaritzburg v Daisy Dear Investments 
& Others 2009 (4) All SA 410 (SCA) para 5. 
200 Occupiers of Erf 101, 102, 104 and 112, Shorts Retreat, Pietermaritzburg v Daisy Dear Investments 
& Others 2009 (4) All SA 410 (SCA) para 11. 
201 Occupiers of Erf 101, 102, 104 and 112, Shorts Retreat, Pietermaritzburg v Daisy Dear Investments 
& Others 2009 (4) All SA 410 (SCA) para 13. 
202 Occupiers of Erf 101, 102, 104 and 112, Shorts Retreat, Pietermaritzburg v Daisy Dear Investments 
& Others 2009 (4) All SA 410 (SCA) para 10. 
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case require alternative accommodation.203 In other words, where the obligations of 
section 4(7) come into play because of the municipality’s constitutional and statutory 
obligations to provide alternative temporary accommodation, joinder may very well be 
a necessary requirement in the case.204 This procedural step plays an important role 
in eviction cases because it enables courts to take all relevant circumstances into 
account in order to ultimately come to conclusions about whether it would be just and 
equitable to grant eviction orders. It is in these cases that justice and equity would 
require a pro-active municipality to explore the possibilities of mediation and 
alternative temporary accommodation. 
All of the above procedural aspects that essentially form the threshold requirements 
for the application of PIE highlight the context-sensitive approach the courts employ in 
the constitutional era when confronted with procedural questions in terms of PIE. The 
need for a context-sensitive approach can most probably be ascribed to the very real 
tension between the owner’s rights and the constitutional rights of the occupiers. 
These rights are the right to one’s property and the right not to be arbitrarily evicted 
from one’s home, which in turn encompasses the protection of human dignity, access 
to adequate housing, access to justice and the right to a fair trial. Already at this stage 
it is becoming apparent that a shift has taken place from the former abstract approach 
of courts to eviction cases, even in the case of the appropriate procedural protocol, to 
an approach that is very aware, sensitive and responsive to the realities of the parties 
before it.205 In the section below the substantive requirements of PIE will be considered 
in order to determine whether the context-sensitive approach, which the section above 
has shown to be instrumental to the courts approach to PIE’s procedural requirements, 
is also present in the courts application of the substantive requirements of PIE. 
 
                                                          
203 Drakenstein Municipality v Hendricks 2010 (3) SA 248 (WCC) para 21, Oelofson v Gwebu 2010 (5) 
SA 241 (GNP) para 25; City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd and Others 2012 (6) SA 
294 (SCA) para 37; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 725-748. 
204 Eagle Valley Properties 250 CC v Unidentified Occupants of Erf 952, Johannesburg Situated at 124 
Kerk Street Johannesburg (0/04599) [2011] ZAGPJHC 3 (17 February 2011) para 11. 
205 See chapter 2, section 2.4.3 above. 
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3 2 3 2 2 Substantive requirements 
PIE has a number of substantive requirements that must be satisfied before an 
applicant is able to succeed with an application for eviction. These substantive 
requirements are regulated by sections 4 and 6 of PIE. Section 4 sets out the 
substantive requirements for an eviction application by an owner and section 6 
provides the substantive requirements for an eviction application by an organ of state. 
This section will only be focussing on evictions by private owners (section 4). The 
section below considers the substantive requirements of PIE with the view of 
determining whether courts apply PIE’s substantive provisions with context-sensitivity. 
 
(a) The unlawfulness requirement 
While unlawfulness is a threshold requirement for the PIE to be utilised in principle, it 
is furthermore a substantive matter that has to be dealt with during trial as well. It is a 
threshold requirement as there are various other eviction mechanisms that may be 
utilised in theory. Unlawful occupation narrows it down and sheds light on the 
utilisation of PIE in particular as opposed to ESTA, rental evictions or labour tenancy 
eviction legislation.  However, having established unlawfulness in principle in order for 
PIE to be utilized, has not provided any insight as to the particular case of unlawfulness 
on the particular facts at hand. To that end it is also a substantive issue that has to be 
dealt with by the court. Here it must be proven that there was neither consent (tacit or 
explicit) nor any other right in law to occupy the particular property. Arguably, there 
may be some overlap regarding unlawfulness between the threshold and the actual 
substantive requirements that have to be met in any given case.  
An unlawful occupier in terms of PIE is someone who occupies the owner’s land for 
residential purposes without the tacit or explicit consent of the owner or person in 
charge of the land or without a right in law to occupy the property. PIE expressly states 
that the person or persons in the position to give consent is the owner or person in 
charge of land, and that consent can either be expressly or tacitly furnished.206 In the 
situation where this consent is lacking the occupiers will be deemed to be unlawful for 
                                                          
206 Consent in terms of section 1 of PIE is defined as “express or tacit consent, whether in writing or 
otherwise, of the owner or person in charge to the occupation by the occupier of the land in question”. 
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purposes of PIE. Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha 
Homes207 is the first Constitutional Court judgment that dealt with the unlawfulness 
requirement in detail.208 In Joe Slovo the state sought to evict a community of 
occupiers, who had allegedly unlawfully occupied an informal settlement on state-
owned land.209 After providing basic services to the occupants the state sought their 
eviction because of its plans to upgrade the informal settlement to provide housing for 
those in need in terms of its housing project.210 Accordingly, the occupiers had to 
vacate the land so the upgrading could take place. The central issue in Joe Slovo was 
whether or not the occupiers of the Joe Slovo informal settlement were indeed unlawful 
occupiers for purposes of PIE.211 On the facts of the case the court was not in 
agreement about (a) whether consent was established; (b) if consent was established, 
when such consent was established; and (c) whether it was revoked.212 The judges 
seemed to have been in agreement that the question of unlawfulness showed consent 
to be the key determinant of the unlawfulness question.213 There is still uncertainty as 
to whether or not a broad approach to consent must be followed due to Yacoob J’s 
and Moseneke DCJ’s contradictory statements in this regard.214 The court’s point of 
                                                          
207 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC). 
208 JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 691. 
209 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others 2010 (3) SA 
454 (CC) para 9; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 691-692. 
210 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others 2010 (3) SA 
454 (CC) para 8; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 691-692. 
211 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others 2010 (3) SA 
454 (CC) para 3. 
212 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others 2010 (3) SA 
454 (CC). The case concerned five different judgments of which three of the judgments agreed that on 
the facts the occupiers had initial consent until it was revoked at a later stage; one judgment held that 
consent was never given and another judgment found that on the facts the government provided 
consent to the occupiers, but that such consent was subject to a suspensive condition. 
213 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others 2010 (3) SA 
454 (CC) para 4, 49, 145, 180, 280, 349; JM Pienaar “‘Unlawful occupier’ in perspective: History, 
legislation and case law” in H Mostert & MJ de Waal (eds) Essays in honour of CG van der Merwe 
(2011) 309-329 318-326; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 691-699. 
214 Moseneke DCJ held that consent must be cast in wide terms in accordance with the Constitution. 
Yacoob J was satisfied that as PIE already provided extensive protection, consent need not also be 
cast in wide terms. See Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and 
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departure was that if the state had granted the occupiers consent, their occupation 
could not be unlawful and as a consequence, PIE would not find application in the 
particular case.215 Therefore, if consent could be proven, it would mean that the 
occupiers would have a defensible right to be in occupation of the land.216 In this 
regard, consent can be express or tacit consent. Yacoob J explained that express 
consent is where two or more parties are involved in the granting of and receiving of 
consent in terms of an express agreement.217 In contrast, tacit consent is consent that 
is derived from the actions of the parties, because no written or oral agreement exists. 
Tacit consent also constitutes an agreement, but the agreement must be proven by 
reference to the circumstances surrounding the alleged agreement. The test for the 
existence of such an agreement is that the only possible inference that can be drawn 
from the evidence is that consent was in fact granted.218 Therefore, the intention to 
grant consent should be clear from the circumstantial evidence.219 
Accordingly, occupiers will always be regarded as unlawful where they occupy land 
without the express or tacit consent from the owner of the property. Express consent 
will require that two parties expressly (in writing or orally) grant and receive consent, 
respectively. Tacit consent will require the court to determine whether consent is the 
only possible inference that can be drawn from the facts of the case. 
                                                          
Others 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC) 67-71, 145; JM Pienaar “‘Unlawful occupier’ in perspective: History, 
legislation and case law” in H Mostert & MJ de Waal (eds) Essays in honour of CG van der Merwe 
(2011) 309-329 318-319; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 693. 
215 See Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others 2010 (3) 
SA 454 (CC) paras 38, 144; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 691-692. 
216 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others 2010 (3) SA 
454 (CC) para 51; JM Pienaar “‘Unlawful occupier’ in perspective: History, legislation and case law” in 
H Mostert & MJ de Waal (eds) Essays in honour of CG van der Merwe (2011) 309-329 318-319; JM 
Pienaar Land reform (2014) 692. 
217Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others 2010 (3) SA 454 
(CC) paras 49, 150-151.  
218 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others 2010 (3) SA 
454 (CC) para 74. 
219 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others 2010 (3) SA 
454 (CC) para 77. It is clear that all the judgments applied a process of inference on the facts of the 
case in order to establish whether consent was granted. 
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(b) The “just and equitable” requirement 
The final substantive hurdle for an applicant to cross in order to succeed with an 
eviction application is the requirement that the eviction can only be granted if it is just 
and equitable in the circumstances. In this regard, courts are enjoined to only grant an 
eviction order when they are satisfied that it would be just and equitable in the 
particular case to do so.220  
This requirement was considered for the first time in PE Municipality.221 The court 
provided an explanation of what just and equitable means in the eviction context by 
highlighting the complex diametrical fundamental needs and interests it regulates.222 
The court held that PIE aims to ensure that equilibrium can be reached between the 
opposing interests in the case, namely the plight of the homeless on the one hand, 
and the property rights of owners on the other. As explained, these rights are 
entrenched in section 26(3) and section 25 of the Constitution respectively. The 
eviction process in terms of the new constitutional order essentially provides a process 
for the orderly removal of informal settlements.223 However, PIE cannot ensure the 
orderly resettlement of occupiers if it is applied in a legalistic manner because every 
resettlement would be unique and would require a unique arrangement to ensure that 
the removal is fair and orderly. Accordingly, PIE essentially requires that courts apply 
the provisions of PIE in such a way that will ensure that the outcomes of eviction cases 
are always just and equitable for all concerned.224  
The court in PE Municipality went on to describe what the phrase “just and equitable” 
entails. It emphasised that the granting of an eviction order would not be just and 
equitable for purposes of PIE if it only took one of the parties’ circumstances into 
consideration.225 Justice and equity therefore require of the court to follow a sensitive 
and balanced approach pertaining to all parties involved and all factors placed before 
                                                          
220 Section 4(4)(d) of PIE. 
221 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 33. 
222 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 33. 
223 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 33. 
224 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 33. 
225 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 33. 
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it.226 The court also held that it will be necessary for the court to delve into 
considerations it has never taken into account before in order to reach a just and 
equitable decision.227 These considerations may include morality, fairness, social 
values and the circumstances of all the parties involved in the case.228 It is essential 
for courts in this regard to accept that, where PIE is involved, the rule of law and 
equality are not in conflict with each other, but are complementing and reinforcing each 
other.229 Lastly, the requirement of just and equitable enjoins courts to approach 
eviction cases in line with the ubuntu philosophy.230 
In light of the court’s understanding of the just and equitable requirement in PE 
Municipality, it is clear that compliance with this substantive requirement is to a large 
extent not in the owner’s control. With regard to this specific requirement, the owner 
can simply seek to disclose to the court the relevant information that she has pertaining 
to the circumstances relevant in the case.231 An assessment and balancing of the 
circumstances will then lead the court to a conclusion on whether or not an eviction 
order in the specific circumstances would be just and equitable. It is the duty of the 
court to consider all relevant factors, to do the balancing exercise and decide the 
case.232 Therefore, the function of courts in balancing out the competing interests is 
an integral part of this substantive requirement. The approach courts employ to this 
balancing exercise is accordingly also part of the standard of justice and equity in a 
given case. 
If the above argument is accepted it cannot be disputed that the approach of courts to 
the requirement of “just and equitable” in PIE is of paramount importance to ensure 
that the outcome of eviction cases indeed ensures a constitutionally-required level of 
                                                          
226 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 35. 
227 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 33. 
228 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 33. 
229 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 35. 
230 See chapter 3, section 3.2.3.1 above. Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 
217 (CC) para 35. 
231 In City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd and Others 2012 (6) SA 294 (SCA) para 30 
the court stated that “it is for the applicant to ensure that the information placed before the court is 
sufficient, if unchallenged, to satisfy it that it would be just and equitable to grant an eviction order”. 
232 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 23. 
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justice and equity. Three cases provide insight into the courts’ actual philosophical 
approach to eviction cases in the constitutional context under PIE. The Modderklip 
Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters and Another233 (“Modderklip HC”) case is 
significant because it illustrates how the High Court approached the application of PIE 
before the instructive judgment of PE Municipality. Voster v Van Niekerk,234 Daisy 
Dear Investments and Johannesburg Housing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Unlawful 
Occupiers, Newtown Urban Village235 are significant on the other hand because they 
will allow for an evaluation of the High Courts’ approach to the requirement of just and 
equitable after PE Municipality. Specific emphasis is placed on the High Court cases 
so as to ascertain whether these lower courts indeed followed the lead of the 
Constitutional Court in PE Municipality. 
Modderklip HC concerned an application brought by a private owner (Modderklip) for 
an eviction order in terms of section 4(6) of PIE against some 15 000 unlawful 
occupiers.236 The application for eviction by the owner was a result of a notice served 
on the owner by the Municipality, in terms of section 6(4) of PIE, which instructed the 
owner to institute eviction proceedings.237 This resulted in the owner instituting the 
eviction proceedings in the Cape High Court. 
The court considered the requirements of section 4(6) of PIE.238 It reiterated that 
section 4(6) of PIE only allows a court to grant an eviction order if it is convinced that 
it is just and equitable to do so after taking all relevant circumstances of the case into 
                                                          
233 2001 (4) SA 385 (W). 
234 Voster v Van Niekerk and Others (6723/2008) [2009] ZAFSHC 9 (5 February 2009). 
235 2013 (1) SA 583 (GSJ). 
236 Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters and Another 2001 (4) SA 385 (W) 388. 
237 Section 6(4) of PIE provides that an organ of state (municipality) can require, by way of a written 
notice, that the owner or person in charge of the land institute eviction proceedings against unlawful 
occupiers on such land. Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters and Another 2001 (4) 
SA 385 (W) 389. 
238 Section 4(6) of PIE provides that: 
“[i]f an unlawful occupier has occupied the land in question for less than six months at the time 
when the proceedings are initiated, a court may grant an order for eviction if it is of the opinion 
that it is just and equitable to do so, after considering all the relevant circumstances, including 
the rights and needs of the elderly, children, disabled persons and households headed by 
women.” 
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account.239  Circumstances forwarded by the respondents to the court included: that 
they were previously occupants of the Chris Hani informal settlement from where they 
were also evicted by the former Benoni Town Council;240 that they were under the 
mistaken impression that the land had been purchased by the Town Council;241 that 
they would be rendered homeless if evicted from the strip of land;242 and that there 
were children, elderly people, pregnant woman and single mothers amongst them.243  
Factors that the court considered that favoured the applicant’s case were: that the 
applicant at common law is entitled to the exclusive use of its property;244 that the 
applicant had been deprived of the economic use of a very substantial portion of its 
property;245 that the informal settlement held a danger of increased crime rates and 
health and safety risks;246 and the large size of the encroachment on the owner’s rights 
and its fast growing pace.247  
The court did a balancing exercise taking all the factors as mentioned into 
consideration to reach an order which to its mind constituted a just and equitable one 
and granted the eviction order.248 The court further held that it was giving sufficient aid 
and consideration to the unlawful occupiers by giving them a justifiable period in which 
to find alternative accommodation.249 According to the court, all the factors purportedly 
indicated that an eviction order would be just and equitable in the particular case. 
Arguably, the finding of the court can be ascribed to the pre-constitutional legal culture 
that might have informed the court’s reasoning in this case.250 The court’s bias towards 
                                                          
239 The preamble of PIE emphasises both sections 25(1) and 26(3) of the Constitution. 
240 Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters and Another 2001 (4) SA 385 (W) 392. 
241 Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters and Another 2001 (4) SA 385 (W) 392. 
242 Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters and Another 2001 (4) SA 385 (W) 393. 
243 Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters and Another 2001 (4) SA 385 (W) 393. 
244 Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters and Another 2001 (4) SA 385 (W) 390. 
245 Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters and Another 2001 (4) SA 385 (W) 390. 
246 Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters and Another 2001 (4) SA 385 (W) 391. 
247 Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters and Another 2001 (4) SA 385 (W) 391. 
248 Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters and Another 2001 (4) SA 385 (W) 395. 
249 Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters and Another 2001 (4) SA 385 (W) 395. 
250 See chapter 2, section 2.5 above for a summary of the type of legal culture that dominated eviction 
adjudication in the pre-constitutional era. 
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the owner was evident in the way it thought about and considered each factor.251 
Furthermore this bias is also evident in the emphasis the court placed on the economic 
value of the property, the importance of protecting the owner’s property, while not 
reiterating the circumstances of the occupiers in the same way. 
This judgment seems to be an example of how the shadow of the common law still 
dominates judicial reasoning even where legislation exists that was specifically 
enacted to give effect to the Constitution. It illustrates how common law principles and 
doctrines still play a leading role when some courts in the constitutional era attempt to 
exercise their discretion to come to a just and equitable solution. This is in direct 
conflict with the idea of how eviction cases should be adjudicated under the 
Constitution as set out in PE Municipality. As already explained, PE Municipality was 
seminal in indicating the type of philosophical approach that a court should adopt in 
its application of the provisions of PIE.252 Very importantly, the approach should be 
informed by the values of ubuntu which automatically calls for context-sensitivity, as 
opposed to a hierarchical and mechanical analysis, which seems to be the approach 
adopted in Modderklip.253 This hierarchical approach is evident in the fact that the court 
gave far more weight to the owner’s interests than those of the unlawful occupiers. 
                                                          
251 Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters and Another 2001 (4) SA 385 (W) 393-395. 
The court’s finding on the factors placed before it for the respondents’ (occupiers’) case, in the final 
instance, weighed in favour of applicant. The court refuted the occupiers’ allegation that they were under 
the impression that the land belonged to the state. Accordingly, the court accepted that the alleged 
implied permission to live on the land was therefore also unsound. It held that the occupiers had no 
reasonable grounds to believe that the Town Council owned the land and gave them permission to 
occupy it. As a result, the court held that the occupiers occupied the land with the knowledge that they 
were doing so unlawfully. Accordingly, it found that this was a consideration that weighed against the 
occupiers and in favour of the owner. The second consideration the respondents raised, which at the 
end swayed the court in favour of the applicant, was the argument made in relation to the homelessness 
of the respondents. The court held that this factor cannot carry weight because the court was not 
furnished with all the information regarding the possibility of alternative accommodation. The duty to 
bring such information before it, according to the court, rested on the respondents who failed to provide 
the relevant information. Finally the court held that the percentage of households headed by women, 
children, disabled persons and elderly people were too small to have sufficient weight to favour the 
respondents’ case substantially. 
252 See chapter 2, section 2.2 above. 
253 See chapter 2, section 2.2 above. 
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This does not mean that an eviction order may never be granted in favour of an 
applicant owner. An approach where courts attribute the appropriate weight to the 
relevant rights, interests and circumstances of the parties could require that a court 
grant an eviction application or it might require that the court refuse to grant such an 
order.254 
Despite the court in PE Municipality giving more flesh to the way in which courts should 
approach the requirement of “just and equitable” for purposes of determining whether 
an eviction order should be granted, some courts continue to fail in this regard.255 
Cases that illustrate this contention even more pertinently are Voster, Daisy Dear 
Investments and Johannesburg Housing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Unlawful Occupiers, 
Newtown Urban Village. 
In Voster, the owner of a house sought the eviction of two elderly persons aged 92 
and 83 respectively.256 The owner relied on section 4 of PIE for the eviction 
application.257 The unlawful occupiers based their defence on an alleged usufruct that 
the applicant owner agreed to at the time the occupiers moved into the house.258 
However, the court found that no such usufruct existed. Accordingly, the court had to 
determine whether the eviction of the respondents in this case would be just and 
equitable in terms of PIE, as no legal basis existed for their occupation.259 In this regard 
the court referred to section 4(7) that enjoins the court to take the interests and needs 
of the elderly into account.260 The court then held that because the occupiers were 
elderly persons, it would not be just and equitable to grant an eviction order against 
them.261 Accordingly, the eviction order was denied on the basis that the occupiers 
were elderly, in line with section 4(2). 
The requirement that courts may only grant an eviction order if it is just and equitable 
to do so, mandates the court to take all relevant circumstances into account when 
                                                          
254 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 522. 
255 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 37. 
256 Voster v Van Niekerk and Others (6723/2008) [2009] ZAFSHC 9 (5 February 2009) para 11. 
257 Voster v Van Niekerk and Others (6723/2008) [2009] ZAFSHC 9 (5 February 2009) para 9. 
258 Voster v Van Niekerk and Others (6723/2008) [2009] ZAFSHC 9 (5 February 2009) para 5. 
259 Voster v Van Niekerk and Others (6723/2008) [2009] ZAFSHC 9 (5 February 2009) para 12. 
260 Voster v Van Niekerk and Others (6723/2008) [2009] ZAFSHC 9 (5 February 2009) para 12. 
261 Voster v Van Niekerk and Others (6723/2008) [2009] ZAFSHC 9 (5 February 2009) para 12. 
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exercising its discretion to grant or refuse an eviction order.262 The court in Voster 
failed to take all relevant circumstances into account because it only took one factor 
into account. In the process the court arguably also failed to undertake a proper 
balancing exercise as required in this context.  Accordingly, where a court does not 
consider all relevant circumstances the consequences are firstly, that the outcome will 
not be just and equitable and secondly, non-compliance with the provisions of PIE by 
the court. In light of the above, the approach followed by the court can also be 
described as mechanical (like the court’s approach in Modderklip HC) because of the 
absence of a proper, contextual balancing exercise. 
The mechanical approach followed by the court in Voster cannot be reconciled with 
what PIE with its underlying idea of ubuntu aims to achieve in the eviction context. 
Ubuntu requires a context- and community sensitive approach, as its very nature 
acknowledges the context of each individual and how people relate to and depend on 
each other in a community. When read in this light, PIE requires that both parties are 
protected by focussing on regulating the relationship between an owner and an 
unlawful occupier.263 It is of utmost importance that the dignity of both parties involved 
is protected in order to ensure that the dignity of the community is also safeguarded. 
For this reason, the court has to approach its task with the philosophy of ubuntu in 
mind, where the starting point is community and the goal is the best outcome for all. 
The goals of PIE will not be achieved if the court only prioritises entitlements or 
interests in a more or less hierarchical fashion.264 
Daisy Dear Investments concerns a case in which a private landowner sought to evict 
about 2000 unlawful occupiers in terms of PIE.265 The eviction application was sought 
as a result of a demand from the Msunduzi Municipality for the owner to evict the 
occupiers.266 The occupiers were a large community and most of the occupiers 
                                                          
262 Sections 4(6) and 4(7). See further Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 
(CC) para 23; AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 525. 
263 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 33. 
264 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 13. 
265 Occupiers of Erf 101, 102, 104 and 112 Shorts Retreat, Pietermaritzburg v Daisy Dear Investments 
(Pty) Ltd and Others 2009 JDR 0675 (GNP) para 3. 
266 Occupiers of Erf 101, 102, 104 and 112 Shorts Retreat, Pietermaritzburg v Daisy Dear Investments 
(Pty) Ltd and Others 2009 JDR 0675 (GNP) para 4. 
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occupied the land for more than five years.267 Furthermore, the community consisted 
of poor and unemployed people and the households were mostly headed by 
women.268 The High Court had to determine whether in the circumstances of the case 
an order in favour of eviction would be just and equitable. What becomes apparent 
from this case is the crucial role courts play to make sure an eviction order is only 
ordered if it is genuinely just and equitable to do so. The court in this case ordered the 
eviction of the unlawful occupiers without having due regard for the provision of PIE. 
The court did not ensure that it had all the relevant factors relevant to the case placed 
before it. It also failed to ascertain why all the relevant circumstances were not placed 
in front of it, so it could be in a position to determine whether or not it must order the 
parties to bring such evidence.269 Furthermore, the court did not consider the 
availability of alternative land for the occupiers to relocate to and it perhaps too easily 
accepted the municipality’s report to be sufficient information regarding the unlawful 
occupiers.270 The court also did not consider whether or not mediation could have 
resolved the dispute.271 The court’s approach in Daisy Dear Investments is evident of 
the complete absence of the philosophical framework that ideals like ubuntu could 
have provided in the circumstances. As explained above, ubuntu requires that courts 
employ a context-sensitive approach. Where the court fails to take all relevant 
considerations into account, it will not be in a position to reach a solution that would 
protect the dignity of all people involved and the decision made by the court will not 
comply with the standard of justice and equity that an eviction order requires. 
In Johannesburg Housing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Unlawful Occupiers, Newtown Urban 
Village272 the court had an interesting approach to the “just and equitable” requirement 
                                                          
267 Occupiers of Erf 101, 102, 104 and 112 Shorts Retreat, Pietermaritzburg v Daisy Dear Investments 
(Pty) Ltd and Others 2009 JDR 0675 (GNP) para 4. 
268 Occupiers of Erf 101, 102, 104 and 112 Shorts Retreat, Pietermaritzburg v Daisy Dear Investments 
(Pty) Ltd and Others 2009 JDR 0675 (GNP) para 3. 
269 Occupiers of Erf 101, 102, 104 and 112 Shorts Retreat, Pietermaritzburg v Daisy Dear Investments 
(Pty) Ltd and Others 2009 (4) All SA 410 (SCA) para 6. 
270 Occupiers of Erf 101, 102, 104 and 112 Shorts Retreat, Pietermaritzburg v Daisy Dear Investments 
(Pty) Ltd and Others 2009 (4) All SA 410 (SCA) para 7. 
271 Occupiers of Erf 101, 102, 104 and 112 Shorts Retreat, Pietermaritzburg v Daisy Dear Investments 
(Pty) Ltd and Others 2009 (4) All SA 410 (SCA) para 9. 
272 2013 (1) SA 583 (GSJ). 
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in PIE. The Newtown case concerned an application for the eviction of a large number 
of persons from the housing complex called Newtown Urban Village, which was 
erected to provide affordable rental accommodation to persons with low income.273 As 
the defendants were not lawful tenants the provisions of PIE found application and the 
owner instituted eviction proceedings in terms of PIE.274 Accordingly, the court had to 
decide whether or not it would be just and equitable to evict the unlawful occupiers.275 
The court’s ratio suggests that what PIE requires of courts and owners is unrealistic 
and impossible. This impossibility is found in (a), the meaning of just and equitable 
and (b), the broad discretion the court has in order to make such determination.276 It 
held that it is extremely difficult to ascribe a meaning to the phrase “just and 
equitable”.277 Furthermore, Willis J explained that this broad discretion PIE gives 
courts is “grossly unfair to judges” because it renders the function of the court, with 
regard to eviction adjudication, “unworkable”.278  
As a result, the court in its investigation as to what just and equitable means turned to 
familiar territory, namely the Companies Act.279 The Companies Act ascribed an 
objective meaning to justice and equity and the court in accordance with this 
understanding held that a reasonable man, objectively speaking, might come to 
different conclusions as to what would be just and equitable on the facts of a case. 
                                                          
273 Johannesburg Housing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Unlawful Occupiers, Newtown Urban Village 2013 
(1) SA 583 (GSJ) paras 1-3. 
274 Johannesburg Housing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Unlawful Occupiers, Newtown Urban Village 2013 
(1) SA 583 (GSJ) para 19. 
275 Johannesburg Housing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Unlawful Occupiers, Newtown Urban Village 2013 
(1) SA 583 (GSJ) para 21. For an detailed discussion of the requirement of “just and equitable” in the 
Newtown case see JM Pienaar “The law of property” in N Botha, J Heaton & C Schulze (eds) Annual 
survey of the South African law (2012) 717 768-772. 
276 Johannesburg Housing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Unlawful Occupiers, Newtown Urban Village 2013 
(1) SA 583 (GSJ) paras 26 and 36. 
277 Johannesburg Housing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Unlawful Occupiers, Newtown Urban Village 2013 
(1) SA 583 (GSJ) para 26. 
278 Johannesburg Housing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Unlawful Occupiers, Newtown Urban Village 2013 
(1) SA 583 (GSJ) para 33. 
279 Johannesburg Housing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Unlawful Occupiers, Newtown Urban Village 2013 
(1) SA 583 (GSJ) para 4. 
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Therefore, the court suggested that templates should be created for courts to follow 
so as to prevent different possible outcomes.280  
The approach exhibited by the court in Newtown with regard to PIE’s just and equitable 
requirement reflects pre-constitutional conservatism and positivistic thinking. This is 
evident firstly, in Willis J’s undertone throughout the entire judgment. Secondly, the 
pre-constitutional conservatism and positivistic thinking is also evident in his reference 
to Company law to ascribe meaning to just and equitable. This clear ignorance of the 
PE Municipality constitutional matrix as interpretive framework ignores the historical 
and constitutional context within which the provisions of PIE and the discretion of the 
court must be understood and interpreted.281 In this regard, the court chose familiarity 
and certainty above the context-sensitive and ubuntu-laden approach mandated by 
the Constitutional Court.282 
Overall, the discussion of both the procedural and the substantive requirements of the 
eviction remedy PIE affirms that ubuntu is generally the ratio underlying PIE and its 
purposes. This has become evident by way of the context-sensitive approach courts 
endorsed in their application of PIE’s procedural and substantive provisions in various 
cases. Unfortunately, this is only a half truth. The theme of context-sensitive 
adjudication is not always followed by courts in eviction cases; this inconsistency came 
out strongly in the discussion of courts’ approach to PIE’s “just and equitable” 
requirement. 
 
                                                          
280 See chapter 3, section 3.2.2.2 above. Johannesburg Housing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Unlawful 
Occupiers, Newtown Urban Village 2013 (1) SA 583 (GSJ) para 52. See further AJ van der Walt 
Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 521; JM Pienaar & J Brickhill “Land” in S Woolman, T Roux & 
M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 2 ed (RS 6 2014) 48-1 48-5. 
281 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) paras 14-16.  
282 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 37. 
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3 3 The judicial function and its procedural approach to PIE 
3 3 1 The interpretive function of the court 
In the pre-constitutional era, interpretation of statutes occurred with the assistance of 
the common law cannons for statutory interpretation.283 This section will analyse how 
the Constitution and PIE impact on the interpretive function of courts in the eviction 
paradigm. A description of each of the conventional cannons will follow as well as a 
brief explanation of the constitutional guidelines that developed in light of the 
Constitution. Finally, an analysis of the courts’ approach to specifically the 
interpretation of PIE will be embarked on to determine how the guidelines for the 
interpretation of the Constitution impact on interpretation in the eviction context. 
The conventional cannons for statutory interpretation are inter alia literalism, 
intentionalism, purposivism, judicial activism, objectivism and the linguistic turn.284 
Literalism concerns the interpretation exercise of ascertaining the meaning of the text 
from the ipsissma verba in which the text is laid down, irrespective of an illogical or 
absurd result.285 However, if the result of the literalist approach is absurd and contrary 
to common sense, the golden-rule finds application, which allows the court to modify 
the words to avoid absurdity.286 This modification would be directed by the statute as 
a whole.287 Intentionalism concerns the interpretive exercise of ascribing a meaning to 
the text that reflects the intention of the legislator.288 Purposivism in turn concerns the 
legislative exercise of attributing a meaning to the text that will reflect the purpose that 
the legislation seeks to achieve.289 The purpose is found in the context of the legislative 
measure that the text forms part of. Judicial activism advances an interpretation theory 
where judges can ascribe a just meaning to a statutory provision or phrase where 
necessary.290 Objectivism deals with the interpretation exercise where meaning is 
                                                          
283 See chapter 2, section 2.4 above. See further HR Hahlo & E Khan The South African legal system 
and its background (1968) 178; LM du Plessis Re-interpretation of statutes (2002) 92. 
284 LM du Plessis Re-interpretation of statutes (2002) 89-119. 
285 LM du Plessis Re-interpretation of statutes (2002) 93. 
286 LM du Plessis Re-interpretation of statutes (2002) 94. 
287 LM du Plessis Re-interpretation of statutes (2002) 94. 
288 LM du Plessis Re-interpretation of statutes (2002) 94. 
289 LM du Plessis Re-interpretation of statutes (2002) 96. 
290 LM du Plessis Re-interpretation of statutes (2002) 97. 
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ascribed to statutory text on the basis that the text takes up an objective existence 
separate from the intention of the legislator after promulgation.291 The statutory text 
retrieves its meaning from the concrete situations within which it is applied.292 Lastly, 
the linguistic turn contends that any interpretation exercise of the court will always 
consist of subjective preferences because of the choices courts must make when 
interpreting text.293 These conventional cannons are not all peremptory precepts for 
the interpretation of statutory text, although Du Plessis points out that some cannons 
have a peremptory status.294 These are cannons that are based on the intention of the 
legislator and also on the clear and unambiguous language theories.295  
In the pre-constitutional era courts did not have a fixed approach to (a) which cannons 
they applied and (b) how they applied these cannons.296 It was common for courts to 
use different cannons in different cases and also to use a combination of cannons as 
opposed to only one at a time.297 However, despite the courts’ inconsistent use of the 
cannons, Du Plessis points out that the dominant approach followed by the South 
African courts in the pre-constitutional era was the literalist-cum-intentionalist 
approach.298 The literalist-cum-intentionalist approach entails the pursuit of the real 
intention of the legislator by interpreting the language used in the text.299 Accordingly, 
it is a combination of intentionalism and the literalism theories of interpretation. As a 
result courts generally in the pre-constitutional eviction paradigm relied on the literalist-
cum-intentionalist approach to interpretation when faced with interpretive questions.300 
The reliance on this cannon of interpretation, in particular, must be ascribed to the 
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political background at the time, together with the strong influence of positivism on the 
judiciary.301 
The advent of the new legal and constitutional dispensation in South Africa brought 
about a new interpretation paradigm.302 The Constitution with its entrenched Bill of 
Rights requires separate interpretation rules for the interpretation of the Constitution. 
Constitutional interpretation entails the process of pinning down the meaning of a 
provision in the Constitution.303 Within the Constitution, there are two provisions that 
give direction in this regard, namely sections 39(2) and 239. Section 39(2) is the 
interpretation clause and holds that “when interpreting any legislation, and when 
developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must 
promote the spirit, purport and objectives of the Bill of Rights”. Section 239 is the 
definition clause and defines national and provincial legislation. 
These provisions do not provide complete guidelines for the interpretation exercise.304 
The Constitutional Court together with the Supreme Court of Appeal have developed 
guidelines for the interpretation of the Constitution in general, the rights in the Bill of 
Rights and legislation promulgated to give effect to the Constitution.305 These 
principles all flow from the Constitutional Court’s dictum in Viking Pony Africa Pumps 
(Pty) Ltd t/a Tricom Africa v Hidro-Tech Systems (Pty) Ltd that the “language of the 
constitutional text must be interpreted generously, purposively and in context.”306 This 
dictum however is not without limitation.307 The constitutional guidelines for 
interpretation limit constitutional interpretation but also provide content to such 
constitutional interpretation. Currie and De Waal identify the first guideline for 
interpretation to be found in the role of the text. This guideline advances that the point 
of departure for the interpretation of the constitutional text is literalism. In terms of 
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literalism, meaning can be found in the text as it stands.308 However, this textual 
approach should not be viewed in the conventional textual sense found in the literalism 
theory. The court in Makwanyane made this clear when it held that the literal meaning 
of the text is acceptable only if it reflects the values of the Constitution.309 Accordingly, 
in terms of the role of the text guideline the starting point for constitutional interpretation 
is the literal meaning of the text, but only to the extent that it confirms the Constitution’s 
values.310  
The second guideline for the interpretation of constitutional text, identified by Currie 
and De Waal is called purposive interpretation.311 Purposive interpretation involves the 
exercise of searching for the purpose of the provision in question and ascribing to it a 
meaning that would give effect to the identified purpose. The Constitution is based on 
foundational values.312 Therefore the purpose will generally also be found in protecting 
specific values and interests. Currie and De Waal point out that this identification 
process can be difficult and will almost always require the court to make a value 
judgment.313 This means that the court will have to decide which values and interests 
the specific provision aims to protect and which one the provision specifically does not 
protect. This will require a further interpretation of the individual values in light of the 
specific text.314 
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The third constitutional interpretation guideline is called the generous interpretation-
guideline.315 The basic idea behind this guideline was set out in S v Zuma.316 In Zuma 
the court explained that when interpreting a provision in the Constitution, the use of 
the generous interpretation-guideline is supposed to ensure that the individual gets 
the full measure of protection from the rights and freedoms entrenched in the 
Constitution.317 In other words, the guideline allows for the court to ascribe to a 
provision in the Constitution a broad interpretation rather than a narrow interpretation. 
However, the generous interpretation-guideline is subject to the condition that the text 
must in principle allow for such broad interpretation.318 
The fourth and final interpretive guideline for the interpretation of the Constitution is 
the context-guideline.319 This guideline advances that the meaning of the constitutional 
text is found in the contextual matrix within which it is used.320 Context, however, is 
not a free standing and isolated guideline; context is used in conjunction with 
purposivism. In other words, the contextual matrix of a constitutional provision will help 
to determine the purpose of the constitutional provision.321 This contextual matrix can 
refer to a number of things, namely the historical and political backgrounds as well as 
the context advanced by the text itself.322  
Section 39(2), together with section 1 of the Constitution, establishes the supremacy 
of the Constitution and the single system of law principle. The single system of law 
principle is based on these two provisions and holds that the Constitution is the highest 
law from which all other laws such as the common law, customary law and statute law 
must flow.323 These sources of law can in no circumstances develop separately and 
parallel to the Constitution. It is of paramount importance that these sources conform 
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to the spirit, purport and objectives of the Constitution. Accordingly, this new leg of 
interpretation, called constitutional interpretation, impacts directly on statutory 
interpretation.324 
PIE is a statute that aims to regulate the eviction of unlawful occupiers from their 
homes. PIE must also conform to the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution, in 
line with section 39(2) of the Constitution. The modes of interpretation as developed 
for purposes of the interpretation of the Constitution impact on the interpretation of 
statutes, due to the single system of law principle explained above. Du Plessis 
explains the implications of the single system of law principle on statutory 
interpretation and identifies two consequences of this principle. Firstly, the rule means 
that all statutes are subject to the Constitution and secondly, it means that statutes 
must be read in light of, and in line with, the Constitution.325  
Section 39(1) demands the interpretation of statutes in a manner that promote the 
constitutional values of an open and democratic society based on freedom and 
equality.326 The question that arises is what this means for the conventional cannons 
of interpretation that directed statutory interpretation in the pre-constitutional era. In 
other words, it remains interesting to consider the extent to which the conventional 
interpretive approach to the interpretation of statutes of the pre-constitutional era has 
been changed by the Constitution. Du Plessis argues that the approach to the 
interpretation of a statute in the constitutional era depends on the nature of the 
legislative measure before the court for interpretation.327 He suggests that the 
conventional cannons are still employed, together with the literalist-cum-intentionalist 
approach to the cannons where the legislative measure that requires interpretation is 
a “normal” statute dealing with neutral issues.328 However, when a statute that 
regulates constitutional issues is interpreted, the new constitutionally-inspired 
guidelines should be employed by the court. PIE is exactly such a constitutionally-
inspired legislative measure. It was promulgated to give effect to section 26(3) and 
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section 25(1) of the Constitution.329 The nature and origin of PIE accordingly indicate 
that PIE should be interpreted with constitutionally-inspired cannons of interpretation 
on the basis of Du Plessis’ argument.  
Since the promulgation of PIE courts have been called upon to interpret the provisions 
of PIE. In this regard, Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker and Another v Jika,330 PE Municipality 
and Changing Tides are especially indicative of how courts have approached its new 
interpretive function in the eviction context. 
Ndlovu concerned two cases with almost identical facts. In both disputes the 
applicants applied for the eviction of the unlawful occupiers in terms of the rei 
vindicatio. The occupier in Ndlovu was a tenant of the applicant who failed to move 
out of the leased premises after his lease had terminated.331 The occupier in Bekker 
lost ownership of the property in a sale in execution but refused to move out of the 
premises after the property was transferred to the new owner.332 The applications for 
the eviction of the respective occupiers were successful in the lower courts and led to 
the combined Ndlovu appeal.333 On appeal, the occupiers insisted that PIE, and not 
the rei vindicatio, was applicable to their situation. Consequently, the court had to 
pronounce on the question of whether unlawful occupiers for purposes of PIE only 
included squatters (who were ab initio unlawful occupiers) or whether it also included 
tenants and mortgagees holding-over (whose occupation was initially lawful, but 
subsequently became unlawful).334 Accordingly, the court had to interpret the term 
“unlawful occupier” in PIE to determine the category of occupiers that PIE aims to 
include in its ambit. 
The court’s approach to the interpretation of the concept “unlawful occupier” in the text 
of PIE consisted of four distinct steps.335 In the first step the court identified and pointed 
out the textual framework in which the term appeared and then identified the precise 
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status of the occupiers.336 The second step in the interpretation exercise of the court 
was to determine the ordinary meaning of the phrase “unlawful occupier”.337 It held 
that textually PIE applies to unlawful occupiers in general.338 After it established what 
the ordinary meaning of unlawful occupier was, it commenced with its third step. In 
this regard, the court looked for internal and external indicators of what parliament 
intended unlawful occupiers to mean. The internal exercise consisted of the court 
identifying various other sections in PIE where the phrase “unlawful occupiers” is also 
used.339 However, because the provisions in which the phrase appeared in the text 
were vague and contradictory, the court had to resort to external indicators of 
parliament’s intention.340 The court’s external exercise looked at the motivation behind 
the enactment of PIE based on the history of South Africa and how this particular class 
of occupiers, namely occupiers holding over, linked up with the historical context and 
reason for PIE’s promulgation.341 Furthermore, the court reiterated that the 
Constitution mandates courts to interpret legislation so that it promotes the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.342 Section 26(3) of the Constitution was then 
identified as representative of the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights in the 
interpretation exercise of what is meant by unlawful occupiers for purposes of PIE.343 
In light of section 26(3) and the historical origins of PIE the court could not find any 
reason as to why the legislator would have intended that vulnerable tenants should 
not also enjoy the protection of PIE.344 Accordingly, the court interpreted unlawful 
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occupiers in a generous manner to ensure that all unlawful occupiers (except those 
expressly excluded from the ambit of PIE)345 will fall under protection of PIE.346 
The above analysis shows firstly, that the court in Ndlovu as a starting point employed 
one of the traditional interpretive strategies, namely the literalist-cum-intentionalist 
approach. However, in the court’s application of the literalist-cum-intentionalist 
approach, it applied the textual guideline for constitutional interpretation. Accordingly, 
the court made the interpretation obtained via the conventional cannon subject to 
constitutional scrutiny. In this regard, the court employed the constitutional interpretive 
guideline of purposivism when it looked at internal and external factors to determine 
what the legislator meant with the concept of unlawful occupiers. It also applied the 
contextual and generous interpretation guidelines when it held that the words unlawful 
occupier had to be interpreted widely after taking the historical and political 
background of PIE and the group seeking PIE’s protection into account. Accordingly, 
Ndlovu illustrates how courts use a combination of the conventional cannons for 
interpretation and the constitutional guidelines developed for the interpretation of 
constitutional text. 
As alluded to above, PE Municipality concerns an eviction application brought by the 
state against unlawful occupiers of privately owned land.347 In PE Municipality the 
Constitutional Court paved the way for the interpretation of sections 25 and 26(3) of 
the Constitution and PIE in eviction cases.348 The court’s approach to the interpretation 
of PIE commenced with an overview of the historical background with which the 
provisions of PIE and section 26(3) of the Constitution must always be read. In this 
regard, the court elaborated on the harsh consequences of the apartheid regime and 
specifically the PISA, specifically in relation to how it marginalised people of colour by 
allowing evictions at the absolute discretion of the state and private owners.349 The 
court stressed the importance of interpreting PIE and the relevant sections in the 
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Constitution with this historical background as well as the present-day consequences 
thereof in mind.350 After explaining the pre-constitutional eviction paradigm and its 
harsh effects, the court proceeded in highlighting how PIE aims to eradicate those 
injustices and invert the effects of PISA.351 The historical background as well as the 
aims of PIE can accordingly be described as the court’s starting point for the 
interpretation of PIE. After establishing the historical background and aims of PIE, the 
court proceeded in setting out the constitutional matrix for the interpretation of PIE. It 
identified that the constitutional matrix within which PIE must be interpreted is: firstly, 
the values of human dignity, equality and freedom that underpin the whole 
Constitution; secondly, section 25 of the Constitution; and thirdly, section 26(3) of the 
Constitution.352 In terms of the underlying values, the court reiterated that the scope 
ascribed to these rights is informed by the values of human dignity, equality and 
freedom. These rights only exist in so far as they affirm the values of human inter-
dependence, solidarity, community and human dignity. Accordingly, these values are 
of utmost importance for the interpretation of section 25 and section 26 and, as a 
result, also for the interpretation of PIE.353 The court went on to give content to these 
rights respectively. It held that section 25 aims to promote both the protection of 
existing property rights and the public interest.354 This dual function gives rise to an 
inherent tension. However, the court held that the tension is not necessarily 
problematic. The tension should be instructive when interpreting section 25.355 The 
court then analysed section 26(3) and established that it is important to interpret 
section 26(3) together with section 25 of the Constitution. When these provisions are 
read together they establish the constitutional approach to “land hunger, 
homeless[ness] and the protection of property rights”.356 The court concluded that this 
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constitutional approach affirms that land reform rights are defensive rather than 
affirmative rights, that eviction may occur even if the result of an eviction order is that 
the occupier loses her home and concrete and case specific solutions must be sought 
in particular instances.357 
The approach of the court in PE Municipality reflects the context-guideline for 
constitutional interpretation. This is evident in that the court considered the historical 
and political background of PIE as well as the context advanced by the text self. 
In Transnet Ltd v Nyawuza and Others,358 a case decided after PE Municipality’s 
instructive judgment on the constitutional matrix was handed down, the High Court 
was faced with the decision of whether PIE indeed conferred on the court a discretion 
to grant or refuse to grant an eviction order.359 The court had to interpret PIE to 
determine whether or not the discretion existed. In this regard, the court started its 
interpretive exercise by identifying the provisions in PIE that referred to such 
discretion. The court then ascribed to these provisions their ordinary meaning. After 
establishing the ordinary meaning, the court turned to the Constitution and its impact 
on the interpretation of statutes. It held that the Constitution requires that the spirit, 
purport and objects thereof should always be promoted when courts interpret PIE.360 
Furthermore, the court identified that in the eviction context the promotion of the spirit, 
purport and objects of PIE is simultaneously the promotion of section 26(3).361 
The approach of the court in Transnet is similar to the approach followed by the court 
in Ndlovu. Firstly, the court in Transnet applied the literalist-cum-intentionalist 
conventional interpretive cannon. Its second step was to test the interpretation against 
the values of the Constitution and applicable provisions of the Bill of Rights. The above 
analysis of courts’ approach to the interpretation of PIE, in the constitutional context, 
shows that courts still apply the dominant pre-constitutional interpretative canon when 
it interprets PIE. In other words, the literalist-cum-intentionalist conventional 
interpretive canon as illustrated in Ndlovu and Transnet is still applied in the 
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constitutional era. However, the court seems to apply this conventional cannon in 
conjunction with the constitutional guidelines. This is necessary due to the express 
mandate on courts in section 39(1) to interpret statutes to promote the constitutional 
values of an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality.362 
Accordingly, courts use a combination of the conventional canons for interpretation 
and the constitutional guidelines developed for the interpretation of constitutional text 
when interpreting PIE. 
This finding shows that courts are mandated in their interpretation of certain provisions 
of PIE to not only look at the written text, but to also consider the historical as well as 
the constitutional context within which the text was promulgated. This conclusion is 
important for my research because it provides an indication that the courts are also 
mandated in terms of the Constitution to be sensitive to context in their interpretation 
of PIE. 
 
3 3 2 The role of the court 
Procedural requirements and practices that define the court’s role in the adjudication 
of disputes have a direct bearing on how courts approach and apply remedies in 
general and therefore also eviction remedies in particular.363 As already explained and 
established in the previous chapter, the English civil procedure law regulated a number 
of procedural aspects in the pre-constitutional era: namely; the role of courts; the 
hierarchy of courts; and the scope of the courts’ powers and jurisdiction.364 The 
defining feature of the common law tradition in the sphere of procedural law was the 
adversarial approach to court proceedings.365 The adversarial approach required 
courts to play a passive and neutral role when adjudicating disputes.366 
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The adversarial approach to court proceedings remained the standard for court 
proceedings when the Constitution came into force. However, section 26(3) of the 
Constitution together with PIE now mandates the court in the context of PIE eviction 
cases to embrace a new role for itself.367 The court in PE Municipality described this 
new approach and emphasised the different dimensions thereof. An analysis of the 
instructions given to the judiciary in PE Municipality pertaining to the role of the courts 
in eviction cases follows in order to determine what this constitutionally mandated 
deviation from the adversarial approach to court proceedings entails. 
In PE Municipality the Constitutional Court expressly held that PIE changed the way 
the law regulates the eviction of unlawful occupiers drastically. This drastic change to 
the regulation of unlawful occupation and evictions requires the court to step into a 
new role for purposes of its approach to and application of PIE. In this regard, the court 
in PE Municipality pointed out that two major features of the prescribed role of the 
courts in eviction cases have changed. These are that (a) the function of the courts in 
the eviction of unlawful occupiers has changed and (b) the end goal, which the court 
must work towards in eviction cases, has also changed.  
Firstly, the courts’ function in the application of PIE is to embody a balance between 
unlawful occupation of land and illegal evictions. In other words, courts have to 
establish an appropriate relationship between sections 25(1) and 26(3) of the 
Constitution in each individual eviction case.368 This appropriate relationship will 
warrant that the outcome of eviction cases would be just and equitable for all parties 
involved.369 For this purpose courts have been given wide powers in eviction cases.370 
This balancing function of the courts is in no way similar to the function the courts had 
when they were called on to adjudicate eviction cases in the pre-constitutional 
context.371 In the pre-constitutional era courts were only concerned with establishing 
what rights were involved and which parties’ rights were the strongest.372 Accordingly, 
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the judicial function was to establish a hierarchical arrangement between the opposing 
interests of the parties and apply them in a more or less mechanical fashion based on 
the facts at hand.373 In contrast, PIE requires of courts to balance the competing 
interests in a manner that takes account of all relevant factors and interests and not 
simply to arrange rights from strongest to weakest to determine who has the strongest 
right.374 During this contextual, balancing exercise courts are enjoined to consider all 
relevant circumstances. The court in PE Municipality explained further what having 
regard to all the circumstances would constitute and held that to have regard, the court 
has to give each and every relevant factor its proper weight as appropriate in the 
circumstances of the case.375 After the court has given weight to all relevant factors, 
the court must make a decision on the basis of which parties’ considerations weigh 
heavier so that it is able to judge what would be just and equitable in each individual 
case.376 
Secondly, the goal of courts in proceedings for the eviction of unlawful occupiers is to 
make sure that the outcome of the eviction order is just and equitable for all 
concerned.377 Justice and equity is accordingly the standard that every eviction order 
must comply with. The court in PE Municipality indicated that the wide power PIE 
ascribes to courts is primarily aimed at enabling courts to make such an order.378 
However, with this wide power courts also have certain obligations. The first obligation 
is to take account of all relevant circumstances.379 This includes the obligation on 
courts to go beyond the facts of the case in some instances and devise innovative 
ways to procure all relevant factors needed to make an order that would be just and 
equitable for all.380 Secondly, PIE obliges the court to have regard to extrinsic factors 
to guide it to a just and equitable outcome.381 Thirdly, the court must ensure that the 
                                                          
373 See chapter 2, section 2.2.2 above. Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 
217 (CC) para 23. 
374 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 23. 
375 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 32. 
376 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 32. 
377 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 13. 
378 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 22. 
379 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 23. 
380 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 32. 
381 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 33. 
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eviction and relocation are done in a fair and orderly way. In this regard, an eviction 
and relocation will only be fair if a plan of resettlement accompanies an eviction 
order.382 Finally, PIE requires of the court to embark on a process of active judicial 
management.383 
This new mandate on courts has in a recent Constitutional Court judgment been 
reaffirmed and reiterated. Pitje v Shibambo and Others384 concerned an appeal to the 
Constitutional Court after the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal refused to 
grant leave to appeal to Mr Pitje, an elderly person of ill-health, against whom an 
eviction order was granted on the basis of double sale principles.385 The Constitutional 
Court affirmed that PIE is not discretionary and that courts are obliged to apply the 
provisions of PIE where a case concerns the question of eviction.386 The court 
reiterated that courts are furthermore obliged to be pro-active and manage the 
proceedings, especially where the parties failed to base their case on PIE and failed 
to present all the relevant circumstances to the court.387  
The new role and functions ascribed to the court under PIE require the court to step 
out of its comfort zone and beyond its normal functions. Also, it clashes head on with 
the manner in which courts approached and applied PIE in the pre-constitutional era. 
The constitutional eviction paradigm leaves no room for mechanical application of 
substantive requirements. The hierarchical arrangement of rights in adversarial court 
proceedings that result in uninvolved and passive presiding officers has been 
terminated. 
 
3 4 Concluding remarks 
It is clear from this chapter that the advent of the Constitution, specifically with the 
inclusion of sections 25(1) and 26(3), brought about a fresh perspective and 
                                                          
382 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 34. 
383 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 35. 
384 (144/15) [2016] ZACC 5 (25 February 2016). 
385 Pitje v Shibambo and Others (144/15) [2016] ZACC 5 (25 February 2016) paras 1, 14. 
386 Pitje v Shibambo and Others (144/15) [2016] ZACC 5 (25 February 2016) para 17. 
387 Pitje v Shibambo and Others (144/15) [2016] ZACC 5 (25 February 2016) para 19. 
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conceptual understanding of the way courts adjudicate eviction cases in the new 
constitutional dispensation.388 PIE now governs the eviction of unlawful occupiers and 
it has changed what is generally required of courts when they seek to find an 
appropriate eviction remedy. The commencement of PIE paved the way for 
accommodating philosophies that advance the values of human inter-dependence, 
solidarity, community and the protection of human dignity, all of which potentially have 
a bearing on the owner’s right to evict. However, PIE does not expressly state that 
these values must be aspired to when the Act is applied. It is by means of interpretation 
that the watershed decision in the context of eviction law, PE Municipality, expressly 
held that the values of ubuntu must inform the courts’ approach to the application of 
PIE.389 The chapter has shown that where courts employ a context-sensitive approach 
the objectives of ubuntu are reached. 
The analysis of the courts’ actual approach to the procedural and substantive 
requirements of PIE in the constitutional context showed that courts have not always 
been consistent in their approach to evictions in the constitutional era, even after the 
landmark decision in PE Municipality. This remains the case, despite the fact that PIE 
has changed the procedural landscape for evictions drastically, as reiterated in the 
Pitje case. This is evident in the shift from action proceedings to application 
proceedings. Furthermore, the explicit changes to the application proceedings for PIE 
make the procedural requirements of PIE sensitive to the context and circumstances 
of occupiers.390 An analysis of case law pertaining to the requirements for locus standi; 
the application scope of PIE (specifically in relation to who qualifies as unlawful 
occupiers); service of documents and joinder of interested parties showed that courts 
are called upon, even when they deal with issues pertaining to the application scope 
or procedure (like the service of the notice of motion and joinder questions) to follow 
a context-sensitive approach to ensure that the aims of PIE are always kept in mind 
and reached.391  
                                                          
388 CG van der Merwe “Things” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA Vol 27 Part 2 2 ed (2010) para 
137. 
389 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 37. 
390 Section 4 of PIE. 
391 Unlawful Occupiers, School Site v City of Johannesburg 2005 4 SA 199 (SCA) para 22. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
142 
The section on the substantive requirements of PIE also indicated that courts have to 
apply the substantive requirements of PIE with the same context-sensitivity as inspired 
by the values of ubuntu. However, case law has revealed that the courts’ application 
of the substantive requirements of PIE is sometimes void of the philosophical ideals 
of ubuntu, precisely because of the absence of such a context-sensitive approach. 
The second part of the chapter provided an explanation of how the interpretive function 
of the court has changed as a result of the advent of the Constitution.392 It became 
apparent that courts are still applying the dominant traditional cannon of statutory 
interpretation, namely the literalist-cum-intentionalist approach. However, the courts 
are now mandated to combine the pre-constitutional cannon for statutory interpretation 
with constitutional guidelines when it seeks to interpret PIE. This was illustrated in the 
judgments of Ndlovu and Transnet. In this regard, it seems as though section 26(3) 
and PIE require the procedural approach of the court to change from adversarial in 
nature to more managerial and pro-active.393 
In light of the analysis done in this chapter, it seems as though the courts’ application 
of the eviction remedy in terms of PIE should be context-sensitive, flexible and also 
principled so as to advance the ideals of ubuntu and similar philosophies. However, it 
is apparent that not all courts, when confronted with the PIE, apply the Act in the same 
fashion. Accordingly, a conclusion can be made that the courts’ approach to the 
application of the provisions of PIE should be context-sensitve, flexible, proactive and 
involved. 
 
                                                          
392 I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 146. 
393 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 39. 
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Chapter 4: A critical analysis of the impact of the 
Constitution on eviction remedies 
 
4 1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to critically analyse the impact of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the “Constitution”) on eviction remedies. This will entail 
a critical analysis of the shift from the pre-constitutional eviction paradigm to the 
constitutional eviction paradigm, with a specific focus on how a landowner’s right to 
evict and how the courts’ approach to eviction remedies have been affected by section 
26(3) of the Constitution and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (“PIE”). 
This chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part aims to provide a contextual 
background for the critical analysis. The contextual background consists of a 
summation and comparison of chapters two and three’s primary findings pertaining to 
(a) eviction remedies available in the two different dispensations; and (b) the manner 
in which courts approached eviction remedies in the pre-constitutional era and the 
manner in which courts are expected to approach eviction remedies in the 
constitutional era. 
The second part of the chapter sets out to critically analyse the above-mentioned 
findings of chapters two and three. The purpose of the critical analysis is to (a) 
determine to what extent section 26(3) of the Constitution and PIE have transformed 
the eviction landscape pertaining to the broader purposes of the PIE and the 
concomitant role of courts in this regard; (b) whether or not courts are succeeding with 
applying and approaching PIE as mandated by the broader purposes and concomitant 
role of courts; and (c) if not, what the potential implications are for landowners in light 
of the relatively strong position landowners had in the pre-constitutional era.  
With the above purposes in mind the second part sets out to explore firstly, whether 
the transformed role of courts is comparable to the role of courts and broader purpose 
of equitable discretions ascribed to courts in private law disputes generally. Secondly, 
the chapter explores the differences between the equity discretions and the purposes 
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of equity in private law disputes with the just and equitable discretion in PIE in order 
to determine the ways in which the PIE discretion is different and the reasons for these 
differences. Thirdly, after establishing the differences between the discretions courts 
are enjoined to exercise within private law equity on the one hand and the just and 
equitable standard in PIE on the other hand, the chapter explores, based on chapter 
three’s findings, whether the courts are applying PIE within this new framework and 
whether any failure to do so can be ascribed to pre-constitutional legal culture. The 
critical analysis explores the implications of the scenario where courts fail to apply PIE 
as mandated by the broader purposes for eviction law on specifically landowners’ 
property rights. Here, the focus falls on the consequences for landowners only (and 
not unlawful occupiers) in light of the relatively strong position of landowners in the 
pre-constitutional era. 
 
4 2 Contextualisation 
4 2 1 The approach of courts 
4 2 1 1 Chapter two findings: The courts’ approach in the pre-constitutional era 
In chapter two it became apparent that courts in the pre-constitutional era approached 
eviction cases in a very particular manner. This manner was the result of the natural 
law understanding and institution of ownership developed by Grotius and the 
pandectists, and subsequently adopted into the South African common law.1 Natural 
and moral law form the basis of the subjective rights doctrine within private property 
law.2 Characteristics such as completeness, individuality and abstractness were 
ascribed to the conceptual understanding of ownership due to the subjective rights 
doctrine, which caused the right to evict to be regarded as absolutely exclusive.3 South 
                                                          
1 See chapter 2, section 2.2.2 above. See also JRL Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman & D Visser 
(eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 657-699 694; AJ van der Walt 
“Bartolus se omskrywing van dominium en die interpretasies daarvan sedert die vyftiende eeu” (1986) 
49 THRHR 303 318. 
2 See chapter 2, section 2.2.1 above. See also WB le Roux “Natural law theories” in C Roederer & D 
Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 25-61 40. 
3 See chapter 2, section 2.2.2 above. See also P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights 
that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 89-96. 
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African case law considered in chapter two indicates: firstly, how this absolute right to 
exclude informed the requirements of the rei vindicatio; and secondly, how this 
approach entrenched the characteristics of ownership.4 Therefore, the underlying 
rationale of the rei vindicatio remedy relates directly to the characteristics of 
completeness, individuality and abstractness of ownership.5 Furthermore, the 
statutory eviction remedies that were available to owners of land in the pre-
constitutional era were based on the same conceptual foundation upon which the rei 
vindicatio was based.6 
The acceptance of this supposedly absolute form of exclusivity of ownership led to the 
pre-constitutional acceptance by South African courts (and society) of what Van der 
Walt describes as the “normality” assumption.7 The normality assumption refers to 
where the normal state of affairs entails the situation where the owner of immovable 
property is always in occupation of her property unless the owner consents to a 
temporary deviation from such a state.8 In other words, the theoretical framework that 
makes up the rights paradigm not only informed the rules, requirements and principles 
of the pre-constitutional eviction remedies, but also informed the courts’ doctrinal, 
rhetorical and logical assumptions and beliefs behind the application of the remedy.9 
Therefore, courts in the pre-constitutional era approached the application of the 
eviction remedies with a robust and conservative attitude.10 
In chapter two, the analysis of the judicial function and the courts’ procedural approach 
to eviction remedies showed that courts were very passive and uninvolved in eviction 
                                                          
4 See chapter 2, section 2.2.3 above. See also P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights 
that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 89-96; Chetty v 
Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 16; Van der Merwe v Webb (1883-1884) 3 EDC 97; Jeena v Minister of 
Lands 1955 (2) SA 380 (A). 
5 See chapter 2, section 2.2.2 above. See further in this regard Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) 16; 
Van der Merwe v Webb (1883-1884) 3 EDC 97; Jeena v Minister of Lands 1955 (2) SA 380 (A). 
6 See chapter 2, section 2.3.2 above. See Vena v George Municipality 1987 (4) SA 29 (C) 43. 
7 See chapter 2, section 2.2.2 above. See further AJ van der Walt Property in the margins (2009) 58. 
8 See chapter 2, section 2.2.2 above. See further AJ van der Walt Property in the margins (2009) 58; 
AJ van der Walt “Exclusivity of ownership, security of tenure and eviction orders: A model to evaluate 
South African land reform legislation” 2002 TSAR 254 257. 
9 See chapter 2, section 2.2.2 above. 
10 See chapter 2, section 2.5 above. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
146 
cases.11 In the first instance, the passive and uninvolved approach is ascribed to the 
status of positivism as the jurisprudential guide of courts for the interpretation of legal 
texts.12 Positivism as a jurisprudential guide, created the institution of judicial 
formalism in courts’ application of both statutory and common law eviction remedies.13 
This remained the case despite the fact that courts may have had a more creative 
interpretive function at their disposal.14  
In the second instance, the adversarial approach to court proceedings, which became 
part of the South African civil procedural law due to British occupation, furthermore 
contributed to the passive and uninvolved stance of the court.15 The adversarial 
approach expressly required of courts not to get too involved in the proceedings.16  
Accordingly, the institution of ownership, based on the natural legal philosophical 
notions of completeness, individuality and abstractness, together with the courts’ 
jurisprudential guide that was informed and directed by positivist legal philosophy and 
the adversarial system caused courts to approach the application of eviction remedies 
in a conservative, objective, formalistic and passive manner.17 As will become evident 
from the discussion below, these observations about the underlying assumptions 
courts harboured about the owner’s right to evict allow for particular deductions to be 
made about the courts’ approach to the eviction remedies. More specifically, the 
                                                          
11 See chapter 2, section 2.4 above. 
12 See chapter 2, section 2.4 above. CJR Dugard “The judicial process, positivism and civil liberty” 
(1971) 88 SALJ 181 183; D Bhana “The role of judicial method in contract law revisited” (2015) 132 
SALJ 122 127. 
13 See chapter 2, section 2.4 above. See also CJR Dugard “The judicial process, positivism and civil 
liberty” (1971) 88 SALJ 181 184-185; D Bhana “The role of judicial method in contract law revisited” 
(2015) 132 SALJ 122 127. 
14 See chapter 2, section 2.4 above. See also Daniels v Daniels 1958 (1) SA 513 (A) 522; CJR Dugard 
“The judicial process, positivism and civil liberty” (1971) 88 SALJ 181 183. 
15 See chapter 2, section 2.4 above. See also HJ Erasmus “The interaction of substantive law and 
procedure” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa 
(1996) 141-161 146. 
16 See chapter 2, section 2.4 above. See also PJ Schwikkard & SJ van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 
2 ed (2002) 9 and JRL Milton “Ownership” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law 
and common law in South Africa (1996) 657-699 694.  
17 See chapter 2, section 2.5 above; Khuzwayo v Dludla 2001 (1) SA 714 (LCC); Betta Eiendomme 
(Pty) Ltd v Ekple-epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 (W). 
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underlying assumptions that dominated pre-constitutional courts in their thinking and 
application of eviction remedies seems to have had a significant, if not direct, impact 
on the way in which courts adjudicate eviction cases currently, in the new constitutional 
dispensation. 
 
4 2 1 2 Chapter three findings: The courts’ approach in the constitutional era 
Chapter three revealed that the advent of the Constitution gave rise to a new 
conceptual understanding of ownership; a conceptual understanding that emphasises 
the law’s inherent power to limit ownership.18 In the context of eviction, the perspective 
and conceptual understanding that ownership is not absolute,19 together with section 
26(3) of the Constitution and PIE, directly impact on the owner’s ability to vindicate her 
immovable property from unlawful occupiers in specific circumstances.20 It paved the 
way for philosophies that advance the values of human inter-dependence, solidarity, 
community and the protection of human dignity to inform the application of the owner’s 
right to evict. However, because PIE does not expressly state that these values must 
be aspired to in the application of the Act, except for inferences that can be made from 
the just and equitable requirement, the watershed decision in the context of eviction 
law, PE Municipality, expressly held that the values of ubuntu must inform the court’s 
approach to the application of PIE.21 
In chapter three, the analysis of the judicial function and the prescribed procedural role 
of courts, showed the following: Firstly, that the dominant traditional cannon of 
                                                          
18 See chapter 3, section 3.2.2 above. See also CG van der Merwe “Things” in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
(eds) LAWSA Vol 27 Part 2 2 ed (2010) para 154. 
19 CG van der Merwe “Things” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA Vol 27 Part 2 2 ed (2010) para 
154; P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 102. 
20 See chapter 3, section 3.2.2 above. See also Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 
(1) SA 217 (CC); CG van der Merwe “Things” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA Vol 27 Part 2 2 
ed (2010) para 154; P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to 
exclude LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 140; P Dhliwayo & AJ van der Walt “The notion 
of absolute and exclusive ownership” 2017 (forthcoming) 19. 
21 See chapter 3, section 3.2.2 above. See further Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 
(1) SA 217 (CC) para 37. 
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interpretation, namely the literalist-cum-intentionalist approach, is no longer 
necessarily the dominant interpretive tool that courts apply in eviction cases. Courts in 
the constitutional era now apply a combination of the literalist-cum-intentionalist 
approach and the constitutional guidelines when interpreting PIE.22 Furthermore, the 
chapter showed that section 26(3) and PIE have required the court to take up a 
managerial and pro-active character in eviction adjudication.23 
Accordingly, the above summation of chapter three indicates that courts in the 
constitutional era are required to apply eviction remedies in a context-sensitive manner 
informed by the philosophy of ubuntu. This approach must be evident in the way courts 
approach procedural and substantive aspects of eviction as well as its approach to its 
own interpretative and judicial role in eviction cases. 
 
4 2 1 3 Comparison of findings 
Chapter two showed that the conceptual understanding of ownership in the pre-
constitutional era led to rights-based eviction remedies. These remedies only focussed 
on protecting a landowner’s rights and freedoms in a very robust manner. Evidence of 
this is found in that courts always sought to protect and entrench the characteristics of 
completeness, individuality and abstractness together with the exclusivity entitlement 
more or less as a point of departure whenever ownership was challenged in eviction 
cases.24  
However, it became clear in chapter three that the Constitution and its entrenched Bill 
of Rights required, at least on a theoretical level, limitations on ownership to be much 
more prominent, so as to allow for constitutionally mandated transformation.25 As 
indicated in chapter three, the concept of ownership in contemporary times is defined 
                                                          
22 See chapter 3, section 3.3.1 above. See also LM du Plessis Re-interpretation of statutes (2002) 83-
98; Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker and Another v Jika 2003 (1) SA 113 (SCA); Transnet Ltd v Nyawuza and 
Others 2006 (5) SA 100 (D). 
23 See chapter 3, section 3.3.2 above. See also Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 
(1) SA 217 (CC) para 39; Pitje v Shibambo and Others (144/15) [2016] ZACC 5 (25 February 2016). 
24 Vena v George Municipality 1987 (4) SA 29 (C); Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 (A); Van der Merwe 
v Webb (1883-1884) 3 EDC; Jeena v Minister of Lands 1955 (2) SA 380 (A). 
25 See chapter 3, section 3.2.2 above. P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit 
landowners’ right to exclude LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 101. 
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as the most complete private right that a person can have in relation to a thing,26 with 
which the owner is able to do with her thing anything she wants to, provided she 
exercises her rights within the limits of the law.27 In contemporary South Africa, the 
last part of the concept of ownership (the laws limiting power) have specifically been 
entrenched in the Constitution. This is evident in the interaction between the rights in 
the Bill of Rights, as well as legislative measures aimed at the enforcement of the 
constitutionally ordained limitations in the public interest.28 This new understanding of 
the concept of ownership therefore endorses a much more socialistic approach to 
ownership.29  
Accordingly, a number of shifts have taken place. Firstly, a shift in the conceptual 
understanding of ownership has occurred. Ownership, in view of the Constitution can 
no longer be regarded as absolutely complete and absolutely exclusive, but is rather 
accepted to be inherently limited.30 Subsequently, while the characteristics of 
completeness and exclusivity still form part of ownership, they too are subject to 
limitation. 
Secondly, the remedy available for eviction of unlawful occupiers has been turned on 
its head.31 The change in emphasis with regard to the conceptual understanding of 
ownership (from hardly any limitation to inherent limitation) and the underlying 
foundations of ownership, brought about significant changes to the remedies available 
for the eviction of unlawful occupiers. The promulgation of PIE, to give effect to section 
                                                          
26 CG van der Merwe “Things” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA Vol 27 Part 2 2 ed (2010) para 
151. 
27 See chapter 3, section 3.2.2 above. See also CG van der Merwe “Things” in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
(eds) LAWSA Vol 27 Part 2 2 ed (2010) para 151. 
28 See I Currie & J De Waal J The Bill of Rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 150-175 where the authors 
discuss how constitutionally entrenched rights can be limited. See for instance the Rental Housing Act 
50 of 1999. 
29 See chapter 3, section 3.2.2 above. See also CG van der Merwe “Things” in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
(eds) LAWSA Vol 27 Part 2 2 ed (2010) para 154. 
30 CG van der Merwe “Things” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA Vol 27 Part 2 2 ed (2010) para 
151. See further P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to 
exclude LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 102; P Dhliwayo & AJ van der Walt “The notion 
of absolute and exclusive ownership” 2017 (forthcoming) 19. 
31 Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker and Another v Jika 2003 (1) SA 113 (SCA) para 48. 
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26(3) of the Constitution, replaced both the common law rei vindicatio and the 
legislative measure, the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 19751 (“PISA”). This 
means that landowners now have to employ PIE to evict unlawful occupiers from land, 
where such occupiers use the occupied building or structure as their homes.32 
Furthermore, section 26(3) transformed the function of an eviction remedy with the 
promulgation of PIE. PIE is an eviction remedy that does more than what is expected 
of a traditional clear-cut eviction remedy such as the rei vindicatio. The rei vindicatio 
only entrenched and protected the owner’s rights; the focus was therefore solely on 
the owner’s ability to ward off interference with her property, more or less absolutely. 
PIE not only sets out to protect the owner’s right to exclusive use and enjoyment of 
her property, but also sets out to protect unlawful occupiers from being evicted from 
their homes in an arbitrary manner, in other words, without a court order.33 The Act 
provides this protection through the substantive and procedural provisions contained 
in it to ensure that the interests of unlawful occupiers in eviction applications will always 
be considered.34 Accordingly, a shift in the function of eviction remedies in South 
African law has also taken place with the promulgation of PIE. 
Finally, these above-mentioned alterations to eviction laws ultimately necessitate a 
change in the manner in which courts approach the application of eviction remedies. 
PE Municipality has indicated that courts are required to take up a transformed role in 
eviction cases.35 Chapter three has further showed that this means that the approach 
of courts to the substantive and procedural aspects of PIE must always reflect the 
values and principles of ubuntu, which necessitates sensitivity to the context in each 
case.36 Furthermore, the way in which courts interpret the eviction legislative measure 
PIE and the procedural role the court takes up, must also reflect these values and 
principles. Clearly, the Constitution mandates a shift in eviction cases from the 
                                                          
32 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 39; Pitje v Shibambo and 
Others (144/15) [2016] ZACC 5 (25 February 2016); PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg 
and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 247; S Liebenberg Socio-economic rights adjudication 
under a transformative constitution (2010) 271; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 688. 
33 The preamble of PIE emphasises both sections 25(1) and 26(3) of the Constitution.  
34 See chapter 3, section 3.2.3 above. 
35 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 37. 
36 See chapter 3, section 3.2.2 above. 
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conservative, robust, formalistic and reserved court to a court that is open, flexible, 
involved and context-sensitive. 
These findings show that section 26(3) has drastically changed the regulation of 
evictions and the courts’ role in eviction adjudication. Courts have a very different role 
now than what was expected of them in the pre-constitutional era. One signal aspect 
of the changed role of courts is the discretion PIE has vested courts with to grant or 
refuse eviction applications based on justice and equity. This new task of courts 
ostensibly seems rather comparable to equitable discretions courts are expected to 
exercise in common law. If this assumption is true, it could mean that what courts are 
expected to do in terms of PIE does not constitute a new style of adjudication; 
however, if the courts’ discretion in terms of PIE is not comparable to equity discretions 
then it means that the just and equitable discretion in terms of PIE requires courts to 
embrace a new approach to the adjudication of eviction cases. In this regard, the 
section below explores whether or not the just and equitable discretion contained in 
PIE is comparable and similar to equity discretions at common law. 
 
4 3  Critical analysis 
4 3 1 PIE in an equity paradigm 
4 3 1 1 The history of equity in South Africa’s private law 
Justice and equity are expressly required in the substantive requirements of PIE.37 
Accordingly, equity is a central part of the outcome courts must aim to achieve in 
eviction cases. This inevitably leads to the question of what equity means in the 
context of PIE and whether South African courts are familiar with equitable remedies 
and their application.  
The South African legal system, although a mixture of English procedural law and 
Roman-Dutch law, never inherited the distinction between courts of law and courts of 
                                                          
37 See chapter 3, section 3.2.3.2 above. See Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) 
SA 217 (CC) para 33. 
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equity from the English procedural system.38 Zimmerman points out that one of the 
reasons why the reception of the separate equitable jurisdictions did not take place, is 
because the South African Roman-Dutch law was accepted to be inherently 
equitable.39 Accordingly, Roman-Dutch law has equitable principles built into its 
foundations and the need for a separate doctrine of equity was purportedly 
superfluous.40 However, although South African law did not receive the equitable 
jurisdictions, it inherited some of the English law’s equitable legal rules and institutions. 
This is evident in a number of English equitable doctrines that can be found in South 
African private law. 41 Accordingly, the South African private law contains the built-in 
equity principles of the Roman-Dutch law alluded to by Zimmerman, together with 
some of the English equitable doctrines. 
An example of an equitable principle of Roman-Dutch law is the principle of bona fides. 
In contract law the requirement of bona fide (good faith) is an equitable concept that 
impacts generally on contractual rules.42 South African courts have in practical terms 
                                                          
38 HR Hahlo & E Khan The South African legal system and its background (1968) 178; R Zimmerman 
“Good faith and equity” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law 
in South Africa (1996) 217-260 217. 
39 R Zimmerman “Good faith and equity” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law 
and common law in South Africa (1996) 217 218. See further HR Hahlo & E Khan The South African 
legal system and its background (1968) 137; Estate Thomas v Kerr and Another (1903) 20 SC 354; 
Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 (3) SA 580 (A) 606. 
40 R Zimmerman “Good faith and equity” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law 
and common law in South Africa (1996) 217-260 218. See further HR Hahlo & E Khan The South African 
legal system and its background (1968) 137; Estate Thomas v Kerr and Another (1903) 20 SC 354; 
Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 (3) SA 580 (A) 606. 
41 Estoppel is an equitable doctrine that forms part of the South African legal system. See R Zimmerman 
“Good faith and equity” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law 
in South Africa (1996) 217-260 227; Grosvenor Motors (Potchefstroom) Ltd v Douglas 1956 (3) SA 420 
(A); Sonday v Surrey Estate Modern Meat Market (Pty) Ltd 1983 (2) SA 521 (C); Johaadien v Stanley 
Porter (Paarl) (Pty) Ltd 1970 (1) SA 394 (A) 411. Another example of an equitable doctrine that migrated 
from English law to South African law is the contractual remedy rectification of a written contract. See 
R Zimmerman “Good faith and equity” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and 
common law in South Africa (1996) 217-260 227; Van der Byl v Van der Byl & Co (1899) 16 SC 388; 
Weinerlein v Goch Buildings Ltd 1925 AD 297; Meyer v Merchants’ Trust Ltd 1942 (AD) 244; Mouton v 
Hanekom 1959 (3) SA 35 (A); Benjamin v Gurewitz 1973 (1) SA 418 (A). 
42 See Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Hovis 1980 (1) SA 645 (A) 653. 
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allowed this equitable concept to shape and inform the law of contract, but have yet to 
confirm its application as a free standing principle.43 However, good faith not only 
impacts the rules and institutions of contract law, it also influences the courts’ 
approach to certain contractual disputes. For example, when courts are confronted 
with the exercise of interpreting contracts, good faith qualifies as a relevant criterion 
where a term in a contract proves to be ambiguous.44  
An example of an equitable defence of English law that successfully migrated into the 
South African law is the doctrine of estoppel. This doctrine not only finds application 
in contract law, but also in the law of property. Interestingly, it is available to a 
defendant as a defence against the owner’s rei vindicatio.45 Yet, it will only be available 
where particular conduct on the owner’s part can be shown by the defendant.46 In this 
regard, the standard requirements of the doctrine of estoppel find application. These 
are: firstly, that the owner of property must have acted culpably.47 Secondly, that the 
owner created an impression that ownership of the property has been transferred to 
                                                          
43 R Zimmerman “Good faith and equity” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law 
and common law in South Africa (1996) 217-260 241. 
44 R Zimmerman “Good faith and equity” in R Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law 
and common law in South Africa (1996) 217-260 241; Trustee, Estate Cresswell & Durbach v Coetzee 
1916 14 AD 19. 
45 See chapter 2, section 2.2.1. See further CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 372; JC Sonnekus 
& JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 472-474; R Zimmerman “Good faith and equity” in R 
Zimmerman & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 217-
260 260; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed 
(2006) 255; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African 
law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 549. The most important cases in which the principles of estoppel have been 
confirmed and applied are Michelsen v Aaronson and Bakkie 1914 TPD 158; Grosvenor Motors 
(Potchefstroom) Ltd v Douglas 1956 (3) SA 420 (A); Apostoliese Geloofsending van Suid-Afrika 
(Maitland Gemeente) v Capes 1978 (4) SA 48 (C); Oakland Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Gelria Mining & 
Investment Co (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 441 (A); Barclays Western Bank Ltd v Fourie 1979 (4) SA 157 (C) 
161-162. 
46 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
255. 
47 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
256. 
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the occupier, upon which the occupier relies.48 Thirdly, that the occupier is exercising 
physical control with ownership intent, to the occupier’s disadvantage.49 The 
satisfaction of these requirements of the doctrine of estoppel will lead to a court 
ordering against an owner’s rei vindicatio and in favour of the occupier on the basis of 
equity. 
Accordingly, equitable remedies and doctrine are part of the South African mixed legal 
system as a result of both Roman-Dutch and English law equity principles and rules. 
 
4 3 1 2 Meaning of equity in the context of PIE evictions 
The natural law foundations of South African Roman-Dutch law require that the 
starting point for ascribing a definition to “equity” first enjoins one to set out what equity 
in natural law means. In this regard, Snyders explains that: 
“Man uses knowledge and reason to formulate alternatives. Compassion, when given 
rein, often affects the choice. Where the choice is both reasonable and compassionate, 
the result is equity.”50 
Equity amounts to that which would be fair and just. However, justice and fairness in 
a democratic society is generally tantamount to what the society appreciates as just 
and fair. It therefore is a result of the society’s values and normative stances on 
specific issues. The Constitution, with its enshrined Bill of Rights, constitutes the 
normative decision South Africa made to promote certain values.51 Consequently, 
section 26(3) and PIE inform what equity requires in the context of evictions. 
                                                          
48 See Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Stama (Pty) Ltd 1975 (1) SA 730 (A) 743. See also PJ Badenhorst, 
JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 256. 
49 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
256. 
50 RN Snyders “Natural law and equity” in RA Newman (eds) Equity in the world’s legal systems (1973) 
33 43. 
51 T Metz “Justice and the law: Liberals, redistribution, capitalists and their critics” in C Roederer & D 
Moellendorf (eds) Jurisprudence (2004) 382-411 386; Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 
2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) paras 14-23. 
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In chapter three attributes ascribed to the phrase “just and equitable” by the court in 
PE Municipality were identified and discussed.52 This discussion brought to light that 
the requirement of just and equitable in PIE enjoins courts to approach eviction cases 
with an ubuntu philosophy.53 The advent of the Constitution, together with its 
entrenched Bill of Rights and its clear goals of unifying South Africans, healing the 
divisions of the past and at the same time protecting existing rights and interests, 
require more equitable considerations, especially in those instances where 
fundamental rights and interests clash. 
Ubuntu has been positioned as an interpretative tool to ensure fair and just results by 
ensuring that the values of ubuntu are present in orders made by courts.54 In the 
context of PIE, ubuntu has been referred to by the highest court of the country.55 This 
comes as no surprise as the common law rules and principles for eviction favoured 
the owner and were accordingly found to lack adequate protection of the fundamental 
right of unlawful occupiers under section 26(3) of the Constitution not to be arbitrarily 
evicted from their homes.56 As a result, PIE is an equitable remedy and the equity 
required by PIE is encompassed in the values underlying ubuntu and the Constitution.  
Bennett compares equity in English law to the notion of ubuntu in South African law.57 
In this comparison Bennet focusses on the points on which equity and ubuntu are 
similar and comparable.58 He points out that equity was developed in English law to 
counter the harsh consequences of the mechanical application of rigid common law 
rules to ensure fair results.59 He highlights that the philosophy of ubuntu in its most 
                                                          
52 See chapter 3, section 3.2.3.2 above. 
53 See chapter 3, section 3.2.3.2 above. See Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) 
SA 217 (CC) para 35. 
54 TW Bennet “Ubuntu: An African equity” in F Diedrich (ed) Ubuntu, good faith and equity (2011) 3-23 
11-15. 
55 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 37. 
56 Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker and Another v Jika 2003 (1) SA 113 (SCA) para 16. 
57 TW Bennet “Ubuntu: An African equity” in F Diedrich (ed) Ubuntu, good faith and equity (2011) 3-23 
3. 
58 TW Bennet “Ubuntu: An African equity” in F Diedrich (ed) Ubuntu, good faith and equity (2011) 3-23 
3. 
59 TW Bennet “Ubuntu: An African equity” in F Diedrich (ed) Ubuntu, good faith and equity (2011) 3-23 
3. 
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simple form also requires that fairness and justice dictate the outcome of any clash of 
interests.60 In this way, Bennet identifies that the aim of both the English notion of 
equity and ubuntu in South African law is to ensure that fairness and justice prevail in 
each individual case. He advocates for the application of ubuntu as an African 
equitable principle because of the striking similarities between ubuntu and English 
equity.61 Bennett describes how in private law the full potential of ubuntu as an 
equitable principle has yet to be explored in South African law.62 My submission is that 
South African courts certainly have to take note of the equitable character of ubuntu 
in eviction cases when they apply PIE. However, ubuntu requires more than what 
common law equity requires. Equity in South Africa is restricted to the boundaries 
formal common law provides; ubuntu is an equity that justifies the pushing of such 
boundaries. In this regard, the section below explores whether common law equity can 
be equated to ubuntu equity as contained in PIE. 
 
4 3 1 3 PIE discretion and common law discretion 
There are a number of property law constructs that allow courts to exercise an 
equitable discretion in relation to: (a) building encroachment cases; (b) right of way of 
necessity cases; and (c) unjustified enrichment cases. The aim of the discussion is to 
determine whether parallels can be drawn between the instances where equitable 
solutions are sought at common law and the scope of justice and equity in terms of 
PIE. 
 
(a) The courts’ equitable discretion: Building encroachment 
The first property law construct discussed here is found in neighbour law, more 
specifically the law on building encroachments. The situation might arise where an 
                                                          
60 TW Bennet “Ubuntu: An African equity” in F Diedrich (ed) Ubuntu, good faith and equity (2011) 3-23 
3. 
61 TW Bennet “Ubuntu: An African equity” in F Diedrich (ed) Ubuntu, good faith and equity (2011) 3-23 
3. 
62 TW Bennet “Ubuntu: An African equity” in F Diedrich (ed) Ubuntu, good faith and equity (2011) 3-23 
15. 
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owner’s building projects or encroaches on his neighbour’s property without the 
neighbour’s consent.63 In these circumstances the court is vested with an equitable 
discretion to ensure fair outcomes in these cases.64 
A lot of uncertainty existed in early case law, as to whether this above-mentioned 
discretion indeed formed part of the South African law of encroachment. Contradictory 
case law exists in which some courts denied that such an equitable discretion exists 
in South African law, while others insisted on such a discretion.65 The opponents of 
the discretion rejected the contention that the equitable discretion found application in 
South African law on the basis that the discretion is found in English law and English 
equity principles.66 The argument that South African law received Roman-Dutch 
                                                          
63 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 201; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed 
(1994) 256; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 
ed (2006) 122; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South 
African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 483; AJ van der Walt The law of neighbours (2010) 132. See further 
case law in which the courts held that a building encroachment that causes a physical intrusion on a 
neighbouring owner’s land constitutes an infringement of the neighbouring owner’s property right to 
exclusive use and enjoyment of her property: Pike v Hamilton, Ross & Co (1853-1856) 2 Searle 191; 
Cape Town Municipality v Fletcher and Cartwrights Ltd 1936 CPD 347; Rand Waterraad v Bothma en 
‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O); Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C). 
64 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 202; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed 
(1994) 254; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 
ed (2006) 123; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South 
African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 484; AJ van der Walt The law of neighbours (2010) 145. The court in 
Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) 139 confirmed that courts have a discretion 
pertaining to the type of relief ordered in building encroachment cases. This stance was confirmed in 
case law, namely Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) paras 26-28; Phillips 
v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 2010) para 21. 
65 Hornby v Municipality of Roodepoort-Maraisburg and Another 1918 AD 278; De Villiers v Kalson 1928 
EDL 217; Town Council of Roodepoort-Maraisburg v Posse Property (Pty) Ltd 1932 WLD 78 87; 
Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co ltd v Mitchmor Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another 1971 (2) 
SA 397 (W) 405 are examples of early case law in favour of the existence of the discretion to award 
compensation rather than removal of an encroaching structure in South African law while Higher 
Mission School v Grahamstown Town Council 1924 EDL 354, 366 is an example of case law not in 
favour of such a discretion.  
66 See Higher Mission School v Grahamstown Town Council 1924 EDL 354; Rand Waterraad v Bothma 
en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O). See also AJ van der Walt The law of neighbours (2010) 146. 
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property law and not English property law principles was made in this regard.67 The 
confusion and uncertainty as to whether or not this discretion found application in 
South African law persisted until the case of Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander68 
brought certainty in this regard.69 In Rand Waterraad the court concluded that South 
African courts indeed have a discretion in encroachment cases to keep the 
encroachment in place in exchange for compensation, or to order demolition of the 
encroachment.70 The court reasoned that equity requires that such discretion exists in 
encroachment cases.71 In this regard, the court found that equity forms part of 
neighbour law rules. Furthermore, Roman and Roman-Dutch authors explained how 
important it is that courts in their application of positive law ensure equitable 
outcomes.72 Accordingly, Rand Waterraad is the leading case that confirms that courts 
have an equitable discretion in encroachment disputes.73 
The equitable discretion in encroachment cases is triggered when exceptional 
circumstances arise that require the court to decide on the type of remedy to award 
the owner on whose property the encroachment is found.74 In this regard, the court 
                                                          
67 Higher Mission School v Grahamstown Town Council 1924 EDL 35; Rand Waterraad v Bothma en 
‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O). 
68 Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O). 
69 Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) 130-138. This case was subsequently 
confirmed and applied in Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) paras 26-28; 
Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 2010) para 21. 
See also Z Temmers Building encroachments and compulsory transfer of ownership LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University (2010) 38-40. 
70 Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) 130-138; Z Temmers Building 
encroachments and compulsory transfer of ownership LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2010) 
38-40. 
71 Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) 138. 
72 Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) 130-138. 
73 Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) paras 26-28 and Phillips v South 
African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 2010) para 21 confirmed Rand 
Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) 130-138. 
74 Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) 138; Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v 
Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281(C) paras 26-28 and Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) 
[2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 2010) para 21; Z Temmers Building encroachments and compulsory 
transfer of ownership LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2010) 39. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
159 
could order one of two things.75 Firstly, the court could order that the encroachment 
should be removed by way of an interdict.76 The second possible order the court may 
make in certain circumstances is to order that the encroachment should be left in 
place, but that the encroacher pay compensation to the encroached-upon owner.77 In 
                                                          
75 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 202 is of the opinion that the court can only make one of two 
orders. See also PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of 
property 5 ed (2006) 122; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles 
of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 483-484 who hold that the court can order one of three 
remedies namely: removal; compensation or the transfer of the encroachment to the encroached-upon 
owner. The latter possible order was granted in three early cases, namely Christie v Haarhoff (1886-
1887) 4 HCG 349 353, Van Boom v Visser (1904) 21 SC 360; Garland v Wellink 1957 PH J4 (W). 
However, Pope and Van der Merwe are of the opinion that transfer of the encroached upon land to the 
encroaching owner is incidental to when the court orders damages to the encroached upon owner. The 
award of damages may include the value of the encroached upon land, transfer costs and in some 
instances a solatium. Furthermore, Van der Walt argues that the transfer of the encroaching structure 
together with the encroached upon land of the encroached upon owner to the encroaching owner will 
generally be problematic where no agreement to that effect can be reached. See AJ van der Walt The 
law of neighbours (2010) 133-135. Accordingly, the order of compensation and transfer of the 
encroached upon land can be described as one remedy rather than two separate remedies. 
76 H de Groot Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche rechtsgeleertheyd (1631 translated by RW Lee The 
jurisprudence of Holland 1926, hereafter referred to as “Grotius“) 2.34.8; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 
ed (1989) 202; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 
5 ed (2006) 122; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South 
African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 483-484; AJ van der Walt The law of neighbours (2010) 133-135; Z 
Temmers Building encroachments and compulsory transfer of ownership LLD dissertation Stellenbosch 
University (2010) 39; Pike v Hamilton, Ross & Co (1853-1856) 2 Searle 191; Van Boom v Visser (1904) 
21 SC 360; Cape Town Municipality v Fletcher and Cartwrights Ltd 1936 CPD 347; Rand Waterraad v 
Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) 138; Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 
281 (C) paras 26-28; Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 
April 2010) para 21; Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) 130-139. 
77 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 202; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 122; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois 
(ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 484; AJ van der Walt The law of 
neighbours (2010) 133-134; Hornby v Municipality of Roodepoort-Maraisburg and Another 1918 AD 
278; De Villiers v Kalson 1928 EDL 217; Town Council of Roodepoort-Maraisburg v Posse Property 
(Pty) Ltd 1932 WLD 78 87; Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co ltd v Mitchmor Investments (Pty) 
Ltd and Another 1971 (2) SA 397 (W) 405; Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 
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deciding between these two possibilities the court has regard to all relevant 
circumstances in order to ascertain which possibility will be most equitable on the facts 
and circumstances of the case.78 
Similarities between the equitable discretion available to courts in encroachment 
cases and the equitable discretion available to courts in their application of PIE in 
eviction cases exist. These are: firstly, in PIE and encroachment cases the discretion 
allows the court to decide between (possibly two) potential orders. The encroachment 
discretion allows the court to order either demolition of the structure or that 
compensation be awarded to the affected owner instead of demolition.79 Similarly, the 
court’s discretion in terms of PIE allows the court to grant an eviction linked to 
conditions, or to refuse an eviction order.80 
Secondly, both discretions are exercised on a case by case basis by balancing 
opposing interests. PIE expressly recognises and mandates this balancing exercise.81 
                                                          
(C) para 32; Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 
2010) para 21; Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) 130-139. 
78 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 202; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 122-123; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du 
Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 483-484; Z Temmers Building 
encroachments and compulsory transfer of ownership LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2010) 
39; Hornby v Municipality of Roodepoort-Maraisburg and Another 1918 AD 278; De Villiers v Kalson 
1928 EDL 217; Town Council of Roodepoort-Maraisburg v Posse Property (Pty) Ltd 1932 WLD 78 87; 
Naude v Bredenkamp 1956 (2) SA 448 (O); Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co ltd v Mitchmor 
Investments (Pty) Ltd and Another 1971 (2) SA 397 (W) 405; Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 
1997 (3) SA 120 (O) 138; Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) paras 32-34; 
Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 2010) para 21.  
79 See chapter 4, section 4.3.2.3 above. See further CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 202; PJ 
Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 122; 
CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed 
(2007) 405-729 483-484; AJ van der Walt The law of neighbours (2010) 133-135; Z Temmers Building 
encroachments and compulsory transfer of ownership LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2010) 
43; Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) 138; Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v 
Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) paras 26-28; Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) 
[2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 2010) para 21. 
80 See chapter 4, section 4.3.3.1 below. Sections 4 and 6 of PIE. 
81 Sections 4 and 6 of PIE. See the watershed eviction case Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various 
Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) paras 13, 23, 33, 33, 35, 37, 48-58 and the recent case Pitje v 
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The common law balancing exercise in encroachment cases can be derived from the 
way in which courts have exercised their discretion in case law.82 
Thirdly, the exercise of the discretion in both contexts exists in order to ensure that the 
outcomes in the respective cases are equitable. PIE expressly requires that the court 
must ensure that justice and equity prevail in eviction cases.83 This same idea comes 
out in Rand Waterraad where the court held that this discretion in encroachment cases 
exists because equity requires it.84 In other words, equity must be the guiding principle 
in encroachment disputes. 
Finally, another similarity between the discretion exercised by courts in encroachment 
cases and the discretion that exists in the application of PIE eviction cases, concerns 
the interests affected in the respective situations. In both situations the court has to 
decide whether the circumstances justify a limitation of an owner’s right to exclusive 
use and enjoyment of her immovable property.85 
However, the differences between these discretions are fundamental. The main 
difference between the equitable discretion exercised by the court in encroachment 
and PIE eviction cases respectively, is found in the source of law from which the 
discretion originates. PIE’s equitable discretion has its origins in the Constitution and 
in PIE that is specifically promulgated to give effect to the Constitution, while the 
                                                          
Shibambo and Others (144/15) [2016] ZACC 5 (24 February 2016) paras 17-21 where the Constitutional 
Court reiterated the role of courts in their application of PIE. 
82 Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) 138; Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v 
Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) paras 40-43; Phillips v South African National Parks Board (4035/07) 
[2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 2010) paras 48-51. 
83 Sections 4 and 6 of PIE. 
84 Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) 138-139. See also Trustees, Brian 
Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) para 27; Phillips v South African National Parks Board 
(4035/07) [2010] ZAECGHC 27 (22 April 2010) para 21. 
85 With regard to the discretion of courts in encroachment cases, see CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed 
(1989) 201; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 
ed (2006) 121-122; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South 
African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 484; AJ van der Walt The law of neighbours (2010) 13. With regard to 
the right in PIE eviction cases see Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters and Another 
2001 (4) SA 385 (W) 390; Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 
33. 
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equitable discretion in encroachment cases finds its origin in the common law. Due to 
this difference, other fundamental differences crop up. In the first place, courts 
received a new role in eviction cases in the constitutional era. They are called upon to 
exercise this equitable discretion in a pro-active manner.86 The common law discretion 
available to courts in encroachment situations however, does not specifically, or 
perhaps expressly, include this element of pro-activeness and confines the exercise 
of the discretion to specific situations and circumstances.87 
Secondly, the fact that PIE was promulgated to give effect to the Constitution has the 
implication that a court’s role in the exercise of its discretion in terms of PIE cases is 
not confined to common law principles of ownership, but to broader constitutional 
principles.88 The circumstances that a court is mandated to take into consideration in 
PIE eviction cases refer to circumstances pertaining to the owner and the unlawful 
occupier who has no rights in the land, but has a constitutional access to housing 
right.89 In contrast, when a court is considering the circumstances to exercise its 
equitable discretion in encroachment cases, such a court has regard to the ownership 
rights of two neighbouring property owners.90 In other words, both parties have a 
                                                          
86 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) paras 36, 39; Machele and 
Others v Mailula and Others 2010 (2) SA 275 (CC) para 15; Arendse v Arendse 2013 (3) SA 347 (C); 
Pitje v Shibambo and Others (144/15) [2016] ZACC 5 (24 February 2016) paras 17-21. 
87 See Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n Ander 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) 138 for the list of principles and 
considerations that should direct a court in the exercise of its equitable discretion. See also PJ 
Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 121-
125; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 
ed (2007) 405-729 484 for a discussion of some of these considerations. 
88 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) paras 11-12 where the 
Constitutional Court held that “PIE not only repealed PISA but in a sense inverted it: squatting was 
decriminalised and the eviction process was made subject to a number of requirements, some 
necessary to comply with certain demands of the Bill of Rights”. 
89 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 23 where the 
Constitutional Court held that “[t]he judicial function in these circumstances is not to establish a 
hierarchical arrangement between the different interests involved, privileging in an abstract and 
mechanical way the rights of ownership over the right not to be dispossessed of a home, or vice versa. 
Rather it is to balance out and reconcile the opposed claims in as just a manner as possible taking 
account of all the interests involved and the specific factors relevant in each particular case”. 
90 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 201; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 122; CG van der Merwe & A Pope “Property” in F du Bois 
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recognised property right. Accordingly, the factors taken into account in terms of PIE 
are much broader because of the constitutional dimension and the difference in status 
between the two parties involved. 
 
(b) The courts’ equitable discretion: Right of way of necessity  
Another property law construct that allows for an equitable discretion is found in the 
law of servitudes. The law of servitudes differentiates between two types of servitudes, 
namely personal servitudes and praedial servitudes.91 Praedial servitudes are in turn 
divided into two further types of servitudes, namely rural and urban servitudes.92 The 
praedial servitude that will be focussed on in this discussion is the right of way of 
necessity, which can be created by way of agreement or by way of a court order.93 A 
court ordered right of way of necessity is significant because it is created by a forced 
transfer of rights, by way of a court order, when a court exercises its discretion in 
favour of the dominant tenement owner after taking all relevant factors into 
                                                          
(ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 483; AJ van der Walt The law of 
neighbours (2010) 132. 
91 J Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas (1829 translated by P Gane Commentary on the Pandect 1958, 
hereafter referred to as “Voet”) 1.1.20; Voet 8.1.2; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 459; JC 
Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed (1994) 527; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 321; CG van der Merwe “Servitudes and 
other real rights” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 592; TN 
Raphulu The right of way of necessity: A constitutional analysis LLM dissertation Stellenbosch 
University (2013) 15; Dreyer v Letterstedt’s Executors (1864-1867) 5 Searle 88 99; Maclear Divisional 
Council v Norton 1918 CPD 16 23; Lorentz v Melle 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T) 1049-1050. 
92 Voet 8.1.3; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 479; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 326; CG van der Merwe “Servitudes and 
other real rights” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 597 and 
TN Raphulu The right of way of necessity: A constitutional analysis LLM dissertation Stellenbosch 
University (2013) 18. 
93 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 485; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed 
(1994) 715; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 
ed (2006) 328; CG van der Merwe “Servitudes and other real rights” in F du Bois (ed) Wille’s principles 
of South African law 9 ed (2007) 405-729 598; TN Raphulu The right of way of necessity: A constitutional 
analysis LLM dissertation, Stellenbosch University (2013) 26. Wilhelm v Norton 1935 EDL 143; Van 
Rhyn and Others NNO v Fleurbaix Farm (Pty) Ltd 2013 (5) SA 521 (WCC) paras 15-16. 
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consideration.94 The basis for this discretion is set out in the case of English v CJM 
Harmse Investments CC and Another.95 In English the court explained that an 
interference with ownership rights should take place only if fairness and 
reasonableness, necessitate and require such interference.96 In this regard, fairness 
and reasonableness are dictated by public policy.97 Furthermore, the court held that 
the servitude of right of way of necessity constitutes such circumstances in which 
reasonableness and fairness necessitate the creation of a right by way of a court 
order.98 
In the first place the court has a discretion to establish the right of way of necessity by 
means of a court order99 where the circumstances indicate that it is reasonably 
necessary for such right of way of necessity even if its establishment goes against the 
owner’s will.100 The ultimate decision of the court rests on weighing up the respective 
                                                          
94 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 490-491; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg 
and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 328; TN Raphulu The right of way of necessity: A 
constitutional analysis LLM dissertation Stellenbosch University (2013) 71-72, 171. 
95 2007 (3) SA 415 (N). 
96 English v CJM Harmse Investments CC and Another 2007 (3) SA 415 (N) 422. See also CG van der 
Merwe & JM Pienaar “The law of property (including servitudes)” 2007 ASSAL 961-1038 1028; TN 
Raphulu The right of way of necessity: A constitutional analysis LLM dissertation Stellenbosch 
University (2013) 83. 
97 Anonymous “Way of necessity: Hancock v Henderson’’ (1965) 25 Maryland Law Review 254-259 
258; MD Southwood The compulsory acquisition of rights (2000) 106; TN Raphulu The right of way of 
necessity: A constitutional analysis LLM dissertation Stellenbosch University (2013) 83, 123. 
98 English v CJM Harmse Investments CC and Another 2007 (3) SA 415 (N) 423. See also TN Raphulu 
The right of way of necessity: A constitutional analysis LLM dissertation Stellenbosch University (2013) 
83. 
99 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 485; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 328; TN Raphulu The right of way of necessity: A 
constitutional analysis LLM dissertation Stellenbosch University (2013) 25-26. 
100 CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 485; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 2 ed 
(1994) 716; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 
ed (2006) 328; TN Raphulu The right of way of necessity: A constitutional analysis LLM dissertation 
Stellenbosch University (2013) 25-26; Wilhelm v Norton 1935 EDL 143; Beukes v Crous & ‘n Ander 
1975 (4) SA 215 (NK). 
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interests of the parties.101 This weighing exercise is then followed by a decision to 
confirm or not to confirm the right of way of necessity. 
In the second place, the court has a discretion to alter a right of way of necessity.102 
The justification for alteration of the right of way of necessity is based on the existence 
of changed circumstances which necessitate a change in the right of way of 
necessity.103 The discretion must be exercised with due regard to the opposing 
interests and especially the changed circumstances. Accordingly, a balance must be 
struck between the respective interests of the parties. In this regard, the court will 
exercise its discretion in favour of the interest that weighs the heaviest. 
There are a number of similarities between the discretion exercised by courts in the 
context of the right of way of necessity cases, and the discretion exercised by courts 
in the PIE eviction cases. Firstly, the discretion in both instances always gives the 
court a choice between two different potential orders. In the second place, both 
discretions turn on what the circumstances of the case require. In other words, the 
discretion of a court to grant a right of way of necessity and the PIE eviction discretion 
both require courts to approach and apply its discretion in a context-sensitive manner. 
Thirdly, it is evident that the right of way of necessity discretion and the PIE eviction 
discretion require of the court to balance the respective opposing interests of the 
parties in order to come to a conclusion that is mutually beneficial. Fourthly, the 
discretion in both instances has the same goal. This goal is to ensure that the court 
                                                          
101 Van Rensburg v Coetzee 1979 (4) SA 655 (A) 675; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 330; TN Raphulu The right of way of 
necessity: A constitutional analysis LLM dissertation Stellenbosch University (2013) 38-39. Raphulu 
coins the weighing up exercise as a “balancing of convenience” exercise. 
102 CG Hall & EA Kellaway Servitudes 3 ed (1973) 78; CG van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 491; PJ 
Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 330; 
TN Raphulu The right of way of necessity: A constitutional analysis LLM dissertation Stellenbosch 
University (2013) 50-51; Wynne v Pope 1960 (3) All SA 1 (C). 
103 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
330; TN Raphulu The right of way of necessity: A constitutional analysis LLM dissertation Stellenbosch 
University (2013) 50-51; Naude v Ecoman Investments 1994 (3) SA 95 (T) 99; Linvestment CC v 
Hammersley and Another 2008 (3) SA 283 (SCA). The guideline principles laid down in Linvestment 
CC v Hammersley and Another should be followed for purposes of considering amending a right of way 
of necessity. 
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order will reach equitable results. Finally, both the discretions allow for a limitation on 
an owner’s right to exclusive use and enjoyment of her property. 
Although the above similarities exist between the court’s discretion to grant a right of 
way of necessity and the court’s discretion in the context of the PIE eviction cases, 
fundamental differences can also be identified. Similar to the court’s exercise of its 
common law discretion in encroachment cases, the court’s discretion in the context of 
the right of way of necessity cannot completely be equated to the court’s discretion in 
eviction cases. The reasons are: firstly, that the discretion of the court in the right of 
way of necessity cases is a common law discretion, while the discretion that the court 
has in terms of PIE eviction cases is a constitutional discretion; secondly, that the court 
in eviction cases is mandated to take up a managerial and pro-active role, while this 
is not pertinently required of courts when they exercise common law discretions; and 
finally, that the court’s discretion in PIE eviction cases is subject to broader 
constitutional considerations and principles rather than common law principles and 
rules only. 
 
(c) The courts’ equitable discretion: Unjustified enrichment 
The law of unjustified enrichment also vests the court with an equitable discretion 
comparable to the discretion that exists in terms of PIE. This discretion applies to the 
adjudication of a specific enrichment claim called the condictio ob turpem vel iniustam 
causam. The condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam enrichment action can be 
instituted in the event where a party to an illegal agreement has lost economic benefits 
to the advantage of another.104 Unjustified enrichment law is aimed at restoring 
economic benefits to those who have lost benefits to another without there being a 
legal justification for such loss, and concomitant benefit.105 The generally accepted 
                                                          
104 W de Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid in die Suid Afrikaanse reg 3 ed (1987) 158; D Visser 
Unjustified enrichment (2008) 442; JC Sonnekus Unjustified enrichment in South African law (2008) 
140; JE du Plessis The South African law of unjustified enrichment (2012) 197; Jajbhay v Cassim 1939 
AD 537; Padayachey v Lebese 1942 TPD 10; Osman v Reis 1976 (3) SA 710 (C). 
105 W de Vos Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid in die Suid Afrikaanse reg 3 ed (1987) 158; JC Sonnekus 
Unjustified enrichment in South African law (2008) 3. Sonnekus explains that “[t]he norms of the law of 
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requirements that must be met for a claimant to succeed with a condictio ob turpem 
vel iniustam causam are: firstly, that ownership must have passed in the transfer; 
secondly, that the agreement that led to the transfer must be an unlawful agreement; 
and finally, that the claimant must claim for the return of the transferred benefit.106 It is 
in terms of this last requirement that the court has a discretion to make a decision on 
the basis of policy and fairness considerations.107 The last requirement invokes the 
par delictum rule of contract law. This rule dictates that the party who institutes the 
condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam must show that she is free of turpitude 
(dishonourable or illegal conduct).108 However, the par delictum rule is not applied in 
an inflexible manner. In Jajbhay v Cassim109 the court confirmed that courts have a 
discretion to relax the par delictum rule so as to prevent injustices from occurring in 
order to promote fairness and equity.110  
What can be taken from the above brief discussion is that whether or not a claimant 
would succeed with a claim for purposes of the condictio ob turpem vel iniustam 
causam essentially depends on the court’s assessment of what fairness dictates in the 
                                                          
enrichment are invoked once no relevant legal ground can be identified for sustaining the patrimonial 
transfer”. 
106 D Visser Unjustified enrichment (2008) 441-453; JC Sonnekus Unjustified enrichment in South 
African law (2008) 132; JE du Plessis The South African law of unjustified enrichment (2012) 197-204; 
Jajbhay v Cassim 1939 AD 537; National Credit Regulator v Opperman and Others 2013 (2) SA 1 (CC) 
para 15. 
107 D Visser Unjustified enrichment (2008) 453; JE du Plessis The South African law of unjustified 
enrichment (2012) 204-205; Jajbhay v Cassim 1939 AD 537; Padayachey v Lebese 1942 TPD 10 12; 
Osman v Reis 1976 (3) SA 710 (C) 712; Lende v Goldberg 1983 (2) SA 284 (C) 286. 
108 D Visser Unjustified enrichment (2008) 443; JC Sonnekus Unjustified enrichment in South African 
law (2008) 140; JE du Plessis The South African law of unjustified enrichment (2012) 204-205; Jajbhay 
v Cassim 1939 AD 537; Padayachey v Lebese 1942 TPD 10 12; Osman v Reis 1976 (3) SA 710 (C) 
712; Lende v Goldberg 1983 (2) SA 284 (C) 286. 
109 1939 AD 537. 
110 Jajbhay v Cassim 1939 AD 537; Padayachey v Lebese 1942 TPD 10 12; Osman v Reis 1976 (3) 
SA 710 (C) 712; Lende v Goldberg 1983 (2) SA 284 (C) 286. See further JE du Plessis The South 
African law of unjustified enrichment (2012) 205. 
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specific case before it. This assessment is in the form of a discretion exercised with 
guidelines found in enrichment law.111 
There are a few similarities between the discretion as applied in the context of the par 
delictum rule in an enrichment claim, and the discretion of courts in PIE eviction cases. 
Firstly, both remedies allow the court to decide between two different options with 
distinct consequences based on the context of each case. Secondly, both discretions 
have the same purpose, namely to ensure equitable outcomes in each individual case. 
Finally, these discretions require that courts apply a context-sensitive approach to 
each case in order to ascertain what fairness and equity require in the particular case. 
However, these two discretions are not completely the same. They are fundamentally 
different in the same way that the courts’ discretion in both encroachment and right of 
way of necessity cases, illustrated above, differs from the courts’ discretion in terms 
of PIE. Again, the source of law, the mandate of the court and the principles applicable 
to the discretion are not the same in the context of the par delictum rule in an 
enrichment claim as the discretion required of courts in terms of PIE. Accordingly, what 
is apparent from the above discussion of the three identified common law discretions, 
in the law of property and the law of unjustified enrichment, is that these discretions 
have certain similarities with the courts’ discretion in the context of evictions in terms 
of PIE. However, the differences, between these private law discretions and the court’s 
discretion in terms of PIE, highlight that the discretion of courts in terms of PIE is 
fundamentally different from the other discretions. PIE requires more of courts than 
what private law rules pertaining to the exercise of the discretion of courts mandate. 
 
4 3 2 PIE in a human rights-paradigm 
The above discussion relating to the discretion courts have in terms of PIE and the 
common law revealed that the distinguishing characteristics of these discretions 
render them irreconcilable. In PIE eviction cases the source of the discretion is the 
                                                          
111 See D Visser Unjustified enrichment (2008) 449; JE du Plessis The South African law of unjustified 
enrichment (2012) 205 for more on these guidelines. 
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Constitution.112 This means that PIE was promulgated primarily to give effect to 
constitutional provisions. The fact that PIE is a constitutionally-ordained legislative 
measure is the primary consideration from which the unique character of PIE flows. It 
is also the basis on which it is distinguished from common law discretions that are 
based on common law principles grounded in equity.  
In the first place, PIE protects constitutional rights and is therefore subject to broader 
constitutional imperatives.113 In particular, PIE gives effect to sections 25 and 26(3) of 
the Constitution.114 Both these rights require regard for broad societal considerations 
and human rights. In line with this observation, Pienaar argues that PIE has added a 
human rights paradigm to the way in which evictions must be dealt with.115 This human 
rights approach allows for factors other than property rights to be considered in 
eviction cases.116 Interestingly, these factors do not refer to existing property rights 
only, but rather refer to the unique circumstances of the most marginalised and 
vulnerable in order to protect their fundamental rights, including human dignity, 
equality and a right to a fair trial.117 These considerations allow for an outcome where 
existing private law rights are considered as equal to other relevant factors in eviction 
cases.118 Accordingly, Van der Walt identifies that PIE challenges the foundations of 
                                                          
112 Sections 26(3) and 25 of the Constitution. See also PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert 
Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 242; S Liebenberg Socio-economic rights 
adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 270; AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 
3 ed (2011) 521-522; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 661; Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various 
Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 11. 
113 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
242; S Liebenberg Socio-economic rights adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 270; 
AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 521-522; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 661; 
Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 11. These broader societal 
considerations are described by the court in PE Municipality as the constitutional matrix.  
114 See chapter 3, section 3.2.2.1 for a discussion of the dual function of PIE. 
115 JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 667-669. 
116 JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 668; AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 521-
522. 
117 AJ van der Walt Property in the margins (2009) 151. 
118 AJ van der Walt Property in the margins (2009) 149, 151, 154; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H 
Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 254; S Liebenberg Socio-economic 
rights adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 274; AJ van der Walt Constitutional 
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the traditional civil law property regime.119 The same cannot be said with regard to the 
common law discretions that are based on equity principles as discussed above. The 
courts’ discretions in terms of encroachment, the right of way of necessity and 
enrichment claim cases are all founded in the common law. These discretions do not 
apply to anything beyond the relationship between property right holders. The 
objective of these discretions is therefore ordinarily to balance competing private law 
rights,120 which applicable policy is usually found in law and economics so that efficient 
outcomes are reached. Accordingly, the discretions exercised in these cases are 
common law discretions, aimed at achieving the most economically viable 
outcomes.121 As a result, these discretions do little to challenge the existing property 
regime, instead, they entrench the hierarchical relationship between rights and no 
rights in that they only concern disputes between parties with existing property rights 
and the concomitant protection of economic interest and efficiency. In other words, 
where a right weaker than ownership is allowed to trump ownership, it is because the 
balance of convenience dictates that such an outcome is the most efficient.122 
                                                          
property law 3 ed (2011) 521-522; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 668; First National Bank of SA Ltd 
t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; First National Bank of SA 
Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 48; Port Elizabeth Municipality v 
Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) paras 16, 23. 
119 AJ van der Walt Property in the margins (2009) 73. 
120 Z Temmers Building encroachments and compulsory transfer of ownership LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University (2010) 62-63; TN Raphulu The right of way of necessity: A constitutional 
analysis LLM dissertation Stellenbosch University (2013) 38-39. 
121 Z Temmers Building encroachments and compulsory transfer of ownership LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch University (2010) 62-63; TN Raphulu The right of way of necessity: A constitutional 
analysis LLM dissertation Stellenbosch University (2013) 38-39. See for example the factors the court 
took into consideration in: Sanders NO and Another v Edwards NO and Others 2003 (5) SA 8 (C) 13; 
Trustees, Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) para 40. 
122 The balance of convenience refers to the balancing of the inconvenience both parties may suffer 
respectively in order to determine which inconvenience is greater than the other. See further Z Temmers 
Building encroachments and compulsory transfer of ownership LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 
(2010) 155; TN Raphulu The right of way of necessity: A constitutional analysis LLM dissertation 
Stellenbosch University (2013) 90; English v CJM Harmse Investments and Another 2007 (3) SA 415 
(N) 421. 
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Furthermore, the fact that PIE is constitutionally ordained and operates in a human 
rights paradigm has an implication for the role of courts in eviction cases. As explained 
by the landmark decision PE Municipality, the court has a central role to fulfil in PIE 
eviction cases.123 Courts are required to be pro-active in eviction proceedings in order 
to ensure that the relevant considerations are presented to it.124 Such an approach to 
evictions will ensure that the most vulnerable and marginalised are protected against 
arbitrary evictions. In contrast, the common law regulates the prescribed role of the 
court through the adversarial system. The adversarial system as explained above 
prescribes that courts take up a passive and uninvolved managerial role.125 
Accordingly, when courts apply common law discretions they are ordinarily restricted 
to the pleadings of the case and may only apply practice rules to the proceedings and 
applicable substantive rules to the legal issues. 
Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert identify a list of the objectives of PIE on the basis of 
eviction case law. They observe that PIE purports (a) to regulate evictions, (b) to 
provide just and equitable outcomes by balancing competing interests to ultimately 
protect and advance human rights, (c) to provide those unlawful occupiers facing 
potential eviction a fair trial, (d) to provide substantive and procedural protection to 
unlawful occupiers, (e) to repeal the PISA and (f) to amend the common law. These 
objectives of PIE indicate the strong commitment PIE has to ensuring that the eviction 
of unlawful occupiers occurs within a human rights paradigm as opposed to a pure 
property rights paradigm. PIE’s reference to equity does not refer to equity in the 
common law sense, because common law equity sets out to only mediate opposing 
property rights in a property rights paradigm. Instead, the just and equitable 
requirement in PIE refers to a much broader notion of equity, one where fundamental 
human rights as enshrined in the Bill of Rights are central to the question whether an 
eviction order can be granted. This should be the approach courts endorse when 
applying the provisions of PIE to ensure that eviction cases are adjudicated as 
mandated by the Constitution. 
                                                          
123 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) paras 36, 39. 
124 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) paras 36, 39; Machele and 
Others v Mailula and Others 2010 (2) SA 275 (CC) para 15; Arendse v Arendse 2013 (3) SA 347 (C); 
Pitje v Shibambo and Others (144/15) [2016] ZACC 5 (24 February 2016) paras 17-21. 
125 See chapter 2, section 2.5 above. 
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Interestingly, chapter three reveals the fact that, practically, the courts’ actual 
approach to PIE’s procedural and substantive requirements in the constitutional 
context is not always completely in line with the constitutional standard of eviction.126 
The section on the application of the procedural requirements of PIE has indicated 
that PIE provides a landowner with an application procedure. This application process 
is regulated by the provisions of PIE and by the application procedure as set out in the 
Uniform Rules of Court.127 Furthermore, an analysis of case law pertaining to the 
threshold requirements namely standing, unlawfulness, service of documents and 
joinder of interested parties indicates that courts are called upon, even when they deal 
with threshold questions, to follow a context-sensitive approach.128 Chapter three also 
showed that ubuntu in addition requires that courts apply the substantive requirements 
of PIE with the same context-sensitive approach so as to advance the just and 
equitable requirement entrenched in PIE.129 However, case law has highlighted that 
the courts’ application of the substantive requirements of PIE sometimes lacks 
context-sensitivity and the values advanced by the philosophical framework of 
ubuntu.130 The section below will determine to what extent the courts’ failure to apply 
PIE within a human rights paradigm as the Constitution mandates relates to courts’ 
pre-constitutional legal culture. 
 
                                                          
126 See chapter 3, section 3.3.1 above. 
127 Section 4 of PIE. 
128 See chapter 3, section 3.2.3.1 above. Unlawful Occupiers, School Site v City of Johannesburg 2005 
(4) SA 199 (SCA) para 22. 
129 See chapter 3, section 3.2.2 above. See also Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 
(1) SA 217 (CC) para 37. 
130 See chapter 3, section 3.2.3.2 above. See Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters 
and Another 2001 (4) SA 385 (W) 395; Occupiers of Erf 101, 102, 104 and 112 Shorts Retreat, 
Pietermaritzburg v Daisy Dear Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others 2009 (4) All SA 410 (SCA) para 3; 
Voster v Van Niekerk and Others (6723/2008) [2009] ZAFSHC (5 February 2009) para 12. 
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4 3 3 Legal culture and eviction remedies 
As previously explained, with regard to Bhana’s definition of legal culture,131 legal 
culture informs the courts’ understanding and attitude towards the application of 
eviction remedies. As a result, legal culture has an impact on how courts ultimately 
approach and apply the constitutional eviction remedy, PIE. Therefore, the pivotal 
point of consideration is whether the application of PIE by the courts is contrary to the 
approach prescribed by PE Municipality and whether this can be associated with the 
existing legal culture of the courts that might still contain the pre-constitutional 
theoretical underpinnings and background assumptions of formalism, conservatism 
and set hierarchies. 
In chapter three a number of cases were discussed, all of which pointed out that some 
courts are resisting the proper application of PIE. These cases highlight the apparent 
disconnect between the courts’ approach to the substantive requirements of PIE and 
how courts are supposed to approach the provisions of PIE. Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) 
Ltd v Modder East Squatters and Another132 (“Modderklip HC”) shows that courts 
adopt a conservative and hierarchical approach to the application of PIE by way of 
ascribing far more weight to the interest of owners than to the interest of unlawful 
occupiers.133 Voster v Van Niekerk,134 Daisy Dear Investments (Pty) Ltd and 
Others135and Shibambo and Others v Pitje136 (“Pitje HC”) were instrumental in showing 
that some courts still fail to ensure that they are in a position to have regard to all 
relevant rights, interests and circumstances of the parties involved in order to properly 
exercise their just and equitable discretion.137 Finally, Johannesburg Housing 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Unlawful Occupiers, Newtown Urban Village138 indicates that 
courts are very uncomfortable with applying PIE and that they would much rather 
                                                          
131 See chapter 3, section 3.1 above. See D Bhana “The role of judicial method in contract law revisited” 
(2015) 132 SALJ 122 124. 
132 2001 (4) SA 385 (W). 
133 See chapter 2, section 2.2.3.3; chapter 3, section 3.2.3.2.2 above. 
134 (6723/2008) [2009] ZAFSHC 9 (5 February 2009).  
135 2009 (4) All SA 410 (SCA).  
136 (77700/2010) [2015] ZAGPPHC 89 (17 February 2015).  
137 See chapter 3, section 3.2.3.2.2 above. 
138 2013 (1) SA 583 (GSJ). 
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prefer to apply rules in a mechanical fashion. In that instance the approach exhibited 
by the court arguably reflected pre-constitutional conservatism and formalism to the 
adjudication of eviction cases.  
What is apparent from chapter three is that some lower courts seem to struggle to 
abandon the hierarchical, formalistic and conservative manner with which they applied 
eviction remedies in the pre-constitutional era. Furthermore, the case law illustrates 
that some lower courts do not always understand and comprehend what is expected 
of them in eviction cases, although PE Municipality has expressly and boldly 
highlighted the new role of courts in PIE eviction cases.139 Based on the above, I 
submit that some courts, especially the lower courts, still identify with the pre-
constitutional concept of, and approach to, ownership, which automatically invokes the 
hierarchical approach to the protection thereof. Furthermore, courts cling to that which 
is familiar, namely a mechanical and hierarchical manner of adjudicating property 
disputes. This phenomenon may be ascribed to the presence of very rich formalism 
and conservativism that forms part of courts’ pre-constitutional legal culture. This 
contributes to some courts struggling with the application of the requirement in PIE 
that an eviction order must be just and equitable and, correspondingly, with the 
application of a context-sensitive approach within the requisite human rights paradigm. 
The implication of this pre-constitutional tendency in the constitutional context of 
evictions is that the constitutional purposes for eviction are not achieved because the 
vehicles which were set in place to ensure that the goals of the Constitution are 
reached, are disregarded. Justice and equity are accordingly not always attained in 
the context of eviction.  
The fact that the above-mentioned failures of courts have direct implications for the 
protection of the constitutional rights of unlawful occupiers cannot be disputed. Where 
courts fail in the ways described above the orders made by the court would invariably 
fall short of the requirements of section 26(3) of the Constitution.140 In this respect, the 
                                                          
139 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 13.  
140 See S Liebenberg Socio-economic rights adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 27 
where Liebenberg observes that “[j]ustice and equity are the pre-requisite for granting an eviction order 
in terms of PIE. The Act gives effect to the requirement in s 26(3) of the Constitution that a court must 
consider ‘all the relevant circumstances’ before granting an order evicting people from their homes”. 
Accordingly, where a court fail to take into consideration all the relevant factors due to pre-constitutional 
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rights of the unlawful occupiers would not adequately be given effect to. In contrast, 
the impact that these above-mentioned failures may have on an owner’s section 25 
constitutional property rights might not be so obvious. Accordingly, the section below 
explores whether the courts’ failure to approach and apply PIE as mandated by the 
Constitution due to pre-constitutional legal culture is problematic for landowners. While 
this is not the primary aim of the study undertaken here, this brief exploration follows 
logically subsequent to the findings of the approach analysis. 
 
4 3 4 The implications of the courts’ failures on landowners’ right to evict 
This section briefly determines what the impact of the above failures of courts are on 
landowners’ eviction rights in light of section 25(1) of the Constitution. A particular 
focus is placed on the impact of the courts’ approach on the position of landowners 
due to their relatively strong position in the pre-constitutional era.141 In this regard, the 
section below sets out: (a) the general test for section 25 infringements and (b) an 
exploration of the impliations for landowners where courts fail to apply PIE as 
mandated by way of an section 25 analysis.142 This will allow for broad conclusions to 
be drawn about whether the courts’ failure to apply PIE as mandated is problematic 
for landowners. 
 
4 3 4 1 The section 25 test: FNB methodology 
Section 25 of the Constitution expressly regulates deprivations and expropriations of 
property.143 Its purpose is to find a proportionate balance between the protection of 
                                                          
legal culture and thereafter grant an eviction order the failure of the court in this regard will lead to 
unlawful occupiers’ section 26(3) rights being infiringed upon. 
141 See chapter 2, section 2.2 above. 
142 This section is not focussed on establishing the constitutionality of PIE per se, or the constitutionality 
of the courts’conduct. Rather these issues are explored here as a consequence of the primary findings. 
Here, the focuss falls on the landowner’s position because of the landowner’s strong position in the pre-
constitutional era. 
143 Section 25 of the Constitution reads as follows: 
“(1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no 
law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. 
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application - 
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existing property rights and the promotion and protection of the public interest.144 
Consequently, where an infringement of property is alleged, such infringement can be 
tested against the requirements contained in section 25 in order to determine the 
constitutional validity of the infringement. The requirements for a valid deprivation of 
property are set out in section 25(1) of the Constitution, while the requirements for 
expropriation are set out in section 25(2).  
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of 
Finance145 developed a methodology for the adjudication of constitutional property law 
disputes.146 According to FNB the point of departure for a section 25 analysis is 
whether an arbitrary deprivation of property occurred in terms of section 25(1).147 
                                                          
(a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and 
(b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment of which 
have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court.” 
144 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 
48; T Roux “Property” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 2 ed 
(RS: 6 2014) 46-1 46-3. 
145 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
146 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 
58; P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 206. 
147 See First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 
and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) 
para 60. See further Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, 
Gauteng Provincial Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 28; AJ van der Walt 
Constitutional Property law 3 ed (2011) 75; T Roux “Property” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional law of South Africa 2 ed (RS: 6 2014) 46-1 46-9. However, case law has indicated that 
courts are willing to skip the deprivation question by starting with the expropriation question in situations 
where it is clear from the outset that the case does not involve a deprivation, but rather an expropriation. 
In this regard see Du Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC); Haffejee NO and Others v 
Ethekwini Municipality and Others 2011 (6) SA 134 (CC); Agri SA v Minister of Minerals and Energy 
2013 (4) SA 1 (CC); AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 225; E Marais “When does 
state interference with property (now) amount to expropriation? An analysis of the Agri SA court’s state 
acquisition requirement (Part I)” (2015) 18 PELJ 2983 2985. 
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Section 25(1) gives rise to a number of subsidiary questions. Firstly, it should be 
determined whether the alleged infringed interest constitutes “property” for purposes 
of section 25(1) of the Constitution.148 In FNB the court established that the property 
concept has to be interpreted generously,149 when it decided that it would not be wise 
to ascribe a fixed meaning to constitutional property.150 It held that ownership of land 
is central to the constitutional concept of property although property is not limited to 
land.151 If a court finds that the interest qualifies as property for purposes of section 
25, the threshold requirement for a section 25 analysis has been met and the court 
can proceed to the second question.152  
                                                          
148 See First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 
and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) 
paras 46(a), 51. 
149 Subsequent case law followed this generous approach to the interpretation of constitutional property. 
See Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial 
Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 32; Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for 
Economic Development, Eastern Cape and Others 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC) para 104.  
150 See First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 
and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) 
para 51; AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 84. 
151 See First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 
and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) 
para 51. See also AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 93. Subsequent cases and 
academic literature have held that certain property interests amount to constitutional property for 
purposes of section 25(1). In this regard, First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, 
South African Revenue Service and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of 
Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 51 has held that ownership of land constitutes constitutional 
property. In Laugh it Off Promotions CC v South African Breweries International (Finance) BV t/a 
Sabmark International and Another 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) paras 1-40; Phumelela Gaming and Leisure 
Ltd v Grundlingh and Others 2007 (6) SA 350 (CC) the Constitutional Court accepted that intellectual 
property was property for purposes of section 25(1); in National Credit Regulator v Opperman and 
Others 2013 (2) SA 1 (CC) para 63 the Constitutional Court held that personal rights such as the right 
to restitution of money paid was constitutional property. 
152 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 85; T Roux “Property” in S Woolman & M 
Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 2 ed (RS: 6 2014) 46-1 46-12. 
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The second question that arises is whether a deprivation of the identified property 
interest has taken place.153 In FNB the court explained that a deprivation refers to any 
interference with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of private property belonging to a 
right or title holder of the concerned property.154 However, it is important to understand 
that deprivations are part of the normal regulation of property interests and will only be 
invalid if they are arbitrary or not authorized by law of general application, as required 
by section 25(1).155 Section 25 therefore ensures that regulatory measures imposed 
on property rights are not arbitrary.156 Accordingly, where a deprivation is present and 
it proves to comply with section 25(1), the deprivation constitutes a legitimate 
regulatory measure.157 If a court finds that on the facts of a particular case a 
deprivation of property has not taken place the inquiry will come to an end based on 
the fact that where there is no deprivation, there will be no infringement in terms of 
section 25. However, in the event that the deprivation question is answered in the 
                                                          
153 See First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 
and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) 
paras 46,57. 
154 See First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 
and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) 
para 57; Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng 
Provincial Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 35; Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC 
for Economic Development, Eastern Cape and Others 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC) para 73. However, the 
court has been inconsistent with its description or explanation of what a deprivation is. In both 
Mkontwane v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 2005 1 SA 530 (CC) para 32 and National 
Credit Regulator v Opperman and Others 2013 (2) SA 1 (CC) para 66 the Constitutional Court held that 
“[w]hether there has been a deprivation depends on the extent of interference with the use, enjoyment 
or exploitation of the constitutionally protected property”. This inconsistency has been described as a 
development of the concept of deprivation by the Constitutional Court. In this regard see Reflect-All 
1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government 
and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 35. 
155 See First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 
and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) 
para 61. 
156 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 17. 
157 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 17. 
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affirmative, the court will move on to establish whether such deprivation is consistent 
with the requirements as set out in section 25(1) of the Constitution.158  
As explained above, the test for a valid deprivation is found explicitly in section 25(1) 
of the Constitution. Section 25(1) requires that a deprivation should firstly, be 
authorized by law of general application and secondly, that it should not be arbitrary.159 
A law of general application refers to a law or a rule that is authorised by valid and 
properly promulgated legislation, regulation, subordinate legislation other than 
regulations, municipal by-laws, rules and principles of common law and customary 
law, rules of court and international conventions that apply to the citizenry.160 In other 
words, the rule or law should be a valid rule and should not apply selectively to only 
specific individuals or members of groups.161  
Secondly, section 25(1) requires that the law of general application may not permit 
arbitrary deprivation of property.162 According to FNB, the arbitrariness question has 
two legs, namely the substantive arbitrariness leg and the procedural arbitrariness 
                                                          
158 See First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 
and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) 
para 61. 
159 Section 25(1) of the Constitution. See also AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 
218. 
160 S Woolman & H Botha “Limitations” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South 
Africa 2 ed (RS: 6 2014) 34-1 34-53. See also AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 
232-237 for an explanation of the requirements any law or rule must comply with in order to constitute 
law of general application.  
161 S Woolman & H Botha “Limitations” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South 
Africa 2 ed (RS: 6 2014) 34-1 34-50; T Roux “Property” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional 
law of South Africa 2 ed (RS: 6 2014) 46-1 46-21. 
162 See First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 
and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) 
para 61. The FNB methodology regarding the arbitrariness question was followed in subsequent case 
law, namely: National Credit Regulator v Opperman and Others 2013 (2) SA 1 (CC) para 65; Reflect-
All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government 
and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 48; Haffejee NO and Others v Ethekwini Municipality and 
Others 2011 (6) SA 134 (CC) para 27; Agri SA v Minister of Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) 
para 49; Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Eastern Cape and Others 
2015 (6) SA 125 (CC) para 77. 
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leg.163 The court explained that substantive arbitrariness concerns establishing 
sufficient reason for the deprivation. In this regard, whether or not sufficient reason for 
the deprivation is established is determined by investigating a complexity of 
relationships depending on the facts of each particular case.164 These are; the 
relationship between the means employed and ends sought to be achieved; the 
relationship between the purpose of the deprivation and the person whose property 
rights are affected; the purpose of the deprivation and the nature of the property, 
having regard to the extent of the deprivation on the particular property. More 
specifically, in the context of the last consideration it needs to be determined whether 
all the incidents of ownership are affected, or whether only some incidents are entirely 
or partially affected. The reason advanced for the deprivation is required to be more 
compelling in cases where the deprivation affects all the incidents of ownership, 
completely.165 The nature and extent of the deprivation will indicate whether, based on 
the facts of the case, a mere rationality inquiry will be enough to establish sufficient 
reason for a deprivation, or whether something closer to a proportionality inquiry is 
more appropriate to determine the validity of the deprivation.166 Therefore, a court is 
enjoined to decide which test for establishing sufficient reason should be employed 
with regard to the extent of the deprivation in the particular case, in order to ultimately 
determine whether a deprivation is arbitrary.167 
                                                          
163 See First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 
and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) 
para 100. 
164 See First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 
and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) 
para 99. 
165 See First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 
and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) 
para 100. 
166 See First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 
and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) 
para 100. 
167 See First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 
and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) 
para 100. 
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Where the deprivation is arbitrary and therefore does not comply with the section 25(1) 
requirements, FNB mandates that the section 36 limitation test be applied to determine 
if such a limitation of the property right is nonetheless justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on equality, human dignity and freedom.168 However, there 
is support in academic literature that section 36 falls into redundancy where the section 
25 test is applied.169 Roux170 and Currie and De Waal171 argue that the section 36 
limitation test is only available theoretically. These scholars explain that (a) where 
there is no law of general application, section 36 cannot be applied; and (b) that 
deprivation of property that is arbitrary is not likely to meet the reasonableness and 
justifiable standard of section 36(1).172 Case law supports these arguments by 
showing that where a deprivation is found to be arbitrary, it is unlikely that a section 
36 analysis would save it from unconstitutionality.173 Interestingly, Van der Walt agrees 
that the relationship between section 25 and section 36 of the Constitution is not 
perfect, but he argues that this imperfection does not mean that the section 25 test is 
                                                          
168 See also See First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 
(CC) para 110. 
169 See T Roux “Property” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 2 ed (RS: 
6 2014) 46-1 46-26; I Currie & J De Waal J The Bill of Rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 557-559. 
170 T Roux “Property” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 2 ed (RS: 6 
2014) 46-1 46-26. 
171 I Currie & J De Waal J The Bill of Rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 557-559. 
172 See T Roux “Property” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 2 ed (RS: 
6 2014) 46-1 46-26; I Currie & J De Waal The Bill of Rights handbook 6 ed (2013) 557. However, Roux 
concedes that where the standard of the arbitariness test is lower, in other words, the sufficient reason 
measure is applied instead of a full proportionality review, the section 36 limitation test may have some 
significance. See T Roux “Property” in S Woolman & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa 
2 ed (RS: 6 2014) 46-1 46-27. 
173 National Credit Regulator v Opperman and Others 2013 (2) SA 1 (CC) paras 73-76; Agri SA v 
Minister of Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) para 49 and Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC 
for Economic Development, Eastern Cape and Others 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC) para 87. See also AJ van 
der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 74. 
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not adequate.174 In contrast, Van der Walt applauds the robust and substantive 
approach that the court applied to the deprivation issue in the FNB-judgment.175  
What remains curious for purposes of this study is whether situations where courts fail 
to apply PIE as mandated, by not having regard to all relevant rights, interests and 
circumstances, would infringe on a landowner’s section 25 rights. The section below 
explores whether failure by courts to approach and apply PIE with the necessary 
context-sensitive approach may result in landowners being arbitrarily deprived of their 
property rights. 
 
4 3 4 2 Possible consequence for landowners when courts disregard their 
mandate in terms of PIE  
It has been established that the outcome of eviction cases, pertaining to unlawful 
occupation in terms of PIE, really depends on the circumstances of each individual 
case.176 However, on the basis of cases decided since the promulgation of PIE, one 
can make a deduction that a court having to decide on whether to grant an eviction 
order, essentially has three different possible orders it can make.177 These are: (a) to 
grant an eviction order with no reservations; (b) to grant an eviction order but suspend 
its enforcement; and finally (c) to refuse to grant an eviction order. Where the courts 
                                                          
174 AJ van der Walt “Striving for a better interpretation - A critical reflection on the Constitutional Court’s 
Harksen and FNB decisions on the property clause” (2004) 121 SALJ 854 873. 
175 AJ van der Walt “Striving for a better interpretation - A critical reflection on the Constitutional Court’s 
Harksen and FNB decisions on the property clause” (2004) 121 SALJ 854 873. 
176 See chapter 3, section 3.4 above. See Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 
217 (CC) 36. 
177 See the following PIE eviction cases that have led to this preposition: Port Elizabeth Municipality v 
Peoples Dialogue on Land and Shelter and Others 2000 (2) SA 1074 (SE); FHP Management (Pty) Ltd 
v Theron and Another 2004 (3) SA 392 (C); Davids and Others v Van Straaten and Others 2005 (4) SA 
468 (C); Kanescho v Realtors (Pty) Ltd v Maphumulo and three similar cases 2006 (5) SA 92 (D); 
Transnet Ltd v Nyawuza and Others 2006 (5) SA 100 (D) 113; Red Stripe Trading 68 CC v Mahlomola 
& Another (2011/06 [2006] ZAGPHC 39 (28 April 2006); Voster v Van Niekerk and Others (6723/2008) 
[2009] ZAFSHC (5 February 2009); Wine v Zondani (2044/08) [2009] ZAECHC 19 (26 February 2009); 
City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd and Others 2012 (6) SA 294 (SCA); Mahogany 
Ridge 2 Property Owners Association v Unlawful Occupiers of Lot 13113 Pinetown and Others 2013 
(2) All SA 236 (KZD). 
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fail to embrace their new role in eviction cases in the constitutional era it is expected 
that the rights and interests of unlawful occupiers will not find adequate protection via 
the provisions of PIE. However, the impact of such failure on the owners’ rights has 
not been reiterated and explained with regard to section 25 of the Constitution. Such 
an exploration might be interesting in light of the strong positions landowners enjoined 
in the pre-constitutional era.178 Accordingly, the exercise of the courts’ discretion that 
results in (a) eviction orders; (b) suspensive eviction orders; and (c) no eviction orders 
is scrutinized in light of section 25 of the Constitution in order to determine the way in 
which failure on the courts’ part to adequately approach and apply PIE impacts on 
landowners’ rights to evict. 
 
(a) The first possible order: The granting of an eviction order 
The court may order the eviction of the unlawful occupiers in favour of the 
landowner.179 The implication of this outcome is that the court order will confirm that 
the landowner is entitled to an eviction order in the particular circumstances. However, 
the decision to grant the eviction order will not exclusively rest on the ownership of the 
landowner.180 The strength of the owner’s entitlement to exclude in the constitutional 
era is founded on what is just and equitable in the circumstances. Such strength should 
no longer be founded solely on an owner’s right to evict as depicted by the 
characteristics of ownership, set out in chapter two above. Normatively, this means 
that the context in which the landowner would be entitled to an eviction order is not 
based on the meaning of ownership as individualistic, abstract or complete. Rather, it 
concerns whether in the particular circumstances the granting of an eviction order 
would be just and equitable. In this instance, the landowner’s right to evict will find 
complete operation as there are no circumstances that necessitate limiting or 
weakening the landowner’s right to evict.181 
                                                          
178 See chapter 2, section 2.2.3 above. 
179 See FHP Management (Pty) Ltd v Theron and Another 2004 (3) SA 392 (C); Davids and Others v 
Van Straaten and Others 2005 (4) SA 468 (C); Transnet Ltd v Nyawuza and Others 2006 (5) SA 100 
(D) 113. 
180 See Transnet Ltd v Nyawuza and Others 2006 (5) SA 100 (D) 106. 
181 Transnet Ltd v Nyawuza and Others 2006 (5) SA 100 (D) 113. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
184 
In the event where a court fails to have regard to all rights, interests and circumstances 
of the parties involved and subsequently grant an eviction order the affected 
landowner will not be prejudiced, even though the court failed to follow the approach 
as mandated by PIE and the Constitution. FNB explains that for an infringement of 
section 25 to take place a constitutionally recognised property right should be limited 
by law of general application.182 In this scenario, an owner’s right to evict would qualify 
as constitutional property.183 However, no deprivation of such right occurs due to the 
fact that the eviction order does not amount to any intereference with the owner’s 
rights; but rather gives effect to the owner’s rights. Accordingly, where courts grant an 
eviction order in favour of the landowner, without adequately exercising its discretion, 
such failure could not possibly amount to a deprivation of landowners’ rights. Section 
25(1) would accordingly not be affected negatively by the courts’ failure to exercise its 
discretion as mandated. 
 
(b) The second possible order: The suspended eviction order 
The court may in terms of its discretion make an eviction order in the landowner’s 
favour, subject to conditions which might result in the delay of the enforcement of the 
eviction order.184 This means that the execution of the eviction order is postponed until 
certain events take place, based on the circumstances of the case as stipulated in the 
court order. As explained in chapter three, these stipulations could arise due to a 
                                                          
182 See First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 
and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) 
para 60. See further Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, 
Gauteng Provincial Government and Another 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 28; AJ van der Walt 
Constitutional Property law 3 ed (2011) 75; T Roux “Property” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional law of South Africa volume 3 2 ed (RS: 6 2014) 46-1 46-9. 
183 See City of Cape Town v Rudolph and Others 2004 (5) SA 39 (C) 69; Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 
v Modder East Squatters and Another 2001 (4) SA 385 (W) 390; Modder East Squatters and Another 
v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South Africa and 2004 (3) All SA 169 
(SCA) para 21. 
184 See Port Elizabeth Municipality v Peoples Dialogue on Land and Shelter and Others 2000 (2) SA 
1074 (SE) 1087; Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd and Others 2012 (6) SA 294 (SCA); Mahogany Ridge 2 
Property Owners Association v Unlawful Occupiers of Lot 13113 Pinetown and Others 2013 (2) All SA 
236 (KZD). 
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number of factors that crystallise from the application of a context-sensitive approach 
by the courts.185 In these instances, the landowner’s right to evict is confirmed, but the 
execution of the eviction order is made subject to certain conditions. The Modderklip 
HC and Daisy Dear Investment cases are examples of where the court decided to 
grant eviction orders subject to suspensive conditions requiring that set periods of time 
lapse to allow the occupiers to move from the land before eviction may take place.  
Accordingly, the landowner has a right to evict, but she also has a duty to be patient 
and empathetic until the conditions for the execution of the eviction order are 
fulfilled;186 only then the landowner’s right to evict can be enforced. Importantly, the 
normative basis for a court finding that the owner is entitled to an eviction order in the 
above context is again not the meaning of ownership as individualistic, abstract and 
complete. Instead, the basis for giving effect to the owner’s right to evict is found in the 
fact that the court is satisfied that the granting of an eviction order in the particular 
circumstances is just and equitable. This outcome emphasises that the strength of the 
owner’s entitlement to exclude in the constitutional era relates to justice and equity 
and no longer to the idea that ownership is absolute.187 
In the event where courts fail to have regard to all rights, interests and circumstances 
of the parties involved and subsequently grant suspended eviction orders the 
landowners’ rights to evict may be adversely affected. This is illustrated in the 
Modderklip HC and Daisy Dear Investment cases. The courts failed to have regard to 
all rights, interests and circumstances of the parties before granting such orders.188 
The failure of the court leads to prolonged legal proceedings that resulted in continued 
                                                          
185 See chapter 3, section 3.2.3.2 above. Section 4(8)(a) and (b) of PIE. 
186 See Port Elizabeth Municipality v Peoples Dialogue on Land and Shelter and Others 2000 (2) SA 
1074 (SE) 10874; Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd and Others 2012 (6) SA 294 (SCA); Mahogany Ridge 2 
Property Owners Association v Unlawful Occupiers of Lot 13113 Pinetown and Others 2013 (2) All SA 
236 (KZD). See also AJ van der Walt “The state’s duty to protect property owners v the state’s duty to 
provide housing: Thoughts on the Modderklip case” (2005) 21 SAJHR 144 159. 
187 P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 188-189. 
188 See chapter 3, section 3.2.3.2.2 above; Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters and 
Another 2001 (4) SA 385 (W) 396; Occupiers of Erf 101, 102, 104 and 112 Shorts Retreat, 
Pietermaritzburg v Daisy Dear Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others 2009 (4) All SA 410 (SCA) para 2. 
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unlawful occupation and in the Modderklip HC case impossibility to evict the unlawful 
occupiers.189  
In light of the above, a section 25 analysis of the scenario follows where a court fails 
to exercise its discretion adequately and thereafter grants an eviction order but 
subjects such order to suspensive conditions. The first question in terms of FNB is 
whether the concerned interest amounts to property for purposes of section 25 of the 
Constitution.190 The Cape High Court decision of City of Cape Town v Rudolph and 
Others191 (“Rudolph”) has effectively indicated that the substantive provisions in PIE 
(a) do affect property interest for purposes of section 25;192 and (b) do constitute 
deprivation.193 Accordingly, the question that is left to be decided is the arbitrariness 
question.194 In this regard, Rudolph has explained that the substantive provisions of 
PIE do not constitute an arbitrary deprivation of property when a court exercises its 
discretion in terms of the empowering provisions of PIE after having regard to all rights, 
interests and circumstances involved.195 However, the scenario currently under 
                                                          
189 President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 (5) SA 
3 (CC) para 48. 
190 See First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 
and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) 
para 51. 
191 2004 (5) SA 39 (C). 
192 See chapter 4, section 4.3.3.2 above; City of Cape Town v Rudolph and Others 2004 (5) SA 39 (C) 
69; Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters and Another 2001 (4) SA 385 (W) 390; 
Modder East Squatters and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others 2004 (3) All SA 169 (SCA) para 21. 
193 See chapter 4, section 4.3.3.2 above; City of Cape Town v Rudolph and Others 2004 (5) SA 39 (C) 
69; Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v Modder East Squatters and Another 2001 (4) SA 385 (W) 390-391. 
194 See chapter 4, section 4.3.3.1 above; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, 
South African Revenue Service and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of 
Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 61. 
195 City of Cape Town v Rudolph and Others 2004 (5) SA 39 (C) 69. The constitutionality of the 
substantive provisions of PIE that provide courts with a discretion to decide eviction cases based on 
what would be “just and equitable” were for the first time considered in Rudolph. Rudolph concerned a 
case where the local authority, the City of Cape Town, submitted in an application for the eviction of 
unlawful occupiers that PIE is unconstitutional in so far as it allows for land grabbing. As point of 
departure, to test the constitutional validity of the substantive provisions of PIE, the court considered 
the structure of section 25 of the Constitution, specifically with regard to the FNB methodology, in order 
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scrutiny is where courts fail to apply PIE as mandated. The question is whether courts’ 
unfettered approach to the application of PIE that results in suspended eviction orders 
could infringe upon landowners’ property interests. 
FNB has shown that a deprivation would only be arbitrarily if it is lacking sufficient 
reason or can be said to be procedurally unfair.196 Furthermore, FNB has indicated 
that the question of whether there is sufficient reason for a deprivation will depend on 
the circumstances of each case and it will be decided by the court by way of a strict 
proportionality test or a less strict rationality test.197 When deciding between applying 
a rationality test or a strict proportionality test the court has to exercise its own 
discretion based on the factors advanced by the FNB case.198 A mere rationality test 
would involve identifying whether there is a rational relationship between the means 
and the ends employed.199 If the rationality test is applied the Rudolph-judgment must 
                                                          
to analyse whether the “just and equitable” requirement provisions in PIE contravenes section 25 of the 
Constitution. In this regard, the court started its analysis with the deprivation question because it is 
assumed, without deciding the point, that the interest sought to be protected was property for purposes 
of section 25. It held that the protection afforded by PIE permits deprivation of certain property rights, 
namely an owner’s right to exclusive use and enjoyment of her property to the extent the court 
determines in its order by way of the inclusion of just and equitable conditions for the execution of the 
eviction order. It then established that PIE qualifies as law of general application. As a result, the section 
25(1) requirement that a deprivation may only take place in terms of law of general application was met. 
196 See chapter 4, section 4.3.3.1 above; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, 
South African Revenue Service and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of 
Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
197 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 
100. 
198 See First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 
and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) 
para 100 for the factors a court would consider when exercising its discretion. The court applied the 
strict proportionality test, however in Mkontwane v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 2005 (1) 
SA 530 (CC) the court applied the less strict rational test. Interestingly, the court in National Credit 
Regulator v Opperman and Others 2013 (2) SA 1 (CC) para 68 followed a hybrid approach by applying 
both the rational relationship test and the strict proportionality test. 
199 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 
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be considered where the court held that PIE’s roots are found in section 26(3) of the 
Constitution and that PIE aims to balance two opposing rights, namely those endorsed 
in section 26(3) and section 25 of the Constitution by requiring that all relevant 
circumstances be considered. 200 In light of the above, if the courts’ ratio in Rudolph is 
followed it can be argued that it would make no sense that a landowner’s right to use 
and enjoyment of his property may be limited where a court empowered by PIE to 
exercise a just and equitable discretion fails to do a proper assessment of the relevant 
factors applicable when exercising such discretion. The Constitution expressly 
requires that all relevant circumstances should be considered and balanced when 
courts exercise their discretion to order or refuse to order eviction.201 It will not be 
necessary to engage in a strict proportionality test as the lower standard rationality 
test has not been satisfied. Thus, even though the order is granted the suspension 
which results in deprivation may be unjustifiable if all circumstances are not taken into 
account. Accordingly, where the court suspends an eviction order after failing to 
approach the provisions of PIE pertaining to its role and its discretion as mandated, 
the continued occupation of a landowner’s property may potentially amount to an 
arbitrary deprivation. 
 
(c) The third possible order: The refusal to grant an eviction order 
A landowner wanting to evict in terms of PIE might not succeed with an eviction 
application.202 In this instance, the landowner’s right to evict is left bare due to the 
circumstances and facts of the case. Factors that could give rise to such an outcome 
could be, for example, facts and circumstances that trump the landowner’s right to 
                                                          
100. The less strict rational relationship test was applied by the Constitutional Court in Mkontwane v 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) para 35. 
200 City of Cape Town v Rudolph and Others 2004 (5) SA 39 (C) 68; Cape Killarney Property 
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mahamba 2001 (4) SA 1222 (SCA) para 20; Port Elizabeth Municipality v 
Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) paras 14-23. 
201 Section 26(3) of the Constitution. 
202 Kanescho v Realtors (Pty) Ltd v Maphumulo and three similar cases 2006 (5) SA 92 (D); Red Stripe 
Trading 68 CC v Mahlomola & Another (2011/06) [2006] ZAGPHC 39 (28 April 2006); Voster v Van 
Niekerk and Others (6723/2008) [2009] ZAFSHC (5 February 2009); Wine v Zondani (2044/08) [2009] 
ZAECHC 19 (26 February 2009). 
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evict because the eviction is not capable of having a just and equitable outcome.203 A 
court’s refusal to grant an eviction order in the owner’s favour would leave the owner 
powerless and her right to evict useless because of the circumstances of the case. 
However, the landowner would be able to approach a court again at a later stage for 
an eviction order in the event that the unlawful occupier’s circumstances changed. 
Furthermore, in some instances compensation could be awarded to the landowner.204  
In the event where the court refuses to grant an eviction order after failing to have 
regard to all the rights, interests and circumstances of the parties involved the 
deprivation may constitute an arbitrary deprivation. The Voster case is an example of 
where the granting of the eviction order, after the court failed to probe for further 
particulars and accordingly failed to consider all relevant circumstances, could amount 
to an arbitrary deprivation of the landowner’s property.205 If a section 25 analysis of 
the above scenario is done, the result will be the same as the section 25 analysis 
above in relation to the second scenario. The deprivation caused by the court order 
would amount to an arbitrary deprivation on the basis of a mere rationality test. Again, 
the question would be whether there is a rational relationship between the means and 
the ends employed.206 Accordingly, an arbitrary deprivation would arguably ensue 
where a denial of the eviction order lacks a proper assessment of the relevant factors 
                                                          
203 Voster v Van Niekerk and Others (6723/2008) [2009] ZAFSHC (5 February 2009); Wine v Zondani 
(2044/08) [2009] ZAECHC 19 (26 February 2009); P Dhliwayo & AJ van der Walt “The notion of absolute 
and exclusive ownership” 2017 (forthcoming) 19. Dhliwayo and Van der Walt argue that ownership is 
inherently limited. It is restricted by the restrictions the law place on it. 
204 President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 (5) SA 
3 (CC). There is support in academic literature that the award of constitutional damages in the 
Modderklip scenario compensates for the disproportionate effect that PIE had on Modderklip. This might 
mean that where the execution of the eviction order becomes impossible and where the landowner 
proved to be vigilant in her search for relief it would be unlikely that the deprivation would be reasonable 
and justifiable without compensation. In this regard, see AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 
ed (2011) 278; JM Pienaar Land reform (2014) 773; P Dhliwayo A constitutional analysis of access 
rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University (2015) 223. 
205 See chapter 3, section 3.2.3.2 above. 
206 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 
100. The rationality test was applied by the Constitutional Court in Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) para 35. 
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applicable when the court exercises its PIE discretion. The Constitution expressly 
requires that all relevant circumstances should be considered and balanced. 
Therefore, such denial would in the absence of a proper balancing exercise amount 
to arbitrary deprivation of a landowner’s right to evict. 
In view of the above comments about the possible effects of the three potential forms 
of eviction orders on the property rights of the affected landowner, it is evident that 
failure of courts to apply and approach PIE in the requisite manner may amount to 
arbitrary deprivation of landowners’ constitutional property rights at least in some of 
these cases. In the past our courts resisted the application scope of PIE due to fear 
that it may destabilise the economy by compromising certainty in the property market 
and by eroding the institution of ownership.207 It is therefore ironic that the same courts 
that once believed that the above must be avoided at all costs are now responsible for 
doing just that.208 This finding calls for courts to align their approach to evictions with 
the pro-active and managerial and context-sensitive approach as mandated by the 
Constitution so that they are positioned to have regard to all rights, interests and 
circumstances of all parties involved. Only then can courts ensure that not only the 
unlawful occupiers’ constitutional rights are protected, but also the constitutional 
property rights of landowners. 
 
4 4 Concluding remarks 
It is clear from this chapter that the constitutional dawn, which brought section 26(3) 
and PIE into operation, has transformed the regulation of the eviction of unlawful 
occupiers. The first part’s analysis of the comparison between the courts’ approach in 
the pre-constitutional era and the courts’ approach in the constitutional era showed 
that section 26(3) and PIE brought about a number of changes. These are firstly, a 
shift in the conceptual understanding of ownership from the pre-constitutional thinking 
that ownership and the right to evict are absolutely exclusive to the understanding that 
                                                          
207 See chapter 2, section 2.3.2 above. See further AJ van der Walt “Exclusivity of ownership, security 
of tenure and eviction orders: A critical evaluation of recent case law” (2002) 18 SAJHR 372 400. 
208 See chapter 2, section 2.2.3.3 above. 
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ownership is limited by nature.209 Secondly, the remedy available to owners for the 
eviction of unlawful occupiers has changed from the pre-constitutional rei vindicatio 
and PISA to the legislative measure, PIE, in the constitutional era.210 Thirdly, the 
function of eviction remedies for purposes of unlawful occupation has changed. The 
eviction remedy in the constitutional era not only protects an owner’s exclusive right 
to use and enjoy her property, it also aims to protect unlawful occupiers from arbitrary 
evictions.211 Lastly, the way in which courts apply eviction remedies requires a shift on 
a theoretical level from a formalistic and accordingly mechanical, conservative and 
uninvolved approach towards a more context-sensitive, transformative, pro-active and 
involved approach.212  
The critical analysis of the second part of this chapter brought some interesting 
findings to light. The analysis of courts’ common law equitable powers has showed 
that the court is familiar with exercising a context-sensitive discretion.213 However, the 
differences between the courts’ discretion in terms of PIE and common law discretions 
are vast and fundamental. PIE simply requires more, by virtue of PIE being a 
constitutionally ordained statute.214 This characteristic of PIE forces the process of the 
eviction of unlawful occupiers to operate within a human rights context that provides 
for broader societal considerations to be taken into account; rather than just property 
rights and economic considerations. It further provides for a revised role of courts that 
are necessarily involved and pro-active instead of uninvolved and passive. 
Accordingly, this section showed that the transformation of the eviction landscape, 
brought about by section 26(3) of the Constitution and PIE, extends beyond the move 
from the formalistic application of private law rules to a private law discretionary 
remedy. Instead, it requires that courts move beyond the private law adjudication style 
into a human rights-paradigm when courts exercise their discretion in terms of PIE.215 
                                                          
209 See chapter 4, section 4.2.1.3 above. 
210 See chapter 4, section 4.2.1.3 above. 
211 See chapter 4, section 4.2.1.3 above. 
212 See chapter 4, section 4.2.1.3 above. 
213 See chapter 4, section 4.3.1.3 above. 
214 See chapter 4, section 4.2.1.3 above. 
215 See chapter 4, section 4.3.2 above. 
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Interestingly, a critical analysis of chapter three’s findings revealed that some courts 
are still failing to adjudicate eviction cases within this prescribed human rights 
paradigm. This section showed that courts are failing in this regard due to traces of 
pre-constitutional legal culture in the way in which they approach and apply PIE in the 
constitutional era. The Modderklip HC, Newtown, Voster, Daisy Dear and Pitje HC 
cases showed that courts are applying the transformative eviction measure PIE with 
an approach that resembles traces of pre-constitutional conservatism, formalism and 
hierarchical thinking.216 
Finally, one of the implications of this approach identified in the chapter was the impact 
of the approach on landowners wishing to evict. The focus fell on landowners 
specifically because the negative implications for landowners might not be as obvious 
as the negative implications a flawed approach on the part of courts has on unlawful 
occupiers under section 26(3) of the Constitution. Interestingly, where courts fail to 
apply PIE as mandated and subsequently (a) grant an eviction order with suspensive 
conditions or (b) refuse to grant an eviction order, landowners may suffer arbitrary 
deprivation of their property rights.217 
                                                          
216 See chapter 4, section 4.3.3 above. 
217 See chapter 4, section 4.3.4.3 above. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
5 1 Introduction 
The approach of courts to eviction remedies has been the combined result of the legal 
doctrine that regulated the concept of ownership, specific eviction remedies, and 
standard practices of presiding officers as entrenched in interpretation and procedural 
rules. In the pre-constitutional era these aspects worked together to ensure that the 
landowner’s apex position was protected.  
Interestingly, the constitutional dawn transformed the eviction landscape on the basis 
of section 26(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the 
“Constitution”) and the enactment of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and 
Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (“PIE”). Port Elizabeth Municipality v 
Various Occupiers1 (“PE Municipality”) enunciated that the PIE not only replaced the 
pre-constitutional eviction remedies but in fact also required that the deep-level 
assumptions of a landowner’s right to evict and the standard practices all associated 
with the courts’ role in eviction cases were also turned on its head. The question that 
this study explores is whether the courts’ approach to eviction remedies always 
reflects the new role of the court as envisioned by the landmark judgment of PE 
Municipality. 
The study provides a mirrored description of the courts’ approach to eviction remedies 
in the pre-constitutional era on the one hand, and the constitutional era on the other. 
This description is utilised to ultimately determine whether the courts’ actual approach 
is on par with the constitutional standard for eviction whereafter the implications of 
these findings, particularly for the landowner, are explored. 
 
                                                          
1 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC). 
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5 2 Conclusions 
5 2 1 The courts’ approach to eviction remedies before the Constitution 
Chapter two focusses on two aspects that informed the legal culture of courts 
pertaining to the application of an owner’s vindication remedies in the pre-
constitutional era. These are: firstly, the conceptual understanding of an owner’s right 
to vindicate as informed by the rules and principles applicable to the remedy itself; and 
secondly, the attitude of courts as a product of the standard practices and 
interpretation rules they follow in their application of vindication remedies. 
The chapter shows how the conceptual understanding of an owner’s right to vindicate 
was established in Roman law, developed in Roman-Dutch and German law and 
received into the South African legal system. Chapter two indicates that the conceptual 
understanding of vindication in ancient Roman times can be linked to natural and 
moral legal thinking about the function of the law. The idea that a person could be 
restored of that which had been taken from her without consent can be ascribed to the 
pre-classical natural and moral legal philosophical notions that nature is impregnated 
with a rational order that provides men with a clear idea of that which is right and that 
which is wrong. An action to restore lost possession was therefore a form of restoring 
the rational order. Accordingly, the rationale behind the existence of the right to 
vindicate in ancient Roman times was found in the theory of ancient natural and moral 
philosophical doctrine. The vindicatio action in Roman law was regarded to have a 
fundamental function in honouring the rational order and was therefore subject to a 
strict and precise formula.2  
In Roman-Dutch law the underlying rationale of vindication, as it was received from 
Roman law, was further developed in light of the focus on and development of the 
concept of ownership. The scholar Bartolus de Saxeforato provided the first formal 
definition of ownership. This was the description of ownership that was received into 
Roman-Dutch law. The Roman-Dutch scholar Grotius on the basis of Bartolus’ 
definition succeeded in providing a distinction between ownership and other property 
rights. Grotius distinguished between ownership and other rights in property by 
                                                          
2 See chapter 2, section 2.2.2.1 above. 
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emphasising the completeness of the former and the limited nature of the latter 
pertaining to entitlements. This focus on the complete and limited nature of the 
entitlements brought about by Grotius and the pandectists respectively, was 
influenced by a developed form of natural and moral legal philosophical doctrine due 
to the fact that Grotius was an avid natural and moral legal theorist. This occurrence 
marked the start of viewing ownership as the apex right in property. Presumably this 
meant that the primary remedy available to an owner to vindicate her property had to 
entrench this apex status of ownership and the hierarchical relationship its status 
brought about. Furthermore, the German pandectists during the French revolution 
bolstered this apex status of ownership by ascribing to ownership an individualistic 
and abstract character. This was aimed at making ownership an absolute and 
unlimited right in order to secure economic liberty after the French revolution. 
Accordingly, a lot of emphasis was placed on the owner’s strong and absolute 
entitlements over her property.3 
The rhetoric of ownership that signified the most absolute power a person can have 
with regard to her property inevitably ascribed to its primary remedy the rei vindicatio 
a similar rhetoric. The right to exclude forms the basis of the owner’s rei vindicatio. 
The strong nature of the owner’s right to exclude was received into South African law 
and applied accordingly. The decisions of Chetty, Jeena, and Webb are evidence of 
how South African courts applied a strong version of the rei vindicatio by entrenching 
in each case the individuality, abstract and complete characteristics of ownership. 
Therefore, the underlying rationale of the rei vindicatio remedy relates directly to a 
strong right to exclude, with the focus being on the owner and the protection of her 
rights against weaker rights. Accordingly, the understanding that ownership is the apex 
right, together with the understanding that the rei vindicatio’s application must 
complement this apex right as its primary remedy, constituted the ratio of courts when 
they applied the rei vindicatio.4 
This underlying belief about the status and strength of ownership was regarded as the 
“normal state of affairs”. In line with Van der Walt’s normality assumption, one can 
argue that the acceptance of completeness, individuality and abstractness of 
                                                          
3 See chapter 2, section 2.2.2.2 above. 
4 See chapter 2, section 2.2.3 above. 
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ownership, together with the strong version of exclusion through the strict application 
of the rei vindicatio led to the pre-constitutional acceptance by South African courts 
(and society) of the idea that the normal state of affairs entails the situation where the 
owner of immovable property will always be in occupation of her property, unless the 
owner consents to a temporary “abnormal state”.5 In other words, the hierarchical 
relationship between ownership, limited real rights, personal rights and no rights not 
only informed the rules, requirements and principles of the rei vindicatio, but also 
informed the courts’ rhetorical and logical assumptions and beliefs underlying the 
application of the remedy. This particular rhetoric, logical assumptions and beliefs of 
the apex status of ownership and the strong power an owner has to vindicate her 
property caused the courts to apply the rei vindicatio remedy in a conservative manner. 
Ultimately, this conservative approach meant that courts upheld and entrenched the 
underlying assumptions of ownership by fiercely defending ownership and its corollary 
entitlement to exclude when the rei vindicatio was applied.6 
Furthermore, chapter two also shows that statutory eviction remedies in the pre-
constitutional era, were applied with the same conceptual understanding as the 
common law rei vindicatio. This conceptual understanding attributed completeness, 
individuality and abstractness to ownership and created the basis for a strong right to 
vindicate property from unlawful occupiers. This was the case even though the pre-
constitutional statutory eviction remedies were primarily employed to segregate South 
Africans according to racial classifications.7 Also, in this context a conservative attitude 
was exhibited by courts in their approach to statutory eviction provisions. This was 
evident in that the courts also applied a hierarchical and mechanical approach to 
eviction disputes adjudicated in terms of eviction legislation.8  
The second aspect of legal culture, namely the attitude of courts towards eviction 
remedies as informed by (a) the interpretive function of courts and (b) the standard 
practices and rules that applied to their presiding role, is explored and explained in the 
second part of chapter two. The analysis of the courts’ interpretive function brought to 
                                                          
5 See chapter 2, section 2.2.3 above. 
6 See chapter 2, section 2.2.3 above. 
7 See chapter 2, section 2.2.2 above. 
8 See chapter 2, section 2.3.2 above. 
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light that courts in the pre-constitutional era were guided by positivism in their 
interpretation of both the common law rei vindicatio and statutory eviction remedies. 
Judicial positivism led to the elevation of one of the cannons of interpretation above 
all the other. This elevated cannon of interpretation is the intention of the legislator 
interpretive rule in statutory interpretation. As a result, the meaning ascribed to the 
statutory eviction provisions as found in the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 
1951 (“PISA”) was primarily a reflection of the legislator’s intention and was 
accordingly applied mostly in a mechanical manner in order to give effect to such 
intention. Furthermore, the application of the common law eviction remedy (the rei 
vindicatio) also showed the same preference to finding the original application of the 
remedy and applying it in the same way as it was applied in terms of South African 
and Roman-Dutch precedent. Interestingly, common law interpretation rules were less 
strict than the statutory interpretation rules in that courts were allowed to ascribe 
interpretations to common law principles that would ensure fair judgments. However, 
case law in chapter two indicates that even despite the relatively wide judicial 
discretion in this regard, courts chose not to interpret the requirements of the rei 
vindicatio in a manner that might require consideration of factors other than 
established rights. Therefore, despite the fact that courts may have had a more 
creative interpretive function in these instances, they in fact limited the rei vindicatio to 
the requirements of the remedy and took no further considerations into account.9 
Interestingly, the case law makes it possible to argue that courts might not have found 
it necessary to invoke their creative interpretive power because they deemed an 
outcome where the owner’s entitlement to exclude was given effect to as fair and 
just.10 
The analysis in chapter two of the standard practices and rules that applied to the 
presiding role of courts showed that the South African courts were subject to the rules 
of the adversarial court system. Case law indicated that the adversarial court system 
ensured that the role of courts in eviction cases remained a limited and passive one. 
This is because the adversarial system expressly required the court not to become 
involved in the proceedings.11 Accordingly, the institution of ownership, based on the 
                                                          
9 See chapter 2, section 2.4.2 above. 
10 See chapter 2, section 2.4.2 above. 
11 See chapter 2, section 2.4.3 above. 
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natural legal and moral philosophical notions of completeness, individuality and 
abstractness, together with the courts’ jurisprudential guide that was informed and 
directed by positive legal philosophy and the adversarial system, caused the courts to 
apply eviction remedies in a conservative, formalistic and passive manner in the pre-
constitutional era.12 
 
5 2 2 The courts’ approach to eviction remedies in the constitutional context 
Chapter three revealed that the aftermath of apartheid necessitated a new approach 
to eviction and resettlement. Section 26(3) of the final Constitution established and 
entrenched a commitment to rectifying the injustices of the past by making evictions 
subject to constitutional scrutiny. Furthermore, parliament enacted PIE to give effect 
to section 26(3). PIE was promulgated to change the eviction landscape, and in so 
doing, it has replaced both the common law rei vindicatio and PISA in the context of 
the regulation of unlawful occupation. PIE forms part of a broader legislative scheme 
aimed at giving effect to section 26(3) of the Constitution.13 As a result, it is confined 
to the regulation of unlawful occupation from what the unlawful occupier regards as 
her home. Interestingly, the chapter also revealed that PIE sets out to give effect to 
section 25(1) of the Constitution which provides that “no one may be deprived of 
property except in terms of a law of general application, and no law may permit 
arbitrary deprivation of property”. Evidently, PIE aims to promote two opposing rights, 
which in the context of evictions, are also conflicting.14 
It is in light of these developments that the courts’ approach to eviction remedies 
becomes of utmost importance. Chapter three set out to investigate in wide terms the 
constitutional standard required to inform the approach of the court in PIE eviction 
cases. It explores: (a) the conceptual understanding of PIE that must underpin the 
courts’ application of PIE; and (b) the attitude with which courts are required to 
approach eviction remedies in light of the rules pertaining to interpretation and the role 
of the court in eviction cases in the constitutional era. 
                                                          
12 See chapter 2, section 2.4.3 above. 
13 See chapter 3, section 3.2.2 above. 
14 See chapter 3, section 3.2.2 above. 
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The chapter indicates that PE Municipality provided courts with a framework aimed at 
shaping the courts’ understanding of property rights in light of section 26(3) of the 
Constitution.15 In this regard, PE Municipality showed that courts have to understand 
eviction disputes within their historical and constitutional context. The chapter showed 
that ubuntu as a philosophical approach has a major role to play in how courts should 
understand PIE and its aims within this historical and constitutional context. Ubuntu 
should inform the way in which courts mediate the constitutional conflict between 
section 25(1) and section 26(3) of the Constitution. The discussion of ubuntu in the 
chapter revealed that ubuntu is much more than an interpretive aid in the context of 
PIE. Rather, it should also dictate which values must be considered in the balancing 
of the opposing interests and inform the particulars of the order made by the court. 
The chapter further indicated that a context-sensitive approach to the adjudication of 
eviction cases is a necessary corollary for the values of ubuntu to be present in the 
way courts apply PIE.16 
Furthermore, the procedural and substantive requirements an owner has to satisfy in 
order to obtain an eviction order have changed dramatically in the context of the 
eviction of unlawful occupiers. Chapter three investigates the shift from action 
proceedings to application proceedings. An analysis of case law pertaining to the 
requirements for locus standi, unlawfulness, the service of documents and joinder of 
interested parties showed that courts are called upon, even when they deal with 
threshold issues like the service of the notice of motion and joinder questions, to follow 
a context-sensitive approach to achieve the aims of PIE.17 The section on the 
substantive requirements of PIE also indicates that courts have to apply the 
substantive requirements of PIE with the same context-sensitive approach as inspired 
by the values of ubuntu as illustrated in the landmark decision, PE Municipality. This 
context-sensitive approach is followed by balancing the opposing relevant factors after 
ascribing to each particular factor its appropriate weight in light of all other relevant 
factors.18 Accordingly, PIE is primarily aimed at providing context-sensitive and 
                                                          
15 See chapter 3, section 3.2.2 above. 
16 See chapter 3, section 3.2.3 above. 
17 See chapter 3, section 3.2.3 above. 
18 See chapter 3, section 3.2.3 above. 
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balanced outcomes (with regard to procedural and substantive matters) in each 
individual and unique unlawful occupation eviction case.  
Chapter three showed that courts must embrace the new meaning of eviction of 
unlawful occupiers in light of the new measures set in place to regulate these 
situations. A new conceptual understanding underpins eviction. This conceptual 
understanding is led by the philosophy of ubuntu in terms of which human dignity and 
human-interdependence are brought to life when the courts see eviction disputes as 
completely dependent on the circumstances of the case with justice and equity as end 
goals for all parties involved. However, an analysis of case law pertaining to the “just 
and equitable” requirement in PIE showed that especially some lower courts are still 
failing to approach and apply PIE as mandated in that they fail to sufficiently employ a 
context-sensitive approach.19 
The second part of chapter three showed that both the interpretive function and the 
role of courts in eviction cases changed dramatically in the constitutional era. In terms 
of the interpretive function it became apparent that the dominant traditional cannon of 
statutory interpretation, namely the literalist-cum-intentionalist approach, is 
predominantly applied as a starting point for the interpretation of concepts related to 
PIE. However, interpretation in the constitutional context also requires that 
constitutional guidelines must be followed, especially when statutes that were 
promulgated to give effect to constitutional rights are interpreted. In this regard, case 
law has indicated that the historical context and constitutional context are the primary 
constitutional guidelines that should inform interpretation. As a result, courts are now 
mandated to combine the pre-constitutional cannon for statutory interpretation with 
constitutional guidelines when they seek to ascribe meaning to the provisions of PIE. 
Accordingly, the interpretive function of courts in the constitutional era is also subject 
to contextual factors in that the historical and constitutional contexts must guide the 
interpretation exercise of courts.20 
Finally, the chapter highlighted that the constitutional era has also changed the courts’ 
prescribed role in eviction cases. The court in PE Municipality established this new 
role of courts. From its dictum it becomes evident that two major features of the 
                                                          
19 See chapter 3, section 3.3.3.2 above. 
20 See chapter 3, section 3.3.1 above. 
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prescribed role of courts in eviction cases have changed. In the first place the function 
of courts has changed. The function of courts in terms of PIE is to embody a balance 
between unlawful occupation and unlawful eviction by establishing an appropriate 
relationship between sections 25(1) and 26(3) of the Constitution. Furthermore, courts 
are provided with express guidelines in this regard, namely to employ a context-
sensitive approach and balance competing interests in light of the aims of PIE. In the 
second place, the end goal of evictions has changed. Justice and equity are what 
courts have to work towards in eviction cases. The Constitutional Court in both PE 
Municipality and Pitje showed that courts are vested with wide powers to ensure that 
this end goal is achieved. These wide powers enable courts to go beyond the 
pleadings of the parties, devise innovative ways to procure all relevant circumstances, 
require joinder, mediation and postponements mero moto.21 Accordingly, it seems as 
though section 26(3) and PIE require that courts deviate from standard procedural 
practices to take up a more proactive and managerial role in PIE eviction cases. 
 
5 2 3 A critical analysis of the impact of the Constitution on eviction remedies 
Chapter four critically analyses the changes brought about by section 26(3) of the 
Constitution and PIE to the regulation of the eviction of unlawful occupiers. The 
chapter revealed that the manner in which courts apply eviction remedies on a 
theoretical level has shifted from formalistic, mechanical, conservative and uninvolved 
to context-sensitive, transformative, proactive and involved.22 Interestingly, an 
analysis of the courts’ common law equitable powers indicated the true extent of this 
purported transformation. Not only has the mandate on courts in this context shifted 
from the mechanical application of rules to the exercise of a just and equitable 
discretion, this new discretion and the general role of courts in eviction cases are 
completely different from traditional private law adjudication methods. The just and 
equitable standard in PIE cannot be compared to the equity principle that informs 
private law doctrine in those instances where courts are called upon to exercise an 
equitable discretion.23 In this regard, chapter four revealed that section 26(3) and PIE 
                                                          
21 See chapter 3, section 3.3.2 above. 
22 See chapter 4, section 4.3.1.3 above. 
23 See chapter 4 section 4.3.1 above. 
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require more than what equity in the private law sense has to offer. In this regard, 
courts are required to approach and apply PIE within a human rights paradigm.24 
As expected, an analysis of case law indicated that courts sometimes fail to apply PIE 
within this human rights paradigm. The cases identified showed that where courts fail 
to apply PIE with an approach that is sensitive to the context, they also fail to apply 
PIE within the human rights paradigm. A further analysis of the courts’ approach in 
these identified cases showed that particularly lower courts struggle to apply PIE with 
the necessary context-sensitivity. These failures on the part of the lower courts 
showed tendencies towards the pre-constitutional way of thinking and legal culture as 
identified in chapter two. Accordingly, some courts are still applying the transformative 
eviction measure PIE outside of the human rights paradigm with continued pre-
constitutional deep-level assumptions and practices that result in conservative, 
formalistic and hierarchical adjudication.25 These pre-constitutional tendencies in the 
constitutional era in the context of evictions has the effect of frustrating the objectives 
of the above identified transformation in eviction law. It goes without saying that the 
unlawful occupiers’ constitutional rights as entrenched in section 26(3) are not 
adequately protected when courts deviate from the mandated way in which they 
should apply PIE. However, chapter four illustrated that where courts approach and 
apply PIE with these pre-constitutional tendencies it is not only unlawful occupiers’ 
constitutional rights that might suffer. Interestingly, the analysis in chapter four showed 
where courts fail to apply PIE within a human rights paradigm and subsequently either 
make a (a) suspensive eviction order or alternatively (b) refuse to grant an eviction 
order, a landowner, as a consequence, may suffer an arbitrary deprivation of her right 
to evict in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution.26 
The critical analysis undertaken in chapter four was useful because it showed that the 
courts’ approach to eviction remedies has perhaps not undergone such an holistic 
transformation on a practical level. This is due to the presence of very rich pre-
constitutional legal culture that still dominates the approach of courts. It has also 
indicated that where courts adjudicate eviction cases with pre-constitutional legal 
                                                          
24 See chapter 4 section 4.3.2 above. 
25 See chapter 4 section 4.3.3 above. 
26 See chapter 4 section 4.3.4 above. 
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culture, their failure in this regard may as a consequence in some instances impact on 
landowners’ constitutional property rights. Although the constitutional property law 
enquiry was not the primary focus of the study, it was interesting to identify it as a 
possible consequence of the way courts approach eviction in the new constitutional 
dispensation. These findings are of utmost importance when considering how such a 
flawed approach can be remedied. 
 
5 3 Concluding remarks 
Overall, the critical analysis of the courts’ approach to eviction remedies in the pre-
constitutional and constitutional contexts has shown that section 26(3) of the 
Constitution and PIE have on a theoretical level transformed the eviction landscape. 
In other words, the broader purposes of PIE have proven to go beyond private law 
doctrine and thinking. However, some courts, especially the lower courts, are still 
failing to apply PIE as mandated due to pre-constitutional deep-level assumptions of 
the strength of the landowner’s right to evict, combined with procedural practices that 
form part of their pre-constitutional legal culture.27 
The findings of this thesis show that the eviction remedy in PIE will never achieve its 
transformative aim of considering both the rights of the owner and the unlawful 
occupier where the courts are failing to apply the Act as required. The study also 
indicates that the courts’ role is pivotal because when courts’ duties and 
responsibilities are not performed with the necessary due diligence, caution and 
seriousness this could lead to serious infringements of constitutional rights of not only 
unlawful occupiers but also landowners. Courts must take their mandate seriously and 
be aware of the possibility of pre-constitutional legal culture dominating the way 
evictions are decided in the constitutional era. The danger of such a flawed approach 
to evictions is clear: the constitutional rights of both landowners and unlawful occupiers 
may be compromised if decisions in this regard are based on hierarchies and 
mechanical application of requirements. The awareness of the pre-constitutional 
tendencies may lead to our current presiding officers making more of an effort to 
ensure that they apply PIE within the requisite human rights paradigm so as to ensure 
                                                          
27 See chapter 4, section 4.3.4.3 above. 
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that the institution that is meant to uphold and protect constitutional rights is not the 
one that is in actual fact infringing those rights. 
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